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ABSTRACT
THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG HFACS LEVELS AND ANALYSIS OF HUMAN 
FACTORS IN UNMANNED AND MANNED AIR VEHICLES
Veysel Yesilbas 
Old Dominion University, 2014 
Director: Dr. T. Steven Cotter
This dissertation analyzes the structural relationships among the Human Factors 
Accident Classification System levels for unmanned air vehicle and manned air vehicle 
accidents and the common relationships between unmanned air vehicle and manned air 
vehicle accident causes. The study acquired DOD HFACS accident classification data 
from 347 United States Air Force Class A accident reports for the years between 2000 
and 2013.
The dissertation utilized a set o f analysis that is considered to contribute 
substantially to the respective domain of the study. The correlations found among 
categorical levels were applied to HFACS taxonomy based on the Reason Model via path 
analysis -  structural equation modeling. The study concluded the presence of statistically 
significant paths at both UAV and MAV accidents and common partial paths of those 
aircraft types within the framework of DOD HFACS taxonomy. The study also suggests 
that accident data can be utilized to test and improve the failure model o f an organization 
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C H APTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Accident investigation and evaluation has been an important part o f military and 
commercial aviation since its beginning. Investigators and researchers seek to understand 
the root causes leading to accidents, exploit the reasons behind root causes, and improve 
flight safety by presenting safety recommendations that can be used by other researchers, 
educators, managers of airline or military organizations, and aircraft manufacturers.
Among aviation accident investigation tools, the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) has been used by the United States Department o f 
Defense (DOD) since 2005 as well as by commercial aviation sectors and countries 
worldwide. The taxonomy of HFACS has been used not only in aviation domain but also 
studied for its application to accident investigation in different sectors such as maritime 
shipping, mining, and commercial traffic. While the need for humans in operating 
environment is decreasing, the expectation for human performance quality in aviation and 
industrial sectors is increasing.
This research applies a quantitative ex post facto  approach to test the relationship 
among the HFACS taxonomy levels using data from 347 United States Air Force 
Accident Investigation Board (AIB) summaries and reports between the fiscal years o f 
2000 and 2013. This research analyzes the structure of causal paths among HFACS levels 
by applying the structural equation modeling (SEM) methodology and then compares the 
common significant paths between unmanned and manned air vehicle accident causes by 
applying path analysis for unmanned and manned accidents.
The views expressed in this dissertation are those o f  the author and do not reflect the official policy or 
position o f  the United States Armed Forces, Department o f  Defense, or Government or those o f  any other 
NATO nations and their Armed Forces.
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1.1 Background of the Study *
Based on James Reason’s (1990) “Swiss Cheese” model o f accident causation, the 
HFACS was designed to define the “holes in the Swiss Cheese” and to facilitate the 
application of Reason’s model to accident investigation and analysis (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). The taxonomy of the HFACS has been used by the United States (US) 
Department of Defense (DOD) throughout its services with slight changes made through 
the levels and sublevels. The structure o f HFACS levels and the causes of unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV) accidents have not been studied in the way o f comparison with 
manned air vehicles (MAV) accidents. In other words, the structure o f HFACS levels and 
the relationship of human factors between UAV and MAV accidents has not been 
thoroughly evaluated using empirical multiple regression causal models.
1.2 Statement o f the Problem
The rapid rise in UAV employment (Department o f Defense, 2011) has been 
accompanied by increased attention to their high accident rates which are greater than 
MAV (Menda et al., 2011). Such high rates had negative implications for UAV 
affordability and mission effectiveness. According to a study conducted by the US Air 
Force, human causal factors are 68 % o f all UAV accidents in the US Armed Forces. As 
aircrafts and systems become more reliable and steadfast with the help o f technological 
developments, human factors in aviation accidents comes to the forefront as a vital point 
in terms of human life and enormous cost. Being used in the military aviation and studied 
widely in the literature, the utility, validity, and reliability o f HFACS has also been 
assessed to gain a better usage and understanding of human factors in accidents. As these
assessments and studies help to improve the validity o f accident causation systems, 
further evaluation studies from different perspectives are needed to contribute to HFACS. 
Although being sufficient as a reporting and investigation tool, HFACS needs to be tested 
and evaluated for significant common causal paths among its levels and for correlation of 
common causal paths between unmanned and manned air vehicle accident causes.
1.3 Purpose o f the Study
The purpose of this study is to analyze the structural relationships o f accident 
causes among HFACS levels in comparable UAV and MAV and to analyze the common 
paths between UAV and MAV accident causes.
1.4 Significance o f the Study
Given the inherent risks, economic impacts, and potential negative consequences 
associated with deficiencies in support personnel and pilot skills, decisions, judgments, 
and perception errors, decreasing accident rates is crucial to military and commercial 
aviation and industrial organizations, which all suffer from budget constraints. In order to 
mitigate the potential for aviation accidents, it is important to ensure that accidents are 
investigated and evaluated in an appropriate methodology and taxonomy so as to 
understand the causes for individual and all cases as well. This understanding requires 
testing of HFACS taxonomy that is used widely in both aviation and other sectors. As 
O'Connor, Walliser, and Philips (2010) recommend, organizations must evaluate the 
reliability and validity of mishap coding systems, as applied by the proposed end-users, 
prior to the widespread adoption of a system. Therefore it is imperative to have a tested 
and evaluated taxonomy or analyses system by a variety o f perspectives so as to augment
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the external and internal validity. In that context, evaluation of the HFACS itself, used 
by all DOD services, is vital since it constitutes a basis from which to understand, 
intervene, and take necessary precautions throughout the organizations. This study’s 
analysis o f causal paths within the structure of HFACS can be regarded as contributing to 
the evaluation of external validity o f the system.
1.5 Research Contributions
The taxonomy o f HFACS is tested for significant paths among HFACS levels 
through structural equation modeling within the context o f two different aircraft type, 
UAV and MAV. The contribution to Reason’s (1990) model and Wiegmann and 
Shappell (2003), HFACS is that the study analyzed the structure o f realized HFACS 
levels. This methodology also tested for significant covariance of accident causes 
between UAVs and MAVs in terms of human factors. Similar analyses can be used in 
other areas that have critical effect o f human factors such as mining, shipping, or other 
type of industries.
The methodology that set forth the path(s) among HFACS levels and sublevels 
can be applied to other domains and organizations that use HFACS taxonomy by the 
mean of analyzing the secondhand accident investigation reports.
1.6 Delimitations
The most important reason that formed the delimitations of the study was the 
available data. The accident reports of UAVs and MAVs analyzed in this study were 
limited to ones used in the United States Air Force. The intended testing o f accident 
causation system was the DOD HFACS since most o f the reports are evaluated with this
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model. The accidents examined were only the Class-A accidents o f US Air Force UAVs 
and MAVs, and the time frame covered the fiscal years from 2000 to 2013. The accident 
reports that did not find any human factors as the accident cause and accident reports for 
which root causes were not determined were excluded. The study also classified the 
accident reports and the aircrafts according to their use of concept rather than a variety of 
aircraft; UAV and MAV. No latent variable such as mission type, accident phase, was 
included in the study. The base version of DOD HFACS published in 2005 was used to 
assess and classify the accident causes o f the summarized reports. Even though there 
were different types of unmanned and manned aircrafts, the reports were classified within 
the context of unmanned and manned aircrafts.
1.7 Definitions of Key Terms
UAV - Unmanned Air Vehicle.
MAV - Manned Air Vehicle
UAV/MAV Mission is a period including taxi to runway, take-off, flight, landing, and 
taxi back for a specific purpose.
Class A Accidents are the accidents that result in fatality or total permanent disability, 
loss of an aircraft, or property damage of $2 million or more (USAF Accident 
Investigation Boards, 2012).
6
CH APTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Reviewing the literature helps to understand the theoretical basis for and the 
background o f the study and also assists in establishing the scope o f the study. The 
literature review for this study is organized in two major sections and four sub-sections 
that helps to analyze the structure o f HFACS levels and the relationship between UAV 
and MAV accident causes. The first part constitutes the ground for HFACS that is human 
factors in aviation, accident causation taxonomies and the Reason (1990) model. The 
second part consists of review of previous studies, which are HFACS adaptation to 
various areas, exploratory studies o f HFACS, and testing/evaluation studies of HFACS.
2.1 Human Factors and Accident Causation in Aviation
The new era of technology and operation environment has led to aviation 
development o f various types o f air vehicles for a variety o f purposes. The mounting 
interest for aviation is a direct result o f their tested and proven capabilities in many fields. 
These developments, caused by many effects, have brought out substantial issues that are 
related to human factors. In aviation, human factors play an important role, because 
human factor effects are vital to protecting human life and minimizing organizations’ 
expenditures. As aircrafts become more reliable with the help of technological 
developments, human factors in aviation accidents come to the forefront as a vital point.
Human factors are steadily seen as a major cause o f manned aircraft accidents. 
According to Wiegmann and Shappell (2003), the percentage of accidents that implicate 
human error ranges from 70% to 80%. In addition, the percentage o f accidents related to 
human error has increased relative to those attributable to equipment failures over the
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past 40 years (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Rash, LeDuc, and Manning (2006) 
advocate that knowledge of human-related factors is necessary for the successful 
formulation of countermeasures to prevent these types o f accidents, and such 
understanding can be achieved by the application of accident analysis techniques to 
existing accident databases.
There have been many studies toward the development of accident causation 
models and frameworks due to the desire for decreasing human errors in aviation 
accidents that result in fatalities and cost a great amount of resources in terms of 
investigation time, loss o f aircraft assets, and litigation. According to Senders and Moray 
(1991), the aviation sector had witnessed a proliferation of human error frameworks 
twenty years ago. This proliferation during 1990s resulted from the overall accident rate 
declining over the last half century, but reductions in human error-related accidents have 
not kept pace with reductions in accidents related to mechanical and environmental 
factors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). A study by Wiegmann, Rich, and Shappell (2000) 
summarizes more than 100 research and technical articles that either directly presents a 
specific human error or accident analysis system or use error frameworks in analyzing 
human performance data within a specific context or task.
2.2 Reason’s Accident Causation Model and the HFACS
Reason’s (1990) Accident Causation Model is a theoretical model that aims to 
explain how accidents occur in organizations and among its levels. The main assumption 
of the theory is that accidents occur in such a way that the causes have relationships with 
other levels o f the organization. A second assumption of the model is that the 
components o f organizations need or are obliged to function together at least to prevent
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accidents. From these assumptions, Reason theorizes that most accidents can be traced to 
active and latent human failures that result from prior latent human failures at higher 
organizational levels. Combinations o f latent errors pose the greatest threat to safety o f a 
complex system.
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Figure 1. Reason’s (1990) Model
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), originally 
adapted from Reason’s (1990) model to military aviation by Wiegmann and Shappell 
(2003), identifies four levels within an organization at which latent and active human 
errors can occur: Organizational Influences, Unsafe Supervision, Preconditions for 
Unsafe Acts, and Unsafe Acts. Among other aviation accident investigation tools, 
HFACS has been used by the U.S. Department o f Defense since 2005 with some changes 
especially at the levels of Preconditions for Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Acts. The taxonomy 
of HFACS has been studied not only in the aviation domain but also in a variety of
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sectors such as maritime shipping, mining, and traffic accidents. Furthermore, HFACS 
has been studied in many countries such as India (Gaur, 2005), China (Li & Harris,
2006), and Australia (Olsen & Shorrock, 2010). Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the four layers 

















Figure 2. The “Swiss Cheese” Model o f Human Error Causation (Reason, 1990) 
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Figure 3. DOD HFACS Model (2005) Adapted from HFACS. 
(Each o f the boxes breakdown to respected nanocodes o f human error)
The taxonomy used in the reports o f this study was the United States Department 
of Defense DOD HFACS (DOD, 2005). The DOD HFACS is an adapted version of the 
HFACS with changes at the levels of Preconditions and Unsafe Acts. The U.S. 
Department o f Defense started using the DOD HFACS by a memorandum in 2005
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among its services. Figure 4 illustrates a comparison o f the original HFACS and the 
DOD HFACS levels.
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Figure 4. Schematic comparison of HFACS (Shappell & W iegmann, 2000) and
DOD HFACS (DOD, 2005)
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2.3 Previous Studies
Numerous studies of the HFACS can be found in the literature. It is possible to 
cluster these studies in order to see the big picture and locate this study into the 
appropriate cluster: (1) HFACS application and adaptation to various areas, (2) 
exploratory studies o f HFACS, and (3) evaluation and testing of the HFACS. This study 
is aimed to contribute to the last two clusters. Most of the literature regarding HFACS 
consists of exploratory analysis aiming to exploit human factors in aviation. Testing or 
evaluation studies o f HFACS are the least found in the literature.
2.3.1 HFACS Application and Adaptation to Various Areas
Although HFACS is being used mainly by aviation organizations and especially 
by military domain, it has been also used for a variety o f areas such as human error in 
maintenance (Krulak, 2004), shipping (Celik & Cebi, 2009), motor vehicle accidents 
(Iden, 2012), and mining (Lenne, Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 2012). This wide usage and 
adaptation of the HFACS concludes that humans persist as the critical element or factor 
to safety, although the technology has been improving in an accelerated manner.
An investigation of human error in shipping accidents by Celik and Cebi (2009) is 
an example of HFACS adaptation to different sectors other than aviation. Celik and Cebi 
generated an analytical HFACS based on Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) in 
order to identify the role o f human factors in shipping accidents. This study furthers 
HFACS by using a decision making process, FAHP, to quantify human contributions to 
shipping accidents.
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Among the adaptations o f  HFACS to mining, Lenne, et al. (2012) aimed to 
provide an analysis o f the systematic factors involved in mining accidents and to examine 
organizational and supervisory failures that are predictive o f  sub-standard performance at 
the operator level. The main finding in this study was to direct few critical categories at 
the higher levels.
Another HFACS application to a different area is the analysis o f motor vehicle 
crashes in the U.S. Military. Iden (2012) aimed to provide a greater understanding of the 
causal factors associated with serious and fatal off-duty personnel motor vehicle crashes 
for military service members with the goal o f preventing future losses. This study used 
archival narratives from Class A and Class B off duty motor vehicle crashes in the United 
States Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.
2.3.2 Exploratory Studies o f HFACS in Aviation
Many studies seek to gain knowledge of accident causation in organizations by 
analyzing historical or second hand data. Even though many studies analyze the accidents 
of services within the U.S. Department of Defense, there are also many studies that 
analyze accident causes within general aviation from different countries.
In a study o f HFACS applied to “Civil Aircraft Accidents in India,” (Gaur, 2005) 
evaluated 48 accident reports that occurred between 1990 and 1999. While the aim was to 
identify the causal factors, the classification was based from the reports by the author and 
independent assessor. The study found that one or more human factors contributed to 37 
of the 48 accidents.
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In another example of a HFACS study, Li and Harris (2006) analyzed 523 
accident reports in the Republic o f China (ROC) Air Force between 1978 and 2002. They 
sought to quantify the relationship between the levels and components in the HFACS 
taxonomy. The study described the common paths between categories at four levels in the 
HFACS and suggested that active failures were promoted by latent conditions in the 
organization. The main focus o f the study was to determine any pathway throughout the 
accidents in terms o f HFACS rather than testing the structure.
The study “Human Factors in Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations” by 
Tvaryanas, Thompson, and Constable (2006) analyzed 221 remotely piloted aircraft 
mishaps within the U.S military services over 10 years. In reviewing the reports and 
coding human factors using the DOD HFACS, they sought to analyze the distribution and 
determinants o f operator errors. Suggesting that latent failures at the organizational level 
were most common and were associated with operator error and mechanical failures, the 
results revealed that 60.2% of mishaps involved operation-related human casual factors.
Another study by Tvaryanas and Thompson (2008) identified recurrent pathways 
within an accident database using the HFACS. They used exploratory principal 
component analysis to assess the structure within the set o f crew member-related mishaps 
for the MQ-1 Predator remotely piloted aircraft. A total o f 95 mishap reports for the 
period October 1996 to September 2005 were reviewed and 433 causal human factors 
were identified for further analysis. Using exploratory factor analysis, the mishap dataset 
was reduced to eight factors while still accounting for 72% o f the variance in the original 
dataset. The authors found that “ ...perception and skill-based error pathways shared 
common latent failures and collectively were responsible for the majority o f crewmember
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related mishaps. Common latent failures were observed in HFACS categories of 
resource/acquisitions management, organizational processes, and technological 
environment” (pp. 528-529). This study, by presenting the linkages between active and 
latent failures and associated probabilities, demonstrated an example o f structural 
approach for a greater understanding o f a mishap database. The study suggested that 
mathematically linking human performance failures to systemic factors furthers the 
descriptive approach to a more structural approach. The majority o f accidents were 
caused by latent failures involving organizational factors and technological environment.
O'Connor, Cowan, and Alton (2010), examined the results o f two different 
methods, identifying human factors safety concerns in U.S. Naval Aviation. The first 
method was the analysis o f 47 F/A-18 and 16 H-60 mishaps using DOD HFACS 
taxonomy. The second method was an analysis o f the responses o f 68 squadrons to a 
survey regarding the human factor issues that were considered as the most important 
concern. The study revealed that the concerns o f the squadrons and the results o f the 
DOD HFACS analysis were different. The DOD HFACS nanocodes were not seen as 
major concerns among squadrons. The study recommended that HFACS needed to be 
improved in terms o f findings and interpretation.
2.3.3 Evaluation/Testing of HFACS
As the HFACS is used in a variety of areas, there have been some studies to 
evaluate or test the HFACS taxonomy from different aspects.
O'Connor (2008) evaluated the internal validity, external validity, and utilitarian 
criteria of DOD HFACS by identifying the human factors causes o f two aviation mishap 
scenarios with the help of 123 naval aviators. The main concern of the study was to
16
evaluate the reliability o f the nanocodes that were considered to be causal o f mishaps.
The study concluded that mutual exclusivity, training, and parsimony were required to 
use DOD HFACS effectively.
The studies o f HFACS Evaluation by Trained Raters (O'Connor, et al., 2010) and 
by Simulated Mishap Boards (O'Connor & Walker, 2011) focused on the level of 
agreement on the factors that caused accidents. The studies included a limited number of 
mishaps, one and two respectively, that scrutinized the reliability o f nanocodes. The 
studies found that there were high levels of agreement regarding the factors that did not 
contribute to the accidents while the level o f agreement on the factors that did cause the 
accident as classified using DOD HFACS were low. The former and the latter studies 
found that the level o f agreement on the factors that did cause the incident as classified 
using DOD HFACS were lower than desirable. Agreement o f 50% or greater between 
raters that a particular nanocode was causal was found only a mean o f 22.5% and 14.6% 
of selected nanocodes respectively. The latter study also found that the acceptable levels 
of reliability were only achieved for 56.9% of nanocodes.
Another study by Olsen and Shorrock (2010) evaluated adaptation o f HFACS in 
the Australian Defense Force (ADF) to classify factors that contribute to incidents in the 
context of a particular air traffic control (ATC) unit. According to study the ADF 
adaptation o f HFACS is unreliable for incident analysis at the ATC unit level and may 
therefore be invalid in this context. Thus, the evaluation of HFACS in this study was 
about assessing inter-coder consensus between many coders for incident reports.
Walker, O’Connor, Phillips, Hahn, and Dalitsch (2011) applied lifted rule 
probabilities at the nanocode level within HFACS to identify common linkages within the
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DOD version of HFACS. The study focused on utilizing HFACS as both an accident 
investigation and reporting tool. They established the relationship between identified 
Unsafe Acts and the latent conditions preceding that action by applying Lifted 
Association Rules to a priori probabilities. The authors reported that the most significant 
lift was in Skill-Based Errors Breakdown in Visual Scan to Preconditions Channelized 
Attention. Other significant relationships were between Skill-Based Errors Procedural 
Error to Organizational Process Procedural Guidance/Publications and between Skill- 
Based Errors Over-control/Under-control to Preconditions Restricted Vision. Overall, 
there were seven significant lifts between Unsafe Acts and Preconditions, two significant 
lifts between Unsafe Acts and Supervision, and one significant lift between Unsafe Acts 
and Operational Influences. There were no significant lifts involving all four layers o f the 
HFACS.
2.4 The Gap Analysis
HFACS has been used to analyze accidents especially in aviation. Based on 
Reason’s model o f human error, HFACS (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) is a commonly 
used analytical framework to evaluate the effect o f human factors in aviation accidents. 
There are many studies exploiting human affects in aviation accidents using the HFACS 
taxonomy. Nevertheless, the structural relationships o f accident causes among HFACS 
levels in comparable UAV and MAV accident causes have not been studied. This study 
tested for and modeled significant paths among HFACS levels and sublevels in UAV and 
MAV accidents and evaluated the significant common paths between UAV and MAV 
accident causes.
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A potential contribution of this study was to test the application o f accident 
coding within the structure of the HFACS versus the four levels within an organization in 
which latent and active human errors are hypothesized to occur by Reason’s Accident 
Causation Model (Figures 1 and 2). Evaluation studies o f HFACS have been generally 
based on the level o f agreement on the factors that caused or contributed to accidents. In 
other words, the coding or classification of causes is the focus area that has been 
discussed for in prior testing or evaluation. The structure or the HFACS model as used in 
practice has not been studied. This type of testing may contribute to revision of the 
accident coding practices and procedures or to revision o f the HFACS model itself.
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CH APTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research methodology can be regarded as the style o f establishing connection 
among the literature review and data type. This chapter explains the data source and 
analysis framework for the research. A quantitative ex post facto  approach, analyzing 
U.S. Air Force Accident Investigation Board (AIB) reports between the years o f 2010 
and 2013, are used to test for significant paths within the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) taxonomy and for common significant paths between 
UAV and MAV accident causes.
The data for this study came from United States Air Force Legal Operations 
Agency web site. This database (USAF Accident Investigation Boards, 2012) contained a 
list of Class A aerospace and ground mishaps (or accidents) and their corresponding 
summaries and full narratives from the Accident Investigation Board (AIB) of USAF 
reports between the years of 2000 and 2013. These accidents involved aircraft, remotely 
piloted aircraft, space systems, and missiles. An accident report is listed on this site after 
approval of Accident Investigation Board o f the USAF. Class A accident reports are used 
as they have the most comprehensive information and are prepared with a high level o f 
expertise.
The US Air Force conducts aerospace accident investigations o f all Class A 
accidents involving Air Force aircraft, UAVs, missiles, and space systems or equipment, 
unless they result in damage solely to government property, in which case the accident 
investigation is discretionary (USAF Accident Investigation Boards. 2012). Aerospace 
Accident Investigation Boards (AIBs), which collect, evaluate and release the accident
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data are convened under the authority o f "Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51 -503, Aerospace 
Accident Investigations" (2010) document.
This U.S Air Force legal document includes the data collection arrangements and 
the regulations of report contents as well. The report, arranged by Aerospace Accident 
Investigation Boards and prepared in accordance with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51 - 
503, Aerospace Accident Investigations (2010), includes three main sections: The 
Executive Summary, the Summary of Facts, and the Statement o f Opinion. Appendix A 
includes a AIBs report’s cover, executive summary and outline.
Human Factors Analysis, conducted in the “Summary of Facts” section of the 
AIBs report, discusses human factors that directly relate to the mishap using the DOD 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (DOD HFACS) definitions in AFI 
91-204 Attachment 5 and may include the following: perceived crew or maintainer 
complacency, overconfidence, under-motivation or over-motivation to succeed, 
distraction, disruption, pressure, channelized attention, uncharacteristic mistake, or other 
degradation that may have led to the accident (Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-503, 
Aerospace Accident Investigations, 2010).
The United States Air Force Legal Operations Agency web site database presents 
summary and detailed accident reports based on the investigation findings including 
human factors. The timeframe included 14 fiscal years, 2000-2013, o f  the accident 
reports. The majority of the reports in the database include only the executive summaries 
of the accidents, which may be due to the information being classified and not intended to 
be shared with the public. This study acquired HFACS accident classification data from
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347 reports of which 75 detailed accident reports were available for the years between 
2010 and 2013.
3.1 Establishment and Verification o f Rater Reliability for this Research
Given that 272 o f the accident reports are summaries and require classification by 
the researcher, the issue o f classification reliability had to be addressed. This section sets 
forth the methodology used to establish and verify researcher rater reliability.
The fundamental sampling question to address is the accuracy and repeatability 
with which the rater classifies each of the remaining 272 accident summaries within the 
HFACS system relative to the known classification by the panels o f “experts” in the 75 
detailed accident reports. The first issue addressed was the sampling plan and design. As 
with all attribute classification sampling problems, the researcher had control o f only the 
misclassification difference to detect between any two raters and the sample size 
necessary to achieve a stated 1 -  a  confidence in the difference to detect. The first 
decision criterion for sampling plan selection was whether or not the required 1 -  a  
confidence can be met, or, if not met, how close the resultant confidence approaches the 
required confidence. The second decision criterion is the resultant sampling resolution.
In general, the selected sample size resulted in a tradeoff between confidence in the 
difference to detect and the sampling resolution. For a given sample size, the smaller the 
difference to detect the lower the resultant confidence but the greater the sampling 
resolution as rater reliability approaches 100%.
For this study, rater reliability was established by comparing the researcher’s 
classifications to those of two other expert pilots o f a sample subset o f the 75 detailed
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accident reports with known HFACS accident classifications by panels o f “experts.”
Since the 75 HFACS detailed reports had known classifications, there were no defective 
classifications in the population, and, therefore, the Hyper-geometric sampling 
distribution did not apply. Thus, the binomial sampling distribution, B(«, p)  applied 
under the assumption that a countable large number o f combinations, Cn" , exist for the 
selected sample size n. from the population o f N = 75 detailed accident reports. The 
following methodology was applied to select a sample size sufficient to achieve a stated 1 
-  cr, confidence in the difference to detect between any two raters.
1. Given that the O'Connor, et. al. (2010) study indicated only a 55% agreement 
among raters, it was reasonable to assume in this study that with no prior 
training the researcher and two expert pilots would randomly agree only 50% 
of the time. Thus, p  = 0.50 joint agreement represents the base random 
assignment case. Joint agreement of the researcher and two expert pilots with 
the classifications made by the panels o f “experts” is a matter o f bias 
assessment in attribute agreement analysis and training and retraining was 
included in the design in order to approach or exceed the 55% agreement 
observed by O ’Connor, et. al.
2. Next, a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was set up to assess the tradeoff between 
confidence in the difference to detect and the sampling resolution over a range 
o f sample sizes. (The output of the spreadsheet analysis and description of 
formulas used in set forth in Appendix B.) A summary o f the analysis is 
presented in the following table.
23
Table 1. Summary Analysis Results o f Sample Size Selection Criteria
Sample Size, n = 20 25 30 35 40
LCL(0.5-0.4,0.92) 0.0000 0.0087 0.0254 0.0384 0.0488
LCL(0.5-0.3,0.93) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0167 0.0303 0.0413
LCL(0.5-0.2,0.99) 0.0000 0.0016 0.0276 0.0478 0.0641
LCL(0.5-0.1,0.999) 0.0000 0.0396 0.0710 0.0954 0.1151
Resolution (bins)
p(Misclass) = 0.5 11 14 15 16 17
p(Misclass) = 0.4 11 13 14 15 16
p(Misclass) = 0.3 11 12 13 14 15
p(Misclass) = 0.2 10 10 12 12 14
p(Misclass) = 0.1 7 8 9 9 10
p(Misclass) = 0.05 5 5 6 7 7
Sample sizes in increments of 1 were considered in the range o f n = 20 to n = 40.
• The LCL (0.5 -  p h confidence level) is the lower confidence limit for the 
stated difference in misclassification proportions at the stated confidence 
level = (1 - a).
^  = ( 0 . 5 - A ) - z a J 0 S ( ' - ° ' 5) + A ( 1 ~ A )  (1)
V n n
Selection criterion: LCL > 0 indicating the ability to detect the stated 
difference (p, = 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1, and 0.05) at the indicated confidence 
level.
Resolution (bins) is the number o f misclassification bins with 
P(misclassification = x) > 0.005. For example, for p  = 0.5 and n = 20, 
there were 11 misclassification bins as shown in Table 2.
24
Table 2. Number o f M isclassifications p  = 0.5, n = 20












Based on this analysis, a sample size n = 30 was selected as jointly providing > 90% 
confidence in detecting differences between any two raters from the p  = 0.50 base 
random assignment case to reduced misclassification rates o fp = 0.40, 0.30, 0.20, 0.10, 
and 0.05 respectively and providing intermediate sampling resolution comparable to that 
of larger sample sizes. Allowing for all possible sample combinations o f n = 30 out of 
the population of N = 75 HFACS detailed reports, C4030 = 1-1496 x 1011 assuring that the 
binomial sampling distribution applies.
The sampling design to establish and verify rater reliability was as follows:
1. The sample of n = 30 detailed accident reports were randomly selected from 
the population of N = 75 detailed reports. The remaining 45 detailed reports 
were randomly assigned to two categories: 10 to training and 20 to testing.
2. The researcher and two expert pilots jointly established classification criteria 
from the 10 training detailed accident reports.
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3. The researcher and two expert pilots independently classified accident causes 
from the summaries of the 10 testing accident reports in accordance with the 
established HFACS classification criteria in two randomly ordered replicates.
4. Attribute agreement analysis was conducted on the classifications. If the 
measurement metrics Each Appraiser versus Expert Standard > 50%, All 
Appraisers versus Expert Standard > 50%, and Between Appraiser agreement 
> 50%, the researcher would proceed to Step 5. If  any one o f the 
measurement metrics < 50%, the remaining 45 detailed reports would be 
randomly re-assigned to two categories: 10 to training and 20 to testing. Step 
2 would be repeated updating the joint classification criteria to include new 
information. Step 3 would be repeated on the new set o f 10 testing reports. 
Attribute agreement analysis in this step would be conducted evaluating for all 
measurement metrics > 50%.
5. The researcher and two expert pilots independently classified accident causes 
o f the summaries o f the n = 30 detailed accident reports in accordance with 
the established HFACS classification criteria in two randomly ordered 
replicates. Attribute agreement analysis was conducted evaluating for Each 
Appraiser versus Expert Standard > 50%, All Appraisers versus Expert 
Standard > 50%, and Between Appraiser agreement > 50%. If this set of 
criteria was not met, the process would return to Step 1 and the remaining 45 
detailed reports would be randomly re-assigned to two categories: 10 to 
training and 20 to testing. Steps 1 to 5 were iterated until the set o f criteria
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was met. As this set o f criteria was met, the researcher proceeded to 
classification in Step 6.
6. The researcher classified accident causes o f the remaining 272 summary 
reports in accordance with established HFACS criteria.
7. Upon completion o f the classification, a random sample o f n = 30 was 
selected from the 272 summary reports classified by the researcher. Using the 
established classification criteria, the n — 30 summary reports were submitted 
in random order to the researcher for re-classification. The n = 30 summary 
reports were submitted in random order to the two expert pilots who 
independently classified accident causes in accordance with the established 
HFACS classification criteria in two randomly ordered replicates. Attribute 
agreement analysis was conducted and meeting the set o f  criteria in Step 5 
indicated acceptable classification by the researcher.
3.2 Methodological Design and Rationale for the Design
Apprehending human errors causation path in UAV and MAV accidents can 
reveal important findings to understand the required interventions for UAVs and MAVs. 
However, it is impossible to manipulate human errors in order to investigate their 
potential influence on UAVs for some certain reasons. This study is based on the analysis 
of human errors contribution to accidents in unmanned and manned types o f aircrafts.
The ex-post facto  method was used for the design of the research. In this design, the 
events were the Accidents, Class A Mishap, that had already occurred. These data were 
analyzed for significant paths among HFACS Categorical levels in manned or unmanned 
types o f aircraft by the means of factor analysis and for commonality o f identified
27
significant paths between UAV and MAV accident causes by means of structural 
equation modeling (SEM).
Factor analysis, attempting to find latent variables which cannot be observed 
(Cox, 2005), is a technique for exploring any number o f linearly interrelated variables to 
a reduced number o f unobservable variables. In this study, exploratory factor analysis 
was conducted to identify any potential statistically significant paths o f relationships 
between HFACS categorical levels using the correlation matrix.
Structural equation modeling is a technique that combines factor analysis (the 
measurement model), which relates sets of directly observable variables to underlying 
conceptual (latent) variables, with path analysis o f the relationships among those 
conceptual variables (Harris, 2001). To this end, factor analysis was conducted first to 
exploit the possible paths among the category level of DOD HFACS. Having the factors 
or components, paths were tested for their statistically significant causation.
Path analysis, results from the estimation o f a causal model from correlations, was 
developed by Wright (1934) as a flexible means o f relating the correlation coefficients 
between variables in a model to the functional relations among them for the purpose o f 
examining genetic studies. This subject was followed by the studies o f Turner and 
Stevens, Tukey in the 1950s (Wright, 1960) and many researchers recently. Path analysis, 
one of the applications o f structural equation modeling and known also as causal analysis, 
is an extension of the regression model, used to test the fit o f the correlation of causal 
models. The analysis was grounded on the estimation of the relationships in the 
hypothesized model by the researcher.
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The three rules o f path analysis, known as Wright’s Rules (Loehlin, 2004), are 
based on the idea that if  a situation can be presented as a proper path diagram, then the 
correlation between any two variables in the diagram can be expressed as the sum of the 
compound paths connecting these two points. As in having some rules to be followed, 
path analysis also has some assumptions that should be taken into account cautiously and 
prudently to prevent any misinterpretation of the model and analysis. Given that direct 
effects in a path model were found to be statistically significant, as Kline (1991) states, 
the researcher must be aware o f the fact that global goodness-of-fit indices provide 
limited information about the adequacy of path models: they reflect only the “average” fit 
of a model. He also expresses that a fit index can imply satisfaction even when the 
proportions o f the model clearly do not match sample data. Any proposed model can be 
revised to fit the data by reducing the degrees of freedom. The conditions necessary to 
establish causal relations include time precedence and robust relationship in the presence 
of other variables (Lei & Wu, 2007).
As Everitt and Dunn (1991, p. 304) articulate the myths and realities o f causal 
models and latent variables, they state that even though any convincing, respectable, and 
reasonable a path diagram may appear, any causal inferences extracted are rarely more 
than a form of statistical fantasy as path analysis deals with correlation, not causation of 
variables.
Consequently, a researcher dealing with path analysis must be aware o f fact that 
the numbers neither tell every aspect o f model nor confirms the model hypothesized. An 
investigator needs additional evidences to imply causality in a path analysis. As Kline 
(2011) articulates, among plausible models with equal or near-equal fit, the researcher
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must explain why any one of them may actually be correct. He must directly 
acknowledge the existence of equivalent or near-equivalent models and describe what 
might be done in future research to differentiate between any serious competing models.
As all the causal effects in this study were unidirectional, the models analyzed are 
recursive. According to Kline (2011), the use o f an estimation model other than 
Maximum Likelihood requires explicit justification. As an assumption, the exogenous 
variables, established at first main level of DOD HFACS, were considered to be 
measured without error. There are two options for the analysis o f recursive path models, 
which are multiple regression or estimation with an SEM computer program (Kline,
2011). Maximum likelihood estimation as the default model in AMOS (Analysis of 
Moment Structures) software program was used for SEM analysis of the hypothesized 
path models to obtain the standardized total effects and goodness o f fit statistics.
According to Miller and Salkind (2002) the prospective outcomes o f “natural” 
experiments such as ex-post facto  research design discovers and exposes causal 
relationships under controlled conditions; thus, statements o f greater rigor are made 
possible and increased validity o f social treatments or program is demonstrated.
Tvaryanas and Thompson’s (2008) and Walker, O’Connor, Phillips, Hahn, and 
Dalitsch’s (2011) observations o f no complete paths through the HFACS taxonomy 
corresponding to Reason’s (1990) “Swiss Cheese” model implies that this research 
should test for all possible combinations o f incomplete and complete paths through the 
DOD HFACS taxonomy as shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. All Possible Covariance Paths o f the HFACS Taxonomy
The general mathematical structural equation model for the all possible paths model 
would be:
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P(Acti) = £j=l-3 £k=l-4 11=1-3 (PAP XPj + pAS XS k +
P a o  X o .i +  P As.p X p.j X s.k  +  P a o .p X P j X o .i +  P a o .s X s .k  X o .i +  P a o .ps X P.j X s.k  X o . i )
X M.n = 0,1
£ iP (A ctj)=  1.0, i=  1 - 4  (2)
This research, however, elected to use dummy variables as “pass through” paths 
when a given HFACS level was not specified in an accident report. This simplified the 
model to that shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Hypothesized Covariance Paths o f  the HFACS Taxonomy using 
Dummy Variables
This yielded a simplified structural equation model conforming to Reason’s original 
(1990) “Swiss Cheese” model.
P(Actj) = Zj=l-4 Zk=l-5 11=1-4 Paops X PJ XSk XG,
X M.n _ 0,1 
Zi P(A cti)=  1.0, i = 1 - 4 (3)
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The simplified model provided additional information on the significance o f inclusion or 
lack of inclusion of latent human failures at higher organizational levels.
3.3 Research Questions
The main purpose of first and second question was to test for significant paths 
among HFACS levels within the context o f UAV and MAV accidents. The main purpose 
of the third question was to identify common paths between the UAV and MAV 
accidents within the context o f HFACS levels.
1. What is, or are, the causation path(s) model for MAV accidents among the 
categorical levels o f HFACS?
2. What is, or are, the causation path(s) model for UAV accidents among the 
categorical levels of HFACS?
3. Are there any common paths between UAV and MAV accident path(s) in terms 
of HFACS categorical levels?
UAV ■  MAV
UL3







Figure 7. M ethodological Design o f Research Questions
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While vertical dark grey arrows stand for the Research Questions 1 and 2, horizontal light 
grey arrows stand for the Research Question 3.
UL4: UAV Accidents HFACS Level-4 which is Organizational Influences.
UL3 UAV Accidents HFACS Level-3 which is Supervision
UL2: UAV Accidents HFACS Level-2 which is Preconditions
UL1: UAV Accidents HFACS Level-1 which is Unsafe Acts
ML4: MAV Accidents HFACS Level-4 which is Organizational Influences
ML3: MAV Accidents HFACS Level-3 which is Supervision
ML2: MAV Accidents HFACS Level-2 which is Preconditions
ML1: MAV Accidents HFACS Level-1 which is Unsafe Acts
The HFACS, developed by Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) and based on 
organizational model of human error o f Reason (1990), provides a hierarchical structure 
that differentiates between various levels within an organization in which an error might 
occur: 1) Unsafe Acts, 2) Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, 3) Unsafe Supervision, and 4) 
Organizational Influences. (Walker, et al., 2011)
3.4 Proposed Hypotheses for the Factor Analysis and SEM Models
H l0 : There is no statistically significant causation path among the levels of 
HFACS in MAV accidents.
FOR MAV ACCIDENTS: Paf= Pas = Pao = Pps = Ppo = Pso= 0
Hl„: There is at least one statistically significant causation path among the levels 
of HFACS in MAV accidents.
FOR MAV ACCIDENTS: pApOR pAs OR pA0OR pPSOR pP0OR pso ^ 0
H20: There is no statistically significant causation path among the levels of 
HFACS in UAV accidents.
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FOR UAV ACCIDENTS: pAP = P a s  =  P a o  =  P ps =  P po  =  P s o  = 0
H2a: There is at least one statistically significant causation path among the levels
of HFACS in UAV accidents.
FOR UAV ACCIDENTS: pAP OR pAS OR pAO OR pPS OR pPO OR pso t  0
H3o: There is no common statistically significant path between UAV and MAV
accident paths in terms o f HFACS Categorical levels.
H3a: There is at least one common statistically significant path between UAV and
MAV accidents paths in terms of HFACS levels.
3.5 Data Analysis
For the first two research questions, having identified number o f accident error 
nanocodes in each respective category of HFACS levels in UAV and MAV accidents 
from the reports of "USAF Accident Investigation Boards” (2012), a factor analysis was 
conducted. This factor analysis provided correlation information on the potentially 
statistically significant paths among HFACS category levels. Given the statistically 
significant correlations identified by factor analysis, four SEM path models were 
hypothesized for each aircraft type at a  -  0.05 and 0.10 significance levels. Each model 
was created and tested in the SPSS/AMOS software in order to determine model fit and 
confirm the significant paths within DOD HFACS taxonomy. This concluded the testing 
for significance of the P coefficients in hypotheses H lo , H la and H2o and H2a.
For the third research question; three different comparisons were made to 
establish the base for common paths between UAV and MAV accidents. The first 
comparison was made between the factor analysis, using the Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16 at
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the two significance levels of the two aircraft type, UAV and MAV. The second 
comparison was made via contrasting the results of the path analysis for each aircraft 
type, MAV and UAV. The third comparison was conducted via applying MAV data to 
UAV model and at the two significance levels to identify similar paths within the context 
of DOD HFACS. UAV data could not be fit to the MAV model due to insufficient 
degrees o f freedom from the sample size. In this comparison, the total effects o f the 
respective analysis are compared to contrast the common paths. This comparison 
concluded the testing for significance of the P coefficients in hypotheses H3o and H3a 
for common significant paths between UAV and MAV accidents in terms of HFACS 
categorical levels. All of statistical tests are performed at the 0.05 and 0.10 significance 
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3.6 Internal and External Validity of the Research
Experimental design and the research methods are considered to be the tools of 
establishing the internal validity. In this study, structural equation modeling was used to 
test the structure and identify the statistically significant paths among the levels o f DOD 
HFACS taxonomy in two aircraft types, UAV and MAV at 0.05 and 0.10 significance 
levels.
The question of “ ... can the results obtained reasonably be used to make 
generalization about the world beyond that specific research context?” (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2013, p. 17) addresses the issue of external validity. The methodology of this study can 
be used to test other structures o f HFACS adaptations and accident causation taxonomies 
as well. The external validity o f a research study is the extent to which the conclusions 
drawn can be generalized to other contexts (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). The conclusions of 
the study address the issues regarding the critiques of HFACS. According to Leedy and 
Ormrod (2013), there are three commonly used strategies that enhance external validity:
A real-life setting, a representative sample, and replication in a different context. 
Considering these three commonly used strategies:
• The setting is real life since the samples are taken from actual aircraft 
accidents and tested in an ex post facto  approach.
• Representative Sample -  the U.S. Air Force is considered to be one o f the 
biggest air forces in the world from very different perspectives, and the usage 
of the UAV as well as MAV is the most frequent within the U.S. Air Force.
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• The timeframe includes 14 fiscal years of the accident reports. Earlier accident 
reports related with old aircrafts might not depict the current technological 
developments.
The results o f this study, which aim to exploit the covariance among the variables 
within the levels o f HFACS and type o f aircrafts, can be replicated in a different 
(generalization and applicability) air force, commercial aviation or sector.
Analyzing the research questions, a methodology can be found to tailor the 
HFACS being used in military aviation or adapted it to other domains other than aviation. 
Since most o f the evaluation studies o f HFACS are concerned about the inter-rater 
reliability and level of agreement on the factors that caused or contributed to accident, 
which can be regarded as internal validity o f HFACS, it is vital to analyze the structure o f 
the HFACS itself, which is external validity. The validity o f the study and validity o f 
HFACS are used in two different settings.
3.7 Research Protocol
A protocol is an essential part o f any study as it outlines in detail the study 
rationale and methodology and provides a plan of action for the investigators to follow 
(Noyes, 2008). Consequently, the author ensures a distinctive understanding into the 
designated methods of the study. Holloway and Mooney (2004) articulated that both a 
systematic review and a piece of original research require a carefully considered 
methodology called a protocol before you can begin; how to construct a protocol is one 
of the most difficult tasks asked of anyone beginning this type of work.
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The data for this study originated from MAV and UAV accidents in the United 
States Air Force. The time frame is from fiscal years o f 2000 to 2013. It was collected by 
Unites States Legal Operations Agency that can be considered as a reliable source since it 
is an official governmental institution. The US Air Force conducts aerospace accident 
investigations o f all Class A accidents involving Air Force aircraft, unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), missiles, and space systems or equipment, unless they result in damage 
solely to government property (in which case the accident investigation is discretionary). 
Aerospace Accident Investigation Boards (AIBs) are convened under the authority o f Air 
Force Instruction (AFI) 51-503, Aerospace Accident Investigations (USAF Accident 
Investigation Boards, 2012).
Structural equation models were constructed in the SPSS/AMOS software 
package to test the structure of HFACS levels in both accident types. MAV data were fit 
to the UAV model to determine if  any significant accident causal paths were common 
between UAV and MAV accidents.
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CH APTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS
4.1 Introduction
The main objective of this study was to analyze the structural relationships o f 
accident causes among DOD HFACS levels in comparable UAV and MAV and to 
analyze the relationship between UAV and MAV accident causes paths. For the first two 
research questions, structural equation models were constructed in the SPSS/AMOS 
software package to test the structure o f DOD HFACS levels in both MAV and UAV 
aircraft types. For the third research question, three different comparisons were made to 
establish a base for common paths between UAV and MAV accidents. The first 
comparison was made between the results o f factor analysis. The second comparison was 
made via contrasting the results o f the path analysis for each aircraft type, MAV and 
UAV. The third comparison was made via applying MAV data to UAV model at two 
significance levels to identify similar paths within the context of DOD HFACS. UAV 
data could not be fit to MAV model due to insufficient degrees of freedom from the 
sample size. In this comparison the standardized total effects o f the respective analysis 
were compared to contrast the common paths. All analyses were conducted at two 
different p  values, 0.05 and 0.10.
The DOD HFACS describes four main tiers, named as main levels in this study, 
of failures/conditions explained in the previous sections. The next layers following the 
“level” are named as category and nanocodes in DOD HFACS. This study used four tiers 
as main levels, categories and sub categories as “categories”, and nanocodes. As the main 
purpose of the study was concerned about the structure rather than internal content, this
arrangement was established to conduct the analysis in a simple and a functional 
technique. The levels and the respective categories and abbreviations used in the analysis 
are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Levels, Categories, Respective Number of Nanocodes and 









Resource/Acquisition Management ORG 9
Organizational Climate OC 5
Organizational Processes OP 6
Dummy Variable ODMY 1
Total Number of Nanocodes in Organizational Influences 20+1
Unsafe 
Supervision (S)
Inadequate Supervision SI 6
Planned Inappropriate Operations SP 7
Failed to Correct Known Problem SF 2
Supervisory Violations SV 4
Dummy Variable SDMY 1




Environmental Factors PE 19
Condition of Individuals PC 55
Personal Factors PP 18
Dummy Variable PDMY 1
Total Number of Nanocodes in Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 92+1
Acts (A)
Skill-Based Errors AE1 6
Judgment & Decision-Making 
Errors AE2 6
Misperception Errors AE3 1
Violations AV 3
Dummy Variable ADMY 1
Total Number of Nanocodes in Acts 16+1
Total number of DOD HFACS Nanocodes and Dummy Variables 147+4
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4.2 Inter-rater Reliability
The attribute agreement analysis is used to measure and evaluate the accuracy of 
subjective ratings by people. In general, it is more likely that subjective ratings are 
accurate and useful if  there is a substantial agreement in measurements among appraisers. 
For this study, rater reliability was established by comparing the researcher’s 
classifications to those of two other expert pilots o f sample subset executive summaries 
of the 48 detailed accident reports with known DOD HFACS accident classifications by 
panels o f United States Air Force “experts” .
As no human subject information was part of the crash data and the experts 
provided information only about the crash data that does not include any human subject 
data about themselves, the study was judged to be exempt from review by the Old 
Dominion University Institutional Review Board (IRB).
At the beginning of the inter-rater reliability study, the researcher and two expert 
pilots, having a diverse experience in aviation, jointly studied the DOD HFACS 
taxonomy together with detailed reports. The training and subsequent phase of the inter­
rater reliability analysis provided raters with a common understanding o f DOD HFACS 
and its contents. Each phase of this study improved the understanding of the system and 
the raters’ accident coding causes or factors. The design to establish and verify rater 
reliability was divided into mainly three sections: Training, Testing and Evaluation.
4.2.1 Training
The initial training included the joint review o f the study’s purpose and DOD 
HFACS taxonomy including some sample detailed accident reports. The other part o f this
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training consisted o f reviewing ten detailed accident reports jointly. While some reports 
included “causal”, “contributory”, “non-contributory” classification, most o f the detailed 
reports provided all relative causes with respective nanocode(s). As the executive 
summaries o f the reports did not include the “non-contributory” factors, it would not be 
possible to infer any cause. To this end, the raters decided to classify the all human errors 
found as causal factors without making any further sorting as “causal” or “contributory.” 
The presence of any cause was assigned a nanocode within a respective category. For the 
reports in which a nanocode was not assigned a letter D was entered to the respective 
level as dummy variable.
4.2.2 Inter-rater Reliability Testing
The second section of the rater-reliability analysis, named as testing, consisted of 
three rounds by the three raters. The researcher and two expert pilots independently 
classified accident causes o f the summaries of n = 48 detailed reports in accordance with 
the established DOD HFACS classification criteria in two randomly ordered replicates 
for each round. Round 1, Round 2 and Round 3 included 10, 10, and 28 executive 
summaries respectively o f detailed accident reports. Minitab® Statistical Analysis 
(16.2.1) software was used for inter-rater reliability of Each Appraiser versus Standard, 
All Appraisers versus Standard, and Between Appraisers. Although the analysis was 
executed at nanocode and category level, the latter one is used in this study, since the 
structural equation models were constructed and statistical analyses were conducted at 
the categorical level.
4.2.2.1 Round One Attribute Agreement Analysis
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At the DOD HFACS category level path, the preliminary percentage o f agreement 
results o f round one showed acceptable Within Appraisers repeatability o f 96.15%, 
82.69%, and 69.23% respectively and acceptable between appraisers agreement of 
50.0%. However, for Each Appraiser versus Standard, raters one and two exhibited 
acceptable agreement at 73.08% and 63.46% respectively. Rater three agreed with the 
standard only 44.23%, which was less than the specified 50% average. After these 
results, the raters reviewed the same accident reports to identify the differences in code 
assignments, agree on the correct assignment per report, and the criteria for each 
assignment. The results o f Round One analysis are presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Attribute Agreement Analysis of Round 1
ROUND 1 ATTRIBUTE AGREEMENT ANALYSIS OF HFACS CATEGORY
LEVEL
Assessment
Agreement Appraiser # Inspected # Matched Percent 95 % Cl
Within Appraisers
Rater 1 52 50 96.15 (86.79,99.53)
Rater2 52 43 82.69 (69.67,91.77)
Rater3 52 36 69.23 (54.90,81.28)
Each Appraiser vs. 
Standard
Rater 1 52 38 73.08 (58.98, 84.43)
Rater2 52 33 63.46 (48.96, 76.38)
Rater3 53 23 44.23 (30.47,58.67)
Between Appraisers 52 26 50.00 (35.81,64.19)
All Appraisers vs. Standard 52 22 42.31 (28.73,56.80)
Two factors were identified as the causes for this low level o f  agreement. First, it 
was the initial part o f independent study, and the raters did not think that they had 
sufficient understanding o f the HFACS classification code definitions. Second, they 
thought that including as many nanocodes as possible would contribute in finding the
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causes o f the accidents. However, including more nanocodes than required decreased the 
level o f agreement.
4.2.2.2 Round Two Attribute Agreement Analysis
The raters performed round two attribute agreement analysis on an additional 10 
randomly selected accident summaries classifying two replicates with approximately a 
one week interval between replicates. The Assessment Agreement results o f round two 
are shown in Table 6. The Within Appraisers, Each Appraiser versus Standard, Between 
Appraisers, and All Appraisers versus Standard agreement percentages were all above the 
specified 50% average.
Table 6. Round 2 Attribute Agreement Analyses
ROUND 2 ATTRIBUTE AGREEMENT ANALYSES OF HFACS CATEGORY
LEVEL
Assessment
Agreement Appraiser # Inspected # Matched Percent 95 % Cl
Within Appraisers
Rater 1 57 54 94.74 (85.38, 98.90)
Rater2 57 53 92.98 (83.00,98.05)
Rater3 57 48 84.21 (72.13,92.52)
Each Appraiser vs. 
Standard
Rater 1 57 50 87.72 (76.32,94.92)
Rater2 57 51 89.47 (78.48,96.04)
Rater3 57 47 82.46 (70.09,91.25)
Between Appraisers 57 44 77.19 (64.16,87.26)
All Appraisers vs. Standard 57 43 75.44 (62.24,85.87)
4.2.2.3 Round Three Attribute Agreement Analysis
Twenty eight executive summaries o f detailed accident reports were randomly 
selected and rated in two replicates by the raters with approximately a one week interval
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between replicates. The Assessment Agreement results o f round three are shown in Table
7. The raters’ Within Appraisers, Each Appraiser versus Standard, Between Appraisers, 
and All Appraisers versus Standard agreement percentages were all above specified 50% 
average.
Table 7. Round 3 Attribute Agreement Analyses
ROUND 3 ATTRIBUTE AGREEMENT ANALYSIS OF HFACS CATEGORY
LEVEL
Assessment
Agreement Appraiser # Inspected # Matched Percent 95 % Cl
Within Appraisers
Rater 1 163 144 88.34 (82.40, 92.83)
Rater2 163 152 93.25 (88.25,96.58)
Rater3 163 137 84.05 (77.51, 89.31)
Each Appraiser vs. 
Standard
Rater 1 163 133 81.60 (74.78, 87.22)
Rater2 163 135 82.82 (76.14, 88.27)
Rater3 163 126 77.30 (70.10, 83.49)
Between Appraisers 163 117 71.78 (64.21, 78.54)
All Appraisers vs. Standard 163 109 66.87 (59.08, 74.04)
The results from Round Three were assessed to be sufficient to continue 
evaluating the remaining reports which do not have detailed reports.
4.2.3 Evaluation of the Remaining Reports
All the remaining reports having no detailed accident information were rated by 
the researcher in accordance with round three. After all reports were rated, thirty 
executive summaries of reports having no detailed information were randomly selected 
and rated in two replicates by the raters with approximately a one week interval between 
replicates. The round four inter-rater attribute agreement analysis results are shown in
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Table 8. The raters’ Within Appraisers and Between Appraisers agreement percentages 
were all above specified 50% minimum.
Table 8. Round 4 Attribute Agreement Analyses
ROUND 4 ATTRIBUTE AGREEMENT ANALYSIS OF HFACS CATEGORY
LEVEL
Assessment
Agreement Appraiser # Inspected # Matched Percent 95 % Cl
Within Appraisers
Rater 1 180 142 78.89 (72.19, 84.61)
Rater2 180 167 92.78 (87.97, 96.10)
Rater3 180 142 78.89 (72.19, 84.61)
Between Appraisers 180 95 52.78 (45.21,60.25)
The results o f Round Four were assessed to be sufficient to utilize the 
classifications for exploratory factor analysis, structural equation modeling, and statistical 
analyses o f path effects.
4.3 Data Arrangement
The data o f this study, 347 Class A accident reports, were acquired from United 
States Air Force Legal Operations Agency web site. This website contains a list o f Class 
A aerospace and ground mishaps or accidents and their corresponding summaries and full 
narratives from the Accident Investigation Board (AIB) o f USAF reports.
The study acquired accident classification data from 347 reports o f which 75 are 
detailed and classified in accordance with DOD HFACS taxonomy for the years between 
2010 and 2013. Arrangement o f the available accident reports with respect to years, 
aircraft type, and report form is presented in Table 9.
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FORM  OF  
THE  
REPORTMAV UAV





2001 27 3 30
2002 30 9 39
2003 32 5 37
2004 18 5 23
2005 17 5 22
2006 18 5 23
2007 15 5 20
2008 21 8 29
2009 17 9 26




2011 12 16 28
2012 12 10 22
2013 8 5 13
SUM 254 93
TOTAL 347
An accident database was prepared in a Microsoft Excel workbook and each 
report’s accident cause was entered to its respective nanocode as 1 for occurrence versus 
0 for nonoccurrence. Since the majority o f reports did not classify mishap or accident 
impacts as major, minor, or contributory in terms o f human injury cost or aircraft cost, no 
weighting system was employed. All causes or factors found in the accident reports were 
entered as having an equal weight of 1, regardless of the impact o f the respective mishap 
or accident. The 0-1 non-occurrence versus occurrence entry created a Poisson process 
by HFACS nanocode, category, and category level. As the study is concerned with the 
structural evaluation o f DOD HFACS taxonomy, fourteen (14) DOD HFACS categories 
and four (4) dummy variables as set forth in Table 4 were used in this study. To reduce
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the total number o f cells, nanocode(s) found at each report were aggregated to into their 
respective HFACS category level. Eighty four accident reports were assigned no DOD 
HFACS nanocode by the USAF AIB and were excluded from the analysis. The numbers 
of excluded reports for UAV and MAV were 33 and 51 respectively. The detailed 
numbers o f the reports assigned DOD HFACS nanocodes are depicted in Table 10.








All Reports 254 93 347
Reports Including DOD 
HFACS Nanocode 203 60 263
4.4. Sample Size
The sample size for factor analysis and structural equation modeling was assessed 
within the same context for the two different set o f data, UAV and MAV. According to 
Kline (2011), a sample size o f less than 100 is considered to be small, between 100-200 
medium, and bigger than 200 cases are considered large. In that context the sample size 
for UAV of n = 60 can be concluded as small and MAV o f n = 203 can be considered as 
a large sample size for the analysis. Another consideration for sample size is the 
complexity o f the structure or model (Kline, 2011). As the proposed model includes no 
latent variable and linearity or single-direction between the categories, it can be 




Normalization can be considered as a method for producing a set o f appropriate 
relations that support the data requirements of an analysis. To normalize the mishap and 
accident occurrence data, each report’s nanocode counts were aggregated within 
categories and divided by the total number o f nanocodes, plus one for the dummy 
variable within each category level to yield Poisson occurrence rates. For example, if an 
accident report was assigned three nanocodes in Personal Factors (PE) category under 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts (P) main level o f DOD HFACS, it was divided by its 
respective sum of total nanocode, 93 (Table 4), yielding a Poisson occurrence rate of 
0.0322581 per report. The normalization to Poisson occurrence rates standardized the 
data for subsequent exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and structural equation modeling.
4.6 Descriptive Analysis o f the Data
The exploratory findings regarding UAV and MAV accidents in terms of DOD 
HFACS Category and main levels are presented in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively. 
The total DOD HFACS nanocodes found in 60 UAV accident reports was 234, and the 
number for 203 MAV accident reports was 676. The nanocode rate per accident was 3.9 
and 3.3 for UAV and MAV respectively.
OR OC OP SI SP SF SV PE PC PP AE1 AE2 AE3 AV
Figure 8. UAV and MAV Accident Rates in Terms of DOD HFACS Category
Levels
The accident rates in terms of the DOD HFACS main levels are depicted in 
Figure 9. The rates o f UAV and MAV accidents can be considered to be close and 
consisent in terms o f the DOD HFACS main levels. The rates of O and P levels in UAV 
are higher than MAV respective levels, whereas the rates o f S and A levels in MAV are 




Figure 9. UAV and MAV Accident Rates in Terms of DOD HFACS Main
Levels
The descriptive statistics were obtained using IBM Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS version 21) program. The descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 11 and Table 12.
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Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for M AV Accident Reports
Variable
Name Mean S.D Variance Skewness Kurtosis
ORG 0.011 0.024 0.001 2.333 6.141
OC 0.000 0.005 0.000 9.999 98.960
OP 0.010 0.022 0.000 2.182 4.127
ODMY 0.032 0.022 0.001 -0.728 -1.484
SI 0.007 0.020 0.000 3.007 8.882
SP 0.006 0.019 0.000 3.194 10.132
SF 0.001 0.006 0.000 8.102 64.284
SV 0.001 0.006 0.000 8.102 64.284
SDMY 0.039 0.021 0.000 -1.385 -0.082
PE 0.003 0.006 0.000 3.032 12.127
PC 0.010 0.014 0.000 2.653 11.740
PP 0.003 0.006 0.000 2.746 9.979
PDMY 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.501 -1.766
AE1 0.050 0.050 0.002 0.734 -0.063
AE2 0.015 0.033 0.001 2.066 3.401
AE3 0.006 0.018 0.000 2.916 6.565
AV 0.003 0.013 0.000 4.460 18.073
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics for UAV Accident Reports
Variable
Name Mean S.D Variance Skewness Kurtosis
ORG 0.009 0.019 0.000 1.679 0.846
OC 0.002 0.009 0.000 5.334 27.360
OP 0.018 0.029 0.001 1.377 0.873
ODMY 0.025 0.024 0.001 -0.068 -2.065
SI 0.008 0.019 0.000 1.835 1.413
SP 0.005 0.020 0.000 4.169 17.083
SV 0.002 0.009 0.000 5.334 27.360
SDMY 0.038 0.021 0.000 -1.294 -0.339
PE 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.859 -0.258
PC 0.009 0.016 0.000 1.810 2.643
PP 0.004 0.010 0.000 2.720 7.616
PDMY 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.895 -1.241
AE1 0.047 0.055 0.003 0.989 0.212
AE2 0.026 0.044 0.002 2.024 4.719
AE3 0.006 0.019 0.000 2.736 5.671
AV 0.001 0.008 0.000 7.746 60.000
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Since the category Supervisory Failure (SF) category of UAV accidents had a 
zero assignment rate, it was eliminated from factor analysis and structural equation 
modeling. Descriptive statistics were calculated for the remaining variables.
Fundamental research findings are presented within the context o f analysis 
executed during study, including factor analysis and path analysis and structural equation 
modeling (SEM) respectively. The study was based on 347 Class A accident reports of 
USAF Accident Investigation Board (AIB) between the years of 2000 and 2013. The 
following findings are summarized from the descriptive analysis o f  the reports:
• Eighty four (84) accident reports out o f 347 contained no DOD HFACS
nanocodes. Thirty three (51) MAV reports and fifty one (33) UAV reports 
contained no DOD HFACS nanocodes. The remaining 263 reports had at least 
one nanocode assigned.
•  A total of 234 DOD HFACS nanocodes were assigned to 60 UAV accident 
reports, and 676 nanocodes were assigned to 203 MAV accident reports. The 
nanocode rate per accident was 3.9 and 3.3 for UAV and MAV respectively.
• The rate o f nanocode assignment to each main category level was as follows:
o “Organizational Influences” was 15.4% for UAV and 13.5% for 
MAV,
o Unsafe Supervision (S) was 7.7% for UAV and 8.9% for MAV,
o Preconditions for Unsafe Acts (P) was 44% for UAV and 42.3% for
MAV,
o Unsafe Acts (A) was 32.9% for UAV and 35.3% for MAV.
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• “Condition of Individuals” (PC ) had the highest accident rate among the 
category level of DOD HFACS in both types o f aircraft, 22.2% and 26.6% for 
UAV and MAV respectively. Skill-Based Errors (AE1) had the second 
highest accident rate as 19.2% and 24%% for UAV and MAV respectively.
• Out of 147 HFACS nanocodes, ninety seven (97) nanocodes were assigned to 
MAV accident reports and sixty seven (67) were assigned to UAV accident 
reports. In other words 66% of the available nanocodes were used to classify 
MAV accident causes and 46 % for UAV accident causes.
From the above summary, the number o f the nanocodes assigned per accident 
report displayed close values among the HFACS category and main levels in terms o f 
UAV and MAV aircraft types.
4.7 Factor Analysis
An exploratory factor analysis was performed using SPSS to explore the potential 
for dimension reduction. The Pearson correlation matrix, that provides the pattern of 
relationships, and its associated significance matrix for MAV and UAV are presented in 
Appendix C and Appendix D respectively. The correlations found statistically significant 
at/? < = 0.05 andp  < = 0.1 levels among MAV DOD HFACS category levels are 
presented in Tables 13 and 14 and among UAV DOD HFACS category levels in Tables 
15 and 16 with their correlations values. When determining the statistically significant 
correlations, those found at the same category level are collinear, and were excluded from 
subsequent path analysis, since this study was focused on the relationships among the 
levels. In other words, any statistically significant collinear relationship within the same 
DOD HFACS category level was eliminated as out of scope of the study and research
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questions. The numbers in Tables 13, 14, 15 and, 16 are the correlation values o f the 
respective categories.
Table 13. Correlations Found Statistically Significant at p  <= 0.05 among DOD









































































Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation o f Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
model o f accident causation, the statistically significant relationships at p  value <= 0.05 
in Table 12 suggested the following potentially statistically significant MAV accident 
causal paths to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.
OC => SP => PC => AE1 => Mishap/Accident
OC => SP => PC => AE2 => Mishap/Accident
OC => SP => PC => AE3 Mishap/Accident
OC => SP => PDMY => AE2 => Mishap/Accident
Other statistically significant relationships at p  value <= 0.05 in Table 12 suggested the 
following additional MAV accident causal paths containing non-statistically significant 
relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.
ORG SI => PP —> ADMY => Mishap/Accident
ORG => SF —> PDMY ADMY => Mishap/Accident
ORG —» SDMY —> PC => AE1 Mishap/Accident
ORG —> SDMY —> PC => AE2 => Mishap/Accident
ORG —» SDMY -> PC => AE3 => Mishap/Accident
ORG -> SDMY —> PDMY AE2 => Mishap/ Accident
OC => SI => PP —> ADMY => Mishap/ Accident
OC => SP => PP ADMY Mishap/Accident
OC => SV —> PDMY -> AE1 => Mishap/Accident
OC => SV —> PDMY -> AE2 => Mishap/Accident
OC SDMY => PP -> ADMY => Mishap/Accident
OC => SDMY -> PC AE1 =i> Mishap/Accident
OC => SDMY —> PC => AE2 => Mishap/Accident
OC => SDMY —> PC => AE3 => Mishap/Accident
OC => SP => PE => ADMY => Mishap/Accident
OP => SI => PP -»
OP => SV PDMY — >
OP SV — > PDMY ->
OP => SDMY => PP —>
ODMY=> SI => PP ->
ODMY —» SDMY -> PDMY =>
ODMY —> SDMY -► PDMY — >
ADMY => Mishap/Accident
AE1 Mishap/Accident





Table 14. Correlations Found Statistically Significant at p  <= 0.1 among DOD
HFACS Categories o f M AV Accidents





















































































































* Statistically significant correlations a tp  value = 0.10.
Additional statistically significant correlations at p  value <=0.10 in Table 13 suggested 
the following additional MAV accident causal paths containing statistically significant 
relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.
ORG SP => PC AE1 => Mishap/Accident
ORG SP => PC => AE2 => Mishap/Accident
ORG => SP => PC => AE3 => Mishap/ Accident
ORG SP => PC => AV => Mishap/Accident
ORG => SP => PP => AV => Mishap/Accident
ORG => SP => PDMY => AE2 => Mishap/Accident
ORG => SP => PDMY => AE3 => Mishap/Accident
ORG => SI => PP => AV => Mishap/Accident
OC SI => PP => AV => Mishap/Accident
OC => SP => PC AV => Mishap/Accident
OP => SI => PP => AV => Mishap/Accident
ODMY => SI => PP => AV => Mishap/Accident
Likewise, additional statistically significant correlations at p  value <=0.10 in Table 13 
suggested the following additional MAV accident causal paths containing non- 
statistically significant relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation 
modeling.
ORG => SP => PDMY —> AE1 => Mishap/ Accident
OP =i> SDMY —> PDMY => AE2 => Mishap/Accident
OP => SDMY -> PDMY => AE3 => Mishap/Accident
OP => SDMY -» PDMY -» AV => Mishap/Accident
ORG => SI —> PDMY AE1 => Mishap/Accident
OC => SI —> PDMY —> AE1 => Mishap/Accident
OP => SI PDMY —► AE1 => Mishap/ Accident
ODMY => SI PDMY —> AE1 => Mishap/Accident
OC => SP => PDMY -> AE1 =i> Mishap/Accident
OP SV -* PDMY -> AE3 => Mishap/Accident
OC SDMY —> PDMY -> AE1 => Mishap/Accident
OP => SDMY -> PDMY -> AE1 => Mishap/Accident
Table 15. Correlations Found Statistically Significant at p  <= 0.05 among DOD





























SP No statistically significant correlation found
















PDMY No statistically significant correlation found
Given the constraint o f the HFACS implementation of Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
model of accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p  value <= 0.05 in 
Table 15 suggested the following potentially statistically significant UAV accident causal 
paths to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.
OP => SI => PP => AE3 => Mishap/Accident 
ODMY => SI PP => AE3 Mishap/ Accident
ODMY => SDMY => PP => AE3 => Mishap/Accident
Other statistically significant relationships at p  value <= 0.05 in Table 14 
suggested the following additional UAV accident causal paths containing non- 
statistically significant relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation 
modeling:
ORG -> SDMY —> PC => AE1 => Mishap/Accident
ORG -+ SDMY -> PC => AE2 => Mishap/Accident
OP => SI -> PDMY — > AV => Mishap/Accident
ODMY => SI —> PDMY —> AV => Mishap/Accident
ODMY ==> SDMY -> PC => AE1 => Mishap/Accident
ODMY => SDMY -> PC => AE2 Mishap/Accident
ODMY —> SV -> PDMY — > AE3 => Mishap/Accident
ODMY —> SV -> PDMY — >■ AV => Mishap/Accident
ORG -> SDMY PC =* ADMY => Mishap/Accident
ODMY => SI -> PDMY — > ADMY=> Mishap/Accident
ODMY => SDMY -> PC => ADMY=> Mishap/Accident
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Table 16. Correlations Found Statistically Significant at p  <= 0.1 among DOD





































SP No statistically significant correlation found



























* Statistically significant corre ations at p  value = C1.10.
Additional statistically significant relationships at p  value <=0.10 in Table 16 
suggested the following additional UAV accident causal paths containing statistically 
significant relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation modeling.
OP => SDMY => PC => AE1 => Mishap/Accident 
ODMY => SI => PP => ADMY=> Mishap/Accident
Likewise, additional statistically significant relationships at p  value <=0.10 in Table 16 
suggested the following additional UAV accident causal paths containing non-
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statistically significant relationships to be tested in subsequent structural equation 
modeling.
OP => SV — » PDMY => AE3 —s Mishap/ Accident
OP => SV —> PDMY => AV => Mishap/Accident
ODMY => SDMY -» PDMY -> AE3 => Mi shap/Acc ident
ODMY SDMY — ^ PDMY => AE1 => Mishap/Accident
ODMY => SDMY —> PDMY => AE2 => Mishap/Accident
4.8 Structural Equation Model (SEM) and Path Analysis
Given the statistically significant correlations identified by factor analysis, four 
SEM path models were hypothesized for each aircraft type at both significance levels. 
Each model was created and tested in the SPSS/AMOS software in order to determine 
model fit and confirm the significant paths within the DOD HFACS taxonomy.
This study applied the following four goodness o f fit measures and their 
recommended criteria for testing model fit: the chi-square (CMIN), the chi-square 
divided by the degree of freedom (CMIN/DF), Goodness o f Fit Index (GFI), Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI), and Root Mean Square Error o f Approximation (RMSEA). The AMOS 
goodness o f fit measures (Arbuckle, 2010) are set forth in Table 17.
Table 17. AMOS Fit Measures
AMOS Fit Measures Acceptable Criteria
The chi-square dividing by the degree of freedom( x2 / df) 1.0 < x2 / d f < 3.0
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.95 < CFI
Goodness o f Fit Index (GFI) 0.9 < GFI
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) RMSEA around 0.05
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As the standardized total effect o f one variable on another approximates the part 
of their observed correlation due to presumed causal relations (Kline, 2011), total effects 
are also discussed with the perspective o f fit indices, maximum likelihood estimates, 
model, and factor analysis.
The path models presented in the figures in this chapter were fit to covariance 
matrices from the normalized raw data of MAV and UAV accident reports by the mean 
of SPSS/AMOS 21 software (Arbuckle, 2012). All the fitted models converged to an 
admissible solution. The factor “Accident” loading on ADMY variable was constrained 
to 1 and its error variable was pruned to establish the scale for estimates o f path 
coefficients and their corresponding statistics needed for path analysis. The findings from 
this analytical approach are also discussed together with the model fit indices in a holistic 
approach to provide a comprehensive analysis.
4.8.1 MAV Model, (N = 203, p  < = 0.05)
Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at 
p  < = 0.05 in Table 13, three models were analyzed for MAV accidents for potentially 
statistically significant MAV accident causal paths. The first MAV model (A) yielded 
unsatisfactory goodness o f fit values suggesting model revision. The second MAV model 
(B) at p  < 0.05 level was constructed according the modification indices o f the first 
model. These indices suggested applying four covariance among exogenous and error 
variables. The covariance applied were the exogenous variables of ORG-ODMY and OP- 
ODMY and the error variables o f SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. The covariance selected 
according to modification indices were all related to dummy variables o f the first three 
levels. This circumstance was consistent with the value of indices as well as the feature of
6 6
the dummy variables, since they were assigned an indicator value of 1 at the absence of 
any error within the respective categorical level. Analysis and parameter summaries, 
models, unstandardized and standardized total, direct, indirect effects, modification 
indices, model fit summary, and path diagrams o f the first MAV model (A) at p  < = 0.05 
level are presented in Appendix E.
The second model (B) o f MAV at p  < = 0.05 level yielded better goodness o f fit 
indices. The path diagram of the second MAV model (B) at p  <= 0.05 level is presented 


































Figure 10. Path Diagram o f Revised MAV Model (B) at p  <= 0.05 Level
6 8
The third model (C) was constructed according to the p < = 0.05 level of 
regression weights o f the second model (B) and statistically non-significant relationships. 
OP-SV, ODMY-SI, ODMY-SDMY were pruned to improve the second model in terms 
of goodness o f fit results. This third model (C) presented similar fit statistics with the 
second model (B) implying small amount difference between the pruned (C) and non­
pruned model (B). Since the overall model Chi-sq/df, CFI, GFI, and RMSEA statistics 
did not change significantly, the second model (B) was retained as the actual one to be 
utilized in the model assessments and path analysis. The detailed AMOS output o f the 
third (C) model is presented in Appendix G. The goodness o f fit indices o f MAV model 
at p  < = 0.05 level for three models are presented in Table 18.
Table 18. The Goodness of Fit Indices of MAV Models a t p  <— 0.05 Level
MAV p  <0.05 Model
Chi-sq/df 



















In model B, the loadings o f Accident on AV and AE3 were not statistically 
significant at p  <= 0.05. Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient o f -0.055 and
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standard error of 0.033 yielding a critical ratio (CR) o f -1.669 for a 9.5% significance 
level. Accident loaded on AE3 with a coefficient o f -0.081 and standard error o f 0.043 
yielding a CR of -1.890 for a 5.9% significance level. Since both Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
model and the design of the HFACS coding system assume that if an unsafe act occurs an 
accident results and since the significances levels o f AV and AE3 fell within the 90.0% to 
94.9% confidence interval, both AV and AE3 were retained in model B for subsequent 
comparability with the MAV {p < = 0.10) and UAV structural equation models. Accident 
loading onto AE1 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -1.123 and standard 
error of 0.097 yielding a CR of -11.575 for a significance o f less than 0.1%. Accident 
loading onto AE2 was statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.281 and standard 
error of 0.078 yielding a CR o f -3.590 for a significance of less than 0.1%.
The estimated path coefficient and its corresponding standard error for each path 
were needed to assess the statistical significance o f the respective path on Accident 
outcomes. Current structural equation modeling software is not programmed to provide 
path coefficients and their standard errors in terms of the HFACS accident cause 
assignments. As can be seen in structural path models in Figures 11 through 15, in order 
the model HFACS paths within the SEM framework, each path had to be decomposed 
into O —> S—» P —► A estimates and the A <— Accident loading. Current SEM software, 
SPSS/AMOS included, provide estimates o f unstandardized regression weights, standard 
errors, and critical ratios for direct effects, standardized regression weights for direct 
effects, and unstandardized and standardized total, direct, and indirect effects. To 
overcome this limitation, this work applied the principle o f the variance of the product of 
independent random variables from mathematical statistics. This principle is applicable,
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because the covariance matrix provides independent estimates of SEM direct effect 
coefficients between HFACS categorical levels. Thus, each HFACS path is composed of 
independent random variables o f SEM direct effect coefficients and their standard errors. 
Correspondingly, each path effect on Accident outcome is the P = Po x ps x Pp x Pa —» 
Accident product. From mathematical statistics, it is known that if  random variables X t, 
X2, ..., Xn (Po, Ps, Pp, and Pa for this analysis) are independent, the variance of the 
product is
Var(X, ... Xn) = Iln (var(Xj) + (E[Xi])2) - fin (E[X,])2 (4)
If the means o f the random variables are zero, Var(Xi ... Xn) = Fin var(Xj). Application 
of the principle of the variance o f the product o f independent random variables provided 
the two estimates o f path standard errors, path P coefficient not equal 0 and equal 0, by 
which to test statistical significance o f the path effect. Both cases were applied in this 
work to test for significant path effect from mean model effect. Since the potentially 
statistically significant MAV accident causal paths were hypothesized from factor 
analytic correlation analysis o f individual inter-categorical pair wise relationships at a  = 
0.05 or p  < = 0.05 and a  = 0.10 or p  < = 0.10 and each path is comprised of the joint 
product of four p direct relationships, the joint a  forjudging path significance must be 
adjusted to
oipath = 1 - ( 1  - a ) 4 (5)
For the paths hypothesized at correlation a  = 0.05, this yields a path = 1 -  (1 -  0.05)4 =
0.1855 or Z = ± 1.324. For paths hypothesized at correlation a  = 0.10, this yields a path =
1 -  (1 -  0.10)4 = 0.3439 or Z = ± 0.947.
71
Statistical tests and Pareto rankings o f the paths were performed for 
unstandardized path effects to identify the main contributing paths. Given the constraint 
of the HFACS implementation of Reason’s Swiss Cheese model o f accident causation, 
the statistically significant correlations from Table 13 at p  value <= 0.05 suggested the 
twenty six potentially statistically significant MAV accident causal paths to be tested in 
path analysis. Table 19 presents the path Pareto analysis o f unstandardized effects, 
standardized effects and statistically significant paths a tp  value <= 0.1855 level for both 
the path P coefficient equal 0 and not equal to 0.
From Table 19, three paths for the P * 0 case were found statistically significant 
a tp  value <= 0.1855. These paths are OC>SP>PC>AE3 with CR = -1.3499, 
OC>SP>PC>AE2 with CR = -1.7194, and OC>SP>PC>AEl with CR = -1.7738. With 
development of an optimal path pruning process (similar to empirical modeling best 
subsets regression), the potentially retained unstandardized paths that exhibit the most 
positive effect relative to the mean effect on accidents are OC>SDMY>PC>AEl with 
effect 0.0823 and CR = 1.3034, OC>SP>PE>ADMY with effect 0.0194 and CR =
1.2025, OC>SDMY>PC>AE2 with effect 0.0177 and CR = 1.2025, and 
ORG>SDMY>PC>AEl with effect 0.0141 and CR = 1.1328. The paths with the most 
negative effect relative to the mean are OC>SP>PC>AEl with effect -0.1947 and CR = 
-1.7738, OC>SP>PC>AE2 with effect -0.0419 and CR = -1.7194, OC>SV>PDMY>AEl 
with effect -0.0099 and CR = -0.318, and OC>SP>PC>AE3 with effect -0.0071 and CR = 
-1.3499. The standardized paths that exhibit the most positive effect on accidents are 
OC>SDMY>PC>AE1, ORG>SDMY>PC>AEl, OC>SP>PE>ADMY and 
OC>SDMY>PC>AE2. The standardized paths with the most negative effect on accidents
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are OC>SP>PC>AEl, OC>SV>PDMY>AEl, OP>SP>PC>AE2 and OC>SP>PC>AE3. 
For the p = 0 case, four paths were found statistically significant at p  value <= 0.1855. 
These were OC>SDMY>PC>AEl with CR = 3.921, ORG>SDMY>PC>AEl with 
CR= 1.3446, OC>SP>PC>AE2 with CR = -2.747, and OC>SP>PC>AEl with CR = 
-9.209. The observation that OC>SDMY>PC>AEl with CR = 3.921 and 
ORG>SDMY>PC>AEl with CR=1.345 were statistically significant for the P = 0 case 
but with CR = 1.3034 and CR-1.328 respectively, were not statistically significant for 
the P * 0 case supports the supposition that development o f an optimal path pruning 
process will reveal more statistically significant paths in a reduced model.
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As presented in Table 13, HFACS DOD category ORG has significant 
correlations with SI (0.162), SF (0.272), PC (-0.201), PDMY (0.249), AEI (-0.268), AE2 
(-0.181), and ADMY (0.422). As standardized total effects presented in Table 20, ORG 
had total effects on SI (0.272), SF (0.314), SDMY (-0.17), PC (-0.028), PDMY (0.009),
PP (0.029), AEI (-0.006), AE2 (-0.008), AE3 (-0.009), ADMY (0.007). Table 21, 
extracted from Table 19 presents the test statistics o f paths emanated from ORG category 
level DOD HFACS. Six paths were tested and one path, ORG>SDMY>PC>AEl, was 
found statistically significant at p  < = 0.1855 value. The path ORG>SDMY>PC>AE2 
was noted above as having the potential for being retained as statistically significant 
under an optimal path pruning process.
Table 21. ORG Category Level of MAV Paths
PATHS Unstd.Effects




ORG > SDMY > PC » AEI « Accident 0.0141 Sig 0.0039
ORG > SDMY > PC » AE2 « Accident 0.0030 No 0.0019
ORG » SF > PDMY > ADMY « Accident 0.0010 No 0.0008
ORG > SDMY > PC » AE3 « Accident 0.0005 No 0.0011
ORG » SI » PP > ADMY « Accident 0.0003 No 0.0002
ORG > SDMY > PDMY » AE2 « Accident 0.0000 No 0.0000
OC
As presented in Table 13, HFACS DOD category OC had significant correlations 
with SI (0.216), SP (0.224), SV (0.401), SDMY (-0.190), PC (0.288), AEI (0.151), AE2 
(0.239) and AE3 (0.144). As standardized total effects presented in Table 20, OC had
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total effects on SI (0.229), SP (0.224), SV (0.393), SDMY (-0.197) PC (0.045), AEI 
(0.010), AE2 (0.013) and AE3 (0.014). Table 22, extracted from Table 19 presents the 
test statistics o f paths emanated from OC. Thirteen paths were tested and four paths were 
found statistically significant at/7 <=  0.1855 value. Path OC>SDMY>PC>AEl was 
found statistically significant for the path P = 0 case. Three paths OC>SDMY>PC>AE2, 
OC>SP>PE>ADMY, and OC>SDMY>PC>AE3 were noted above as having the 
potential for being retained as statistically significant under an optimal path pruning 
process.
Table 22. OC Category Level o f MAV Paths
PATHS Unstd.Effects




OC » SDMY > PC » AEI « Accident 0.0823 Sig 0.0045
OC » SP » PE » ADMY « Accident 0.0194 No 0.0033
OC » SDMY > PC » AE2 « Accident 0.0177 No 0.0023
OC » SP » PP > ADMY « Accident 0.0066 No 0.0011
OC » SDMY » PP > ADMY « Accident 0.0052 No 0.0009
OC » SDMY > PC » AE3 « Accident 0.0030 No 0.0013
OC » SP » PDMY » AE2 « Accident 0.0009 No 0.0001
OC » SV > PDMY > AE2 « Accident -0.0006 No -0.0001
OC » SP » PC » AE3 « Accident -0.0071 Sig -0.0031
OC » sv > PDMY > AEI « Accident -0.0099 No -0.0054
OC » SP » PC » AE2 « Accident -0.0419 Sig -0.0053
OC » SP » PC » AEI « Accident -0.1947 Sig -0.0107
oc » SI » PP > ADMY « Accident 0.0010 No 0.0002
OP
As presented in Table 13, OP had significant correlations with SI (0.140), SV 
(0.122), SDMY (-0.153), AEI (-0.154) and ADMY (0.230). As standardized total effects
presented in Table 20, OP had total effects on SI (0.222), SV (0.055), SDMY (-0.220), 
AEI (-0.008), and ADMY (-0.008). Table 23, extracted from Table 19 presents the test 
statistics of paths emanated from OP. None of the four OP originated paths were found 
statistically significant at p  < = 0.1855 value.
Table 23. OP Category Level of MAV Paths
PATHS Unstd.Effects




OP » SV > PDMY » AEI « Accident -0.0003 No -0.0001
OP » SDMY » PP > ADMY « Accident 0.0012 No 0.0010
OP » SI » PP > ADMY « Accident 0.0002 No 0.0002
OP » SV > PDMY » AE2 « Accident 0.0000 No 0.0000
ODMY
As presented in Table 13, HFACS DOD category ODMY had significant 
correlations with SI (-0.125), PDMY (-0.229), AEI (0.243), AV (0.151), and ADMY 
(-0.451). As standardized total effects presented in Table 20, ODMY had total effects on 
SDMY (-0.206), SI (0.246), PP (0.032), PC (-0.034), PDMY (-0.001), ADMY (0.008), 
AEI (-0.008), AE2 (-0.010), and, AE3 (-0.011). Table 24, extracted from Table 19 
presents the test statistics o f paths emanated from ODMY. Three ODMY originated paths 
were tested and none of them were found statistically significant at p  < 0.05 value.
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Table 24. ODMY Category Level o f MAV Paths
PATHS Unstd.Effects




ODMY » SI » PP > ADMY « Accident 0.0002 No 0.0002
ODMY » SDMY » PDMY > AEI « Accident 0.0001 No 0.0002
ODMY » SDMY » PDMY > AV « Accident 0.0000 No 0.0001
4.8.2 Additional Paths for MAV model at/? <= 0.10
Observing Table 14, ORG-SP, ORG-AV, OP-AE2, OP-AV, OP-ADMY, ODMY- 
PP, SI-AE1, SP-AE1, SP-ADMY, SV-AE3, SDMY-AE1, PE-ADMY, PC-AV, PP-AV 
and PDMY-AE3 were found to have additional statistically significant correlations in 
MAV model at/? <= 0.10 level. Applying these correlations to path diagram, twenty four 
more paths were suggested as potentially statistically significant paths in addition to 
twenty six MAV paths at/? <=  0.05 level.
Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at 
p  <= 0.10 in Table 14, three models were analyzed for MAV accidents for potentially 
statistically significant MAV accident causal paths. The first MAV model (A) at p  < = 
0.10 level yielded unsatisfactory goodness o f fit values suggesting model revision. The 
second MAV model (B) at/? <=  0.10 level was constructed according the modification 
indices of the first model. These indices suggested applying four covariance among 
exogenous and error variables. The covariance applied were the same as in MAV model 
(B) a tp  < = 0.05 level; the exogenous variables o f ORG-ODMY and OP-ODMY and the 
error variables o f SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. Analysis and parameter summaries, models, 
unstandardized and standardized total, direct, indirect effects, modification indices,
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model fit summary, and path diagrams of the first MAV model (A) at p  < = 0.10 level are 
presented in Appendix H.
The second model (B) o f MAV at/? < = 0.10 level yielded better goodness o f fit 
indices. The path diagram of the second MAV model (B) at/? <= 0.10 level is presented 
























Figure 11. Path Diagram of Revised MAV M odel (B) at p  <= 0.10 Level
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The third model (C) was constructed according to the p  < = 0.10 level o f 
regression weights o f the second model (B) and statistically non-significant relationships 
that were utilized in the path analysis. Based on these assessments a path, OP-SV, was 
pruned to improve the second model in terms o f goodness o f fit statistics. This third 
model (C) presented similar fit statistics with the second model (B) implying small 
amount difference between the pruned (C) and non-pruned model (B). Since the overall 
model Chi-sq/df, CFI, GFI, and RMSEA statistics did not change significantly, the 
second model (B) was selected as the actual one to be utilized in the model assessments. 
The detailed AMOS output o f the third (C) model is presented in Appendix J. The 
goodness o f fit indices of MAV model at p  < = 0.10 level for three models are presented 
in Table 25.
Table 25. The Goodness o f  Fit Indices o f  MAV Models at p  <= 0.10 Level
MAV p < Q . \ Model
Chi-sq/df 




















In model B, the loadings o f Accident on AV was not statistically significant at p  
< =0.1 . Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient of -0.053 and standard error o f 0.033 
yielding a CR o f -1.613 for a 10.7% significance level. Since both Reason’s Swiss 
Cheese model and the design of the HFACS coding system assume that if  an unsafe act 
occurs an accident results AV was retained in model B for comparability with the MAV 
{p <= 0.05) and UAV structural equation models. Accident loading onto AEI was 
statistically significant with a coefficient o f -1.122 and standard error o f 0.097 yielding a 
CR of -11.563 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE2 was 
statistically significant with a coefficient o f -0.281 and standard error o f 0.078 yielding a 
CR of -3.596 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE3 was 
statistically significant with a coefficient o f -0.081 and standard error o f 0.043 yielding a 
CR of -1.884 for a significance of 6.0%.
Statistical tests and Pareto rankings o f the additional 24 paths were performed for 
unstandardized path effects to identify the statistically significant and main contributing 
paths. Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation o f Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
model o f accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p  value <=0.10 
suggested the fifty potentially statistically significant MAV accident causal paths to be 
tested in path analysis. Table 26 presents the path Pareto analysis o f unstandardized 
effects and statistically significant paths at/? <=  0.10 level.
From Table 26, eight out of fifty paths for the (3 *  0 case were found statistically 
significant at p  value <= 0.3439. The unstandardized paths that exhibit the most positive 
effect relative to the mean model effect on accidents are OC>SDMY>PC>AEl with 
effect 0.0847 and CR = 1.3111, OC>SDMY>PDMY>AEl with effect 0.0224 and CR =
0.4953, OC>SP>PE>ADMY with effect 0.0190 and CR = 0.9313, OC>SDMY>PC>AE2 
with effect 0.0177 and CR = 1.2741, ORG>SP>PC>AEl with effect 0.0167 and CR = 
1.0882, and ORG>SDMY>PC>AEl with effect 0.0102 and CR = 0.8741. The paths 
with the most negative effect relative to the mean model effect are OC>SP>PC>AEl 
with effect -0.1990 and CR = -1.7931, OC>SP>PC>AE2 with effect -0.0416 and CR = - 
1.7164, OC>SI>PDMY>AE 1 with effect -0.0264 and CR = -0.5492, 
OC>SV>PDMY>AEl with effect -0.0220 and CR = -0.5156, and OC>SP>PC>AE3 with 
effect -0.0081 and CR = -1.3452. Paths OC>SP>PC>AEl, OC>SP>PC>AE2, and 
OC>SP>PC>AE3 were statistically significant in the MAV (p < = 0.05) model. The 
paths OC>SP>PC>AEl and OC>SP>PC>AE2 are statistically significant exhibiting the 
most negative effect. The standardized paths that exhibit the most positive effect on 
accidents are OC>SDMY>PC>AEl, ORG>SP>PC>AEl, OC>SP>PE>ADMY, and 
ORG>SDMY>PC>AEl. The standardized paths with the most negative effect relative to 
the mean are OC>SP>PC>AEl, OC>SP>PC>AE2, OC>SP>PC>AE3 and 
ORG>SI>PDMY>AEl.
For the case o f |3 = 0, eight paths were found statistically significant at p  value <= 
0.3439. The observation that OC>SI>PDMY>AEl with CR=-1.2422 and 
OC>SV>PDMY>AEl with CR=-1.270 were statistically significant for the p = 0 case 
but with CR = -0.5492 and CR=-0.5156 were not statistically significant for the p * 0 
case supports the supposition that development of an optimal path pruning process will 
reveal more statistically significant paths in a reduced model.
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OP 8 OC OC 8 OC
PATHS (additional paths from M A V p< = O.lOmodel) Unstd.
Effects SE|3*0 CR SEp=0 CR Std. Effects
ORG » SP > PC » AEI « Accident 0.0167 0.0153 1.0882 0.0094 1.7746 0.0046
ORG » SP > PC » AE2 « Accident 0.0035 0.0033 1.0633 0.0068 0.515 0.0022
ORG » SP » PC » A D « Accident 0.0007 0.0007 0.9188 0.0037 0.1847 0.0015
ORG > SP > PC » AV « Accident 0.0001 0.0001 0.5776 0.0028 0.0295 0.0003
ORG > SP > pp » AV « Accident 0 0.0001 0.5209 0.0028 0.0128 0.0001
ORG » SP > PDMY » AE2 < Accident 0 0.0004 -0.0441 0.0073 -0.0021 -0.0001
ORG > SP > PDMY » A D < Accident 0 0.0001 -0.1231 0.0039 -0.0028 -0.0002
ORG » SI » PP > AV « Accident 0 0.0001 -0.1425 0.0035 -0.0053 -0.0001
OC » SI » PP > AV « Accident -0.0001 0.0005 -0.1439 0.0063 -0.0108 -0.0001
OC » SP > PC > AV « Accident •0.001 0.0013 -0.737 0.0063 -0.1571 -0.0008
OC » SI » PP > AV « Accident -0.0001 0.0005 -0.1439 0.0063 -0.0108 -0.0001
ODMY » SI » PP » AV « Accident 0 0.0001 -0.133 0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0001
ORG » SP » PDMY > AEI « Accident -0.0002 0.0024 -0.1001 0.0101 -0.0242 -0.0007
OP » SDMY » PDMY > A D « Accident 0.0003 0.0017 0.1982 0.0092 0.0376 0.0002
OP » SDMY » PDMY > A D « Accident 0.0002 0.0004 0.6413 0.005 0.0485 0.0005
OP » SDMY » PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0.0002 0.1322 0.0038 0.0052 0.0001
ORG » SI » PDMY > AEI « Accident -0.0072 0.0133 -0.5423 0.0117 -0.6122 -0.002
OC > SI > PDMY » AEI « Accident -0.0264 0.0481 -0.5492 0.0213 -1.2422 -0.0015
OP » SI » PDMY > AEI < Accident -0.0055 0.0106 -0.5146 0.012 -0.4556 -0.0014
ODMY » SI > PDMY » AEI « Accident -0.0062 0.0125 -0.4978 0.0138 -0.4534 -0.0016
OC » SP > PDMY > AEI « Accident 0.0029 0.0244 0.1189 0.0226 0.1285 0.0017
OP » SV > PDMY » A D « Accident 0 0.0001 -0.3921 0.0032 -0.0093 -0.0001
OC » SDMY > PDMY > AEI « Accident 0.0224 0.0453 0.4953 0.0249 0.901 0.0012






4.8.3 UAV MODEL, (N = 60,/? <= 0.05)
Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at 
p  <= 0.05 in Table 15, three models were analyzed for UAV accidents for potentially 
statistically significant UAV accident causal paths. The first UAV model (A) at p <  =
0.05 level yielded unsatisfactory goodness of fit values suggesting model revision. The 
second UAV model (B) at p  < = 0.05 level was constructed according the modification 
indices o f the first model. These indices suggested applying four covariance among 
exogenous and error variables. The covariance applied were the exogenous variables of 
ORG-ODMY and OP-ODMY and the error variables o f SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. The 
covariance selected according to modification indices were all related to dummy 
variables of the first three levels. Analysis and parameter summaries, models, 
unstandardized and standardized total, direct, indirect effects, modification indices, 
model fit summary, and path diagrams of the first UAV model (A) at p  < = 0.05 level are 
presented in Appendix K. Since no path was founded to be pruned, the second model (B) 
was selected as the actual one to be utilized in model assessments. The path diagram of 




































Figure 12. Path Diagram of Revised UAV Model (B) at p  <= 0.05 Level
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The second model (B) o f UAV at p  < = 0.05 level yielded better goodness o f fit indices. 
The detailed AMOS output o f the second (B) are presented in Appendix L. The goodness 
of fit indices of UAV model a tp  <= 0.05 level for two models are presented in Table 27.
Table 27. The Goodness of Fit Indices of UAV Models at p  <= 0.05 Level
UAV p  < 0.05 Models
Chi-sq/df 















In model B, the loadings o f Accident on AV and AE3 were not statistically significant at 
p  <= 0.05. Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient o f -0.022 and standard error o f 
0.038 yielding a critical ratio (CR) of -0.571 for a 56.8% significance level. Accident 
loaded on AE3 with a coefficient of -0.132 and standard error o f 0.084 yielding a CR of 
-1.584 for an 11.3% significance level. Since both Reason’s Swiss Cheese model and the 
design of the HFACS coding system assume that if  an unsafe act occurs an accident 
results both AV and AE3 were retained in model B for subsequent comparability with the 
UAV (p <=  0.10) and MAV structural equation models. Accident loading onto AEI was 
statistically significant with a coefficient o f -1.108 and standard error o f 0.174 yielding a 
CR of -6.377 for a significance o f less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE2 was
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statistically significant with a coefficient o f -0.545 and standard error o f 0.159 yielding a 
CR of -3.428 for a significance o f less than 0.1%.
Statistical tests and Pareto rankings o f the paths were performed for 
unstandardized path effects to identify the statistically significant and main contributing 
paths. Given the constraint o f the HFACS implementation o f Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
model of accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p  value <= 0.05 
that suggested fourteen potentially statistically significant UAV accident causal paths 
were tested in path analysis. Table 28 presents the path Pareto analysis o f unstandardized 
effects and statistically significant paths in UAV accidents a l p <  = 0.1855 level.
From Table 28, none o f the fourteen paths were found statistically significant at p  
value <= 0.1855 for both the p * 0 case and the p = 0 case. That is none o f the path 
effects statistically differed from the model mean effect on accidents. Within the range 
of model effects, the unstandardized and standardized paths that exhibit the most positive 
effect on accidents are ODMY>SDMY>PC>AEl with effect 0.0366 and CR = 0.7917 
and ODMY>SI>PP>AE3 with effect 0.0017 and CR = 0.6033. The unstandardized and 
standardized paths with the most negative effect within the range o f model effects are 
ODMY>SDMY>PC>AE2 with effect -0.0241 and CR = -0.9089,
ORG>SDMY>PC>AEl with effect -0.0113 and CR = -0.2689, and 
ODMY>SDMY>PC>ADMY with effect -0.0099 and CR = -0.7019.
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Table 29. Standardized Total Effects o f UAV Model at p  <= 0.05 Level
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
sv -.213 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDMY .307 .000 .044 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.233 .110 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.065 .034 .001 .000 .026 .314 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .052 .000 .007 .000 .168 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDMY -.010 -.003 .002 .137 .041 -.027 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADMY -.010 .000 -.001 .015 -.025 -.003 .969 -000 -.179 .112
AE3 -.016 .009 .000 -.003 .005 .079 -.196 .249 .000 -.022
AV .001 .000 .000 -.012 -.004 .002 -.074 .000 .000 -.086
AE2 .027 .000 .004 .003 .090 -.001 -.348 .000 .528 .023
AE1 .024 .000 .003 -.001 .079 .000 -.564 .000 .468 -.006
ORG
HFACS DOD category ORG had significant correlations with PC (-0.255), 
PDMY (0.245), AE1 (-0.260), and ADMY (0.265), presented in Table 15. As 
standardized total effects presented in Table 29, ORG, had effects on SDMY (0.044), PP 
(0.001), PC (0.007), PDMY (0.002), ADMY (-0.001), AE2 (0.004), and AE1 (0.003). 
Table 30, extracted from Table 28, presents the test statistics o f paths emanated from 
ORG category level. Three paths were tested and no paths were found statistically 
significant a tp  <=0.1855 value.
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Table 30. ORG Category Level o f UAV Paths
PATHS Unstd.Effects




ORG > SDMY > PC » AE2 « Accident -0.0050 No -0.0014
ORG > SDMY > PC » AE1 « Accident -0.0113 No -0.0020
ORG > SDMY > PC > ADMY « Accident -0.0020 No -0.0013
OP
HFACS DOD category OP has significant correlations with only SI (0.233) 
presented in Table 15. As standardized total effects presented in Table 29, OP had effects 
on SI (0.110), PP (0.034), PDMY (-0.003), AE3 (0.009). Table 31, extracted from Table 
28, presents the test statistics o f paths emanated from OP category level. Two paths were 
tested and no path was found statistically significant at p  < = 0.1855 value.
Table 31. OP Category Level o f UAV Paths
PATHS Unstd.Effects




OP » SI » PP » AE3 « Accident -0.0007 No -0.0017
OP » SI » PDMY » AV « Accident -0.0000 No -0.0002
ODMY
As presented in Table 15, the HFACS DOD category ODMY in UAV accidents 
has statistically significant correlations with SI (-0.283), SDMY (0.255), PC (-0.234), 
PDMY (-0.240), AE1 (0.336), and AE2 (0.246). SV, located at the second main level of 
DOD HFACS, did not have any statistically significant correlation with the exogenous 
variables present at the first level, ORG, OP, ODMY. To this end a path from ODMY to
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SV was drawn to exemplify the Reason model. As standardized total effects presented in 
Table 29, ODMY had effect on SV (-0.213), SI (-0.233), SDMY (0.307), PP (-0.065), PC 
(0.052), PDMY (-0.010), ADMY (-0.010), AE3 (-0.016), AV (0.001), AE2 (0.027), and, 
AE1 (0.024). Table 32, extracted from Table 28, presents the test statistics o f paths 
emanated from ODMY category level. Nine paths were tested and no paths were found 
statistically significant at p  < = 0.1855 value.
Table 32. ODMY Category Level of LAV Paths
PATHS Unstd.
Effects




ODMY » SDMY > PC » AE1 « Accident 0.0366 No 0.0103
ODMY » SI » PP » AE3 « Accident 0.0017 No 0.0036
ODMY » SDMY > PC > ADMY « Accident -0.0099 No -0.0089
ODMY » SDMY > PC » AE2 « Accident -0.0241 No -0.0095
ODMY » SI > PDMY > ADMY « Accident 0.0007 No 0.0007
ODMY » SI > PDMY > AV « Accident 0.0000 No 0.0004
ODMY > SV > PDMY > AV « Accident 0.0000 No -0.0019
ODMY > SV > PDMY > AE3 « Accident -0.0001 No -0.0001
ODMY » SDMY » PP » AE3 « Accident -0.0002 No -0.0004
4.8.4 Additional Paths for UAV model at p  <= 0.10
Observing Table 16; OP-SV, OP-SDMY, OP-AE1, ODMY-SV, SDMY-PC, 
SDMY-AE3, PP-ADMY, PDMY-AE1, PDMY-AE2, and, PDMY-ADMY were found as 
additional statistically significant correlations in UAV model at/? <=  0.10 level. 
Applying these correlations to path diagram seven more paths were suggested as 
potentially statistically significant paths in addition to fourteen UAV paths at p  < = 0.05 
level.
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Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at 
p  <= 0.10 in Table 16, three models were analyzed for UAV accidents for potentially 
statistically significant UAV accident causal paths. The first UAV model (A) at p  < =
0.10 level yielded unsatisfactory goodness o f fit values suggesting model revision. The 
second UAV model (B) at p  < = 0.10 level was constructed according the modification 
indices o f the first model. These indices suggested applying four covariance among 
exogenous and error variables. The covariance applied were the same as in UAV model
(B) at p <  = 0.05 level; the exogenous variables o f ORG-ODMY, OP-ODM Y and error 
variables o f SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. Analysis and parameter summaries, models, 
unstandardized and standardized total, direct, indirect effects, modification indices, 
model fit summary, and path diagrams of the first UAV model (A) at p < =  0.10 level are 
presented in Appendix M.
The second model (B) o f UAV at p  <= 0.10 level yielded better goodness o f fit 
indices. The path diagram of the second UAV model (B) at/? <= 0.10 level is presented 
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Figure 13. Path Diagram of Revised UAV M odel (B) at p  <= 0.10 Level
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The third model (C) was constructed according to the p  < = 0.10 level o f 
regression weights o f the second model (B) and statistically non-significant relationships 
that were utilized in the path analysis. Based on these assessments a path, OP-SV was 
pruned to improve the second model in terms o f goodness o f fit results. This third model
(C) presented similar fit statistics with the second model (B) implying small amount 
difference between the pruned (C) and non-pruned model (B). Since the overall model 
Chi-sq/df, CFI, GFI, and RMSEA statistics did not change significantly, the second 
model (B) was selected as the actual one to be utilized in the model assessments. The 
detailed AMOS output o f the third (C) model is presented in Appendix O. The goodness 
o f fit indices o f UAV model at/? <=  0.10 level for three model are presented in Table 33.
Table 33. Goodness of Fit Indices o f UAV Models at p  <= 0.10 Level
UAV
p  <= 0.10 Model
Chi-sq/df 



















In model B, the loadings o f Accident on AV and AE3 were not statistically significant at 
p  < = 0.10. Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient o f -0.026 and standard error o f
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0.038 yielding a critical ratio (CR) of -0.687 for a 49.2% significance level. Accident 
loaded on AE3 with a coefficient of -0.134 and standard error o f 0.084 yielding a CR of 
-1.585 for an 11.3% significance level. Since both Reason’s Swiss Cheese model and the 
design of the HFACS coding system assume that if  an unsafe act occurs an accident 
results both AV and AE3 were retained in model B for comparability with the UAV {p 
< = 0.05) and MAV structural equation models. Accident loading onto AE1 was 
statistically significant with a coefficient o f -1.130 and standard error o f 0.174 yielding a 
CR of -6.502 for a significance o f less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE2 was 
statistically significant with a coefficient o f -0.550 and standard error o f 0.160 yielding a 
CR of -3.430 for a significance o f less than 0.1%.
Statistical tests and Pareto rankings o f the paths were performed for 
unstandardized path effects to identify the statistically significant and main contributing 
paths. Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation o f Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
model o f accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p  value <=0.10 
that suggested the twenty one potentially statistically significant UAV accident causal 
paths were tested in path analysis. Table 34 present the path Pareto analysis o f 
unstandardized effects and statistically significant paths in UAV accidents at p  < = 0.10 
level.
From Table 34, none of twenty one paths were found statistically significant at p  
value <= 0.3439 for the {3 * 0 case. One path was found statistically significant at p  value 
<= 0.3439 for the P = 0 case. The unstandardized paths that exhibit the most positive 
effect within the range o f the mean model effect on accidents are 
ODMY>SI>PP>ADMY with effect 0.0118 and CR = 0.6903, and ODMY>SI>PP>AE3
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with effect 0.0023 and CR = 0.6251. For the p = 0 case, the path 
ODMY>SDMY>PC>AEl is statistically significant. The paths with the most negative 
effect within the range o f the mean model effect are ORG>SDMY>PC>AEl with effect 
-0.0689 and CR = -0.7863, ODMY>SDMY>PC>AE2 with effect -0.0286 and CR = 
-0.7574, and ORG>SDMY>PC>AEl with effect -0.0197 and CR = -0.3451.
PATHS(fiist 14UAV/) <= 0.05 model; last 7 UAV/? < = O.lOmodel) Unstd.
Effects
SE
CR SE (3=0 CR Std. Effects
p*o
ODMY » SI » PP » AE3 « Accident 0.0023 0.0037 0.6251 0.0167 0.1365 0.0046
ODMY » SI > PDMY » ADMY « Accident 0.0008 0.0117 0.0684 0.0719 0.0112 0.0007
ODMY » SI > PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0.0001 0.0333 0.0073 0.0006 0.0001
OP » SI > PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0.0001 -0.0172 0.007 -0.0002 0
ODMY » sv > PDMY > AE3 « Accident 0 0.0006 -0.0135 0.0126 -0.0006 0
ODMY » sv > PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0.0001 -0.1395 0.0057 -0.0021 -0.0001
ODMY » SDMY » PP » AE3 « Accident -0.0003 0.0036 -0.0785 0.0203 -0.0138 -0.0006
OP » SI » PP » A D « Accident -0.0007 0.0024 -0.2844 0.016 -0.0429 -0.0015
ORG > SDMY > PC > ADMY « Accident -0.0034 0.0119 -0.2839 0.0636 -0.053 -0.0021
ORG > SDMY » PC » A D « Accident -0.0082 0.0243 -0.3361 0.0298 -0.2742 -0.0022
ODMY » SDMY > PC » ADMY « Accident -0.0118 0.0195 -0.6049 0.0694 -0.1698 -0.0108
ORG > SDMY » PC » AE1 « Accident -0.0197 0.057 -0.3451 0.0353 -0.5569 -0.0034
ODMY » SDMY » PC » A D « Accident -0.0286 0.0378 -0.7574 0.0326 -0.8791 -0.0113
ODMY » SDMY » PC » AE1 « Accident -0.0689 0.0876 -0.7863 0.0386 -1.7853 -0.017
ODMY » SI » PP » ADMY « Accident 0.0118 0.0172 0.6903 0.0605 0.1958 0.0109
OP > SV > PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0.0001 0.1213 0.0054 0.0017 0.0001
ODMY » SDMY > PDMY > A D « Accident 0 0.0014 0.005 0.0202 0.0003 0
OP > SV > PDMY > A D « Accident 0 0.0005 0.0118 0.0121 0.0005 0
ODMY » SDMY > PDMY > AE1 « Accident 0 0.0281 -0.0012 0.0494 -0.0007 0
ODMY » SDMY > PDMY » A D « Accident -0.0003 0.011 -0.0246 0.0416 -0.0065 -0.0001

















4.9 Comparative Model Analysis
This part o f the analysis is conducted for the purpose of answering the third 
research question of whether there is a common statistically significant path between 
UAV and MAV accidents in terms of HFACS categorical levels. These two aircraft types 
are compared in three different ways to examine the findings. The first comparison is 
made with factor analysis, using the Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16 at two levels o f the two 
aircraft type, UAV and MAV. The second comparison is made via contrasting the results 
of the path analysis for each aircraft type, MAV and UAV. The third comparison is 
conducted via fitting MAV data to the UAV model at two significance levels to identify 
similar paths within the context o f DOD HFACS. UAV data could not be fit to the MAV 
model due to insufficient degrees o f freedom from the sample size.
4.9.1 First Comparison: Common Correlations Extracted from Factor Analysis
The first comparison is made based on the results o f  the factor analysis using the 
Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16 at two levels for the two aircraft types, UAV and MAV. Table 
35 presents the common correlations among DOD HFACS levels within the context of 
UAV and MAV accidents extracted by the means o f factor analysis at two significance 
levels.
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Table 35. Common Correlations between UAV and MAV Accidents
FROM LOW ER LEVEL
ORG PC (-) PDMY AE1 (-) ADMY
OP SI SV* SDMY* (-) AE1* (-)




PC AE1 AE2 ADMY (-)
PDMY AE2* (-) ADMY*
* Common statistically significant correlation at/? <= 0.10 level 
(-) Negatively correlated
4.9.2 Second Comparison: Common Paths Extracted by Path Analysis
The second comparison of this part is conducted via contrasting the results o f the 
path analysis for each aircraft type, MAV and UAV. The results extracted in accordance 
with the path analysis are compared in two significance levels. No statistically significant 
path was found as common between UAV and MAV accidents at p  < = 0.05 and p  < —
0.1 levels.
4.9.3 Third Comparison: Model with Reciprocal Data
The third comparison is conducted via applying MAV data to UAV model at two 
significance levels to contrast similar statistically significant paths within the context of 
DOD HFACS. UAV data could not be fit to MAV model due to insufficient degrees o f 
freedom from the sample size. In this comparison the standardized total effects o f the 
respective analysis are compared to contrast the similar paths. As discerning criteria for 
similar paths between the two different models, the statistically significance paths in 
UAV model are compared with “UAV Model with MAV Data”.
102
4.9.3.1 UAV Model with MAV Data at p  < = 0.05 level (N = 203)
Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at 
p  <= 0.05 in Table 15, two models were analyzed for “UAV model with MAV data” for 
potentially statistically significant UAV accident correlations using MAV data. The first 
“UAV model with MAV data” (A) at p  < = 0.05 level yielded unsatisfactory goodness of 
fit values suggesting model revision. The second model (B) at p < = 0.05 level was 
constructed according the modification indices o f the first model. These indices 
suggested applying four covariance among exogenous and error variables. The 
covariance applied were the exogenous variables o f ORG-ODMY, OP-ODMY, and error 
variables of SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. The covariance selected according to 
modification indices were all related to dummy variables o f the first three levels.
Analysis and parameter summaries, models, unstandardized and standardized total, 
direct, indirect effects, modification indices, model fit summary, and path diagrams of the 
first “UAV model with MAV data” (A) at p  < -  0.05 level are presented in Appendix P. 
Since the UAV models at both levels used the second model (B), this analysis utilized the 
second model for the purpose o f comparison. The path diagram of the second “UAV 
model with MAV data” model (B) at p <  = 0.05 level is presented in Figure 14.
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UAV model with MAV data 
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Figure 14. Path Diagram o f Revised “UAV Model with MAV Data” (B) at p  <=
0.05 Level
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The second model (B) o f “UAV model with MAV data” at p  <— 0.05 level 
yielded better goodness o f fit indices. The detailed AMOS output o f the second (B) is 
presented in Appendix Q. The goodness o f  fit indices o f “UAV model with MAV data” at 
p  <= 0.05 level for two models are presented in Table 36.
Table 36. Goodness of Fit Indices of UAV Models W ith MAV Data at p  <-  0.05
Level
UAV model with MAV data p  < 
0.05 Model Value
Chi-sq/df A 10.466
(1.0 < x2 / d f < 3.0) B 3.784
CFI A 0.201
(0.95 < CFI) B 0.779
GFI A 0.713
(0.9 < GFI) B 0.867
RMSEA A 0.216
(around 0.05) B 0.117
In model B, the loading o f Accident on AV was not statistically significant at p  
<=0.05. Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient of -0.057 and standard error of 0.032 
yielding a CR o f -1.778 for a 7.5% significance level. Since both Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
model and the design of the HFACS coding system assume that if an unsafe act occurs an 
accident results, AV was retained in model B for subsequent comparability with the 
“UAV model with MAV data” (p <= 0.10). Accident loading onto AE1 was statistically 
significant with a coefficient of -1.100 and standard error o f 0.096 yielding a CR of 
-11.432 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE2 was statistically 
significant with a coefficient o f -0.290 and standard error o f 0.077 yielding a CR of
105
-3.769 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loaded on AE3 with a coefficient of 
-0.098 and standard error of 0.044 yielding a CR o f -2.225 for a 2.6% significance level.
Statistical tests and Pareto rankings of the paths were performed for 
unstandardized path effects to identify the statistically significant and main contributing 
paths. Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation o f  Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
model o f accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p  value <= 0.05 
that suggested the fourteen potentially statistically significant “UAV model with MAV 
data” accident causal paths were tested in path analysis. Table 37 presents the path Pareto 
analysis o f unstandardized effects and statistically significant paths in “UAV model with 
MAV data” accidents at p  < = 0.1855 level. From Table 37, none o f the fourteen paths 





CR SE p=0 CR Std. Effects
ORG > SDMY » PC » AE1 « Accident 0.0037 0.0071 0.5253 0.0087 0.4245 0.0011
ORG > SDMY » PC » AE2 « Accident 0.0006 0.0012 0.5026 0.0063 0.0% 0.0004
ODMY » SDMY > PC » AEi « Accident 0.0036 0.0074 0.4822 0.0099 0.3595 0.0009
ORG » SDMY » PC » ADMY « Accident 0.0011 0.0024 0.4798 0.0211 0.054 0.001
ODMY > SDMY > PC » AE2 « Accident 0.0006 0.0013 0.4621 0.0072 0.0812 0.0004
ODMY » SDMY » PC » ADMY « Accident 0.0011 0.0025 0.4417 0.024 0.0457 0.0009
ODMY > SI » PP » A D « Accident 0 0.0001 0.2965 0.0042 0.0101 0.0001
OP » SI > PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0 0.0392 0.0026 0.0005 0
OP » SI » PP » A D « Accident 0 0.0001 -0.0278 0.0038 -0.0005 0
ODMY » SV > PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0 -0.3158 0.0023 -0.004 0
ODMY > SI > PDMY > ADMY « Accident -0.0007 0.002 -0.3488 0.0255 -0.0278 -0.0006
ODMY > s v > PDMY > A D « Accident 0 0.0001 -0.4335 0.0151 -0.0029 -0.0001
ODMY » SI > PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0.0001 -0.4361 0.0029 -0.0094 -0.0001















4.9.3.2 UAV Model with MAV Data aXp <= 0.10 level (N = 203)
Based on the relationships (Pearson correlations) found statistically significant at 
p  < = 0.10 in Table 16, two models were analyzed for “UAV model with MAV data” 
potentially statistically significant UAV accident correlations using MAV data. The first 
“UAV model with MAV data” (A) at p  < = 0 .10  level yielded unsatisfactory goodness of 
fit values suggesting model revision. The second model (B) at p  < = 0.10 level was 
constructed according the modification indices o f the first model. These indices 
suggested applying four covariance among exogenous and error variables. The 
covariance applied were the exogenous variables o f ORG-ODMY, OP-ODMY, and error 
variables o f SI-SDMY and PC-PDMY. Analysis and parameter summaries, models, 
unstandardized and standardized total, direct, indirect effects, modification indices, 
model fit summary, and path diagrams o f the first “UAV model with MAV data” (A) at p  
< =0.10 level are presented in Appendix R. Since the UAV models at both levels used 
the second model (B), this analysis utilized the second model for the purpose of 
comparisons. The path diagram of the second “UAV model with MAV data” model (B) 
a tp  < = 0.10 level is presented in Figure 15.
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Figure 15. Path Diagram o f Revised “UAV Model with MAV Data” (B) at p <=
0.10 Level
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The second model (B) o f “UAV model with MAV data” at/? <=  0.10 level 
yielded better goodness o f fit indices. The detailed AMOS output o f the second (B) is 
presented in Appendix S. The goodness o f fit indices for two models are presented in 
Table 38.
Table 38. Goodness o f Fit Indices o f UAV Model with MAV Data at p  <= 0.1
Level
UAV model with MAV data 
/?< 0.1 Model
Chi-sq/df A 10.837
(1 .0 < x 2 /d f< 3 .0 ) B 3.837
CFI A 0.207
(0.95 < CFI) B 0.781
GFI A 0.715
(0.9 < GFI) B 0.870
RMSEA A 0.221
(around 0.05) B 0.120
In model B, the loadings o f Accident on AE1, AE2, AE3 and AV were 
statistically significant at/? <= 0.10. Accident loading onto AE1 was statistically 
significant with a coefficient o f -1.102 and standard error o f 0.096 yielding a CR of 
-11.471 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loading onto AE2 was statistically 
significant with a coefficient o f -0.288 and standard error o f 0.077 yielding a CR of 
-3.743 for a significance of less than 0.1%. Accident loaded on AE3 with a coefficient of 
-.099 and standard error o f 0.044 yielding a CR of -2.245 for a 2.5% significance level. 
Accident loaded on AV with a coefficient o f -0.058 and standard error o f 0.032 yielding a 
critical ratio (CR) of -1.808 for a 7.1% significance level.
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Statistical tests and Pareto rankings of the paths were performed for 
unstandardized path effects to identify the statistically significant and main contributing 
paths. Given the constraint of the HFACS implementation o f  Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
model of accident causation, the statistically significant correlations at p  value <=0.10 
suggested the twenty one potentially statistically significant “UAV model with MAV 
data” accident causal paths to be tested in path analysis. Table 39 presents the path Pareto 
analysis o f unstandardized effects and statistically significant paths in “UAV model with 
MAV data” accidents at p  < = 0.3439 level.






CR SEp=0 CR Std. Effects
ORG > SDMY » PC » AEI « Accident 0.0018 0.0044 0.4078 0.0093 0.1914 0.0005
ORG > SDMY > PC > ADMY « Accident 0.0007 0.0018 0.3848 0.0224 0.0303 0.0006
ORG > SDMY > PC > AE2 « Accident 0.0004 0.00 II 0.4127 0.0067 0.0658 0.0003
ODMY » SDMY » PP » A D « Accident 0 0.0004 0.0675 0.005 0.0051 0
ODMY » SI » PP » A D « Accident 0 0.0001 0.2058 0.0043 0.0057 0
OP » SI > PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0.0001 0.39% 0.0029 0.0079 0.0001
ODMY » SV > PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0 -0.0648 0.0025 -0.0006 0
ODMY » SV > PDMY > A D « Accident 0 0.0001 -0.0863 0.0035 -0.0022 0
ODMY » SI > PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0 -0.2843 0.003 -0.0046 -0.0001
OP » SI » PP » A D « Accident 0 0.000) -0.2844 0.0043 -0.0097 -0.0001
ODMY » SDMY > PC » A D « Accident -0.0001 0.0012 -0.0457 0.0084 -0.0065 0
ODMY » SDMY > PC > ADMY « Accident -0.0001 0.002 -0.043 0.0281 -0.003 -0.0001
ODMY » SDMY > PC » AEI « Accident -0.0002 0.0048 -0.0452 0.0116 -0.0189 -0.0001
ODMY » SI > PDMY > ADMY « Accident -0.0004 0.0016 -0.2705 0.0263 -0.0167 -0.0003
ODMY » SDMY > PDMY > AEI « Accident 0.0001 0.0041 0.0291 0.013 0.0092 0
ODMY » SI > PP » ADMY « Accident 0.0001 0.0008 0.10% 0.0226 0.0037 0.0001
OP » SV > PDMY > A D « Accident 0.0001 0.0001 0.4539 0.0035 0.0171 0.0001
OP » SV > PDMY > AV « Accident 0 0 0.3275 0.0025 0.0049 0
ODMY » SDMY > PDMY > AE2 « Accident 0 0.0007 0.0116 0.0093 0.0008 0
ODMY » SDMY > PDMY > AE3 « Accident 0 0.0003 -0.0641 0.0049 -0.0035 0






















4.10 Comparative Goodness o f Fit Statistics
All the first models (A) o f the respective aircraft type and significance level had 
low levels of fit within the context o f ( y l  / df), RMSEA, GFI, CFI statistics. Applying 
covariance to the second models (B), the results improved in fit indices. The third models 
were constructed to improve models according to respective regression weights o f the 
second models (B) and statistically non-significant relationships that were utilized in the 
path analysis. However; the results o f the third models (C) presented similar fit statistics 
with the second models (B) implying small amount difference between the pruned (C) 
and non-pruned models (B). Since the overall model Chi-sq/df, CFI, GFI, and RMSEA 
statistics did not change significantly, the second models (B) were selected as the actual 
models to be utilized in the analysis. The third models (C) were not applicable to UAV 
model at p  < = 0.05 level and “UAV model with MAV data” at both significance level. 
All the second (B) models of that utilized in analysis did not exactly fit but presented 
close satisfactory results in terms of goodness o f fit indices. The second UAV (B) models 
at both levels depicted fit measures in terms of y l  /  d f measures. The comparative 
measures of goodness of fit o f all models are presented in Table 40.
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A 8.637 8.972 4.865 5.038 10.466 10.837
B 3.722 3.806 2.252 2.322 3.784 3.896
C 3.667 3.76 - 2.291 - -
Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI) 0.95 < CFI
A 0.242 0.242 0.243 0.245 0.201 0.207
B 0.741 0.745 0.769 0.768 0.779 0.781
C 0.74 0.745 - 0.770 - -
Goodness o f  Fit 
Index (GFI) 0.9 < GFI
A 0.707 0.708 0.625 0.631 0.713 0.715
B 0.831 0.834 0.748 0.750 0.867 0.870
C 0.829 0.834 - 0.749 - -
Root Mean 






A 0.194 0.199 0.256 0.262 0.216 0.221
B 0.116 0.118 0.213 0.150 0.117 0.120
C 0.115 0.117 - 0.148 - -
4.11 Results o f the Hypothesis
Three main analyses, MAV models, UAV models and comparisons, were 
conducted to answer the three research questions. According first two main analyses, 
there were statistically significant causal paths at two levels, p  < = 0.1855 and p  < = 
0.3439 among MAV DOD HFACS Category levels shown in Tables 19 and 26. There 
were no statistically significant causal paths at p  < = 0.1855 among UAV DOD HFACS 
Category levels as shown in Table 28. There was one statistically significant causal path 
at p  < = 0.3439 among UAV DOD HFACS Category levels for the case P = 0 as shown
114
in Table 34. For the third question, there were no common statistically significant causal 
paths at two levels,/? <=  0.1855 and p <  = 0.3439, as shown in Tables 37 and 39. In that 
context:
H lo : There is no statistically significant causation path among the levels of 
HFACS in MAV accidents.
H l„: There is at least one statistically significant causation path among the levels 
o f HFACS in MAV accidents.
Conclusion: Based on critical ratios in Tables 19 and 26, statistically significant 
path effect coefficients were observed at joint a  = 0.1855 (a  = 0.05 individual 
direct effect coefficients) and joint a  = 0.3439 (a  = 0.10 individual direct effect 
coefficients) under both cases path p i- 0 and P = 0 for MAV accidents. Reject 
H lo  of no statistically significant causation path leading to MAV accidents and 
conclude that one or more statistically significant accident causation path(s) are 
identified by SEM analysis.
H20: There is no statistically significant causation path among the levels of 
HFACS in UAV accidents.
H2„: There is at least one statistically significant causation path among the levels 
o f HFACS in UAV accidents.
Conclusions: Based on critical ratios in Table 28, statistically significant path 
effect coefficients were not observed at joint a  = 0.1855 (a  = 0.05 individual 
direct effect coefficients) under both cases path p ^ 0 and p = 0 for UAV 
accidents. Fail to reject H2q o f no statistically significant causation path at joint
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a  = 0.1855 leading to UAV accidents and conclude that no statistically significant 
accident causation path(s) are identified by SEM analysis. Based on critical ratios 
in Table 34, statistically significant path effect coefficients were not observed at 
joint a  = 0.3439 (a  = 0.10 individual direct effect coefficients) under the case of 
path p # 0 for UAV accidents. Fail to reject H2o of no statistically significant 
causation path at joint a  = 0.3439 for the case o f path P # 0 leading to UAV 
accidents and conclude that no statistically significant accident causation path(s) 
are identified by SEM analysis. Conversely, based on critical ratios in Table 34, 
one statistically significant path effect coefficient was observed at joint a  =
0.3439 (a  = 0.10 individual direct effect coefficients) under the case of path p = 0 
for UAV accidents. Reject H2o of no statistically significant causation path at 
joint a  = 0.3439 for the case of path p = 0 leading to UAV accidents and conclude 
that statistically significant accident causation path(s) are identified by SEM 
analysis.
H3o: There is no common statistically significant path between UAV and MAV 
accident paths in terms of HFACS categorical levels.
H3a: There is at least one common statistically significant path between UAV and 
MAV accidents paths in terms of HFACS levels.
Conclusion: Based on critical ratios in Tables 37 and 39, statistically significant 
common path effect coefficients were not observed at joint a  = 0.1855 (a  = 0.05 
individual direct effect coefficients) and joint a  = 0.3439 (a  = 0.10 individual 
direct effect coefficients) under both cases path P ^  0 and P = 0 for MAV accident
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data fit to UAV accident models. Fail to reject H lo  of no statistically significant 
common causation paths between UAV and MAV accident paths and conclude 
that no statistically significant common accident causation path(s) are identified 
by SEM analysis.
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C H A PTER  5 
RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOM M ENDATIONS
This chapter discusses results, conclusions, and recommendations for future research 
from this investigation o f USAF MAV and UAV accident causes.
5.1 Introduction
The main objective of this study was to analyze the structural relationships o f 
accident causes among DOD HFACS levels in comparable UAVs and MAVs and to 
analyze any potential common relationships between UAV and MAV accident cause 
paths. In the pursuit of these objectives, this work developed two types o f analyses that 
are considered to contribute to the study MAV and UAV accident causes. The first 
analytical contribution was the structuring DOD HFACS accident codes such that they 
can be analyzed by attribute agreement analysis for inter-rater reliability estimates. The 
second analytical contribution was the normalization of DOD HFACS accident code data 
such that it can be analyzed for path effect and statistical significance within the 
structural equation modeling (SEM) methodology. These two analytical methods are 
discussed separately in order to establish their contributions to the analysis o f accident 
causes within the aviation domain and suggest their application to the analysis o f accident 
causes in other industrial, service, and governmental domains.
5.2 Inter-rater Reliability Results
The main contribution o f this study to inter-rater reliability analysis o f the 
assignment o f HFACS codes in MAV and UAV accident reports was the development of 
the inter-rater reliability attribute agreement analysis study methodology in Section 4.2.
1 1 8
Typically, attribute agreement analysis is applicable to units that require subjective 
assignment to one of a few categories. For example, the assignment o f a unit o f finished 
product to one of categories grade A, grade B, rework to the next higher grade, sell to 
third world, or scrap. Another example would be classification o f loan applications to 
very low, low, medium, or high risk or to reject categories. The entire unit is assigned to 
the category based on its cumulative characteristics. Given that there are three 
“Organizational Influences” categories, four “Unsafe Supervision” categories, three 
“Preconditions for Unsafe Acts” categories, and four “Unsafe Acts” categories plus one 
dummy variable for each category level, there a r e 4 x 5 x 4 > < 5  = 400 path classifications 
for each MAV or UAV accident under the HFACS. This number o f path classifications 
can be multiplied further, since USAF experts assign category codes that create partial 
paths and multiple paths within the same accident report. Thus, assignment o f an 
accident report to a discrete path classification is not always possible.
The attribute agreement analysis inter-rater reliability method developed as part of 
this work overcame this need for discrete path classification by:
• Treating each HFACS categorical level as an independent assignment. This 
decomposed each path by Reason’s Swiss Cheese model to four independent 
classification problems.
• Adding a dummy variable to each HFACS categorical level as a pass through 
category for accidents in which USAF investigators did not make code 
assignment for the given level.
• Normalizing the data into a Poisson process by dividing the number o f 
nanocode assignments within a respective category by the total number o f
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nanocodes within the categorical level plus one for the introduced dummy 
variable.
These modifications allowed each path to be treated as arising from a multiplicative 
process o f independent variables for subsequent SEM analysis.
The inter-rater reliability procedure developed in Section 3.1 was designed to 
verify the individual rater’s reliability before and after rating the 272 accident summaries. 
The first step was to establish the measurement standard for acceptable inter-rater 
agreement. To this end, this work relied on a prior study by O’Connor, et. al. (2010) 
indicating only a 55% agreement among raters o f aircraft accident reports. This study set 
the standard for between rater agreement and all raters’ agreement to experts’ 
classification at greater than or equal to 50% average or 50/50 odds of random 
assignment classification.
The second step was the tradeoff analysis between confidence in the difference to 
detect and the sampling resolution over a range o f sample sizes to select a sample size 
that provided > 90% confidence in detecting differences between any two raters from the 
p  = 0.50 base random assignment case.
The third step was development o f the seven step rater reliability method in 
Section 3.1. Step One decomposed the 75 detailed accident reports into ten training, 20 
pre-classification testing, and 30 inter-rater testing categories and randomly assigned 
each detailed accident report to each category. The three raters studied the ten training 
reports to develop their own classification scheme based on their observations o f USAF 
expert investigator HFACS code assignments. The three raters were then tested on a 
random sample o f ten reports out o f the 20 pre-classification testing reports for HFACS
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category assignment agreement in two rounds of attribute agreement analysis. The three 
raters achieved the greater than 50% average agreement for between raters and all raters’ 
agreement to experts’ classification on the second round. The first inter-rater reliability 
testing was conducted next on the 30 detailed reports and confirmed the greater than 50% 
average agreement for between raters and all raters’ agreement to experts’ classification. 
This pre-classification and inter-rater testing attribute agreement analyses can continue 
for multiple rounds until the between raters and all raters’ agreement to experts’ 
classification achieve the average agreement rating standard. The pre-classification and 
inter-rater testing attribute agreement analyses established the rater’s reliability a priori 
to rating the 272 accident summaries. After rating of the 272 accident summaries, the 
post inter-rater testing of 30 random samples from the 272 classified accident summaries 
by the three raters showed between rater agreement greater than the 50% average criteria 
establishing confidence that the summaries had been classified at a rate greater than 
50/50 odds random assignment and approaching the 55% agreement in prior studies by 
O’Connor, et. al. (2010).
Finally the categorical level classification scheme developed for this work 
transformed the HFACS classification data into a format suitable for attribute agreement 
analysis. Each categorical level was assigned multiple rows, one for each category 
assigned within the level. This allowed for multiple category assignments within a 
category level. In addition to the category codes and the dummy variable code, a code of 
“N” was assigned to show disagreement between raters within a categorical level or o f a 
rater with himself between replicates. This classification scheme is illustrated in Table 
41.
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Table 41. Accident Categorical Level Classification Scheme
Report R ater 1 R ater 1 R ater 2 R ater 2 R ater 3 R ater 3
M0020 F-16C-0 D D D D D D
M0020 F-16C-S D D D D D D
M0020 F-16C-P N N PC PC N PC
M0020 F-16C-P D D N N D N
M0020 F-16C-A SB SB SB SB SB SB
M0020 F-16C-A N N N JD N N
M0020 F-16C-A Ml MI MI N MI MI
M0604 C-5-0 D D D D D D
M0604 C-5-S SI SI SI SI SI SI
M0604 C-5-P PC PC PC PC PC PC
M0604 C-5-A N SB N N N N
M0604 C-5-A JD JD JD JD JD JD
M0710 V-16C-0 D D D D D D
M0710 V-16C-S D D D D D D
M0710 V-16C-P PC N N N N N
M0710 V-16C-P N N PP PP PP PP
M0710 V-16C-P N D N N N N
M0710 V-16C-A SB SB SB SB SB SB
M0710 V-16C-A N JD N N N N
5.3 Factor Analysis and Path Analysis
An exploratory factor analysis was used to reduce the number o f possible 400 
path classifications to the few potentially significant paths represented by the statistically 
significant inter-categorical Pearson correlations. The combinations of significant 
correlations from the from the “Organizational Influences” level to the “Unsafe Acts” 
level o f DOD HFACS variables were used to structure the hypothesized paths among the 
DOD HFACS category levels. As a result o f this analysis, 39 and 24 statistically 
significant correlations o f MAV and UAV accidents respectively were extracted at p <  = 
0.05 significance level. The numbers o f the correlations found at p  < -  0.10 levels were 
54 and 33 for MAV and UAV accidents respectively. From these correlations, 26 MAV 
paths and 14 UAV paths at correlation significance o fp  < — 0.05 level and 50 MAV paths
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and 21 UAV paths at p  < = 0.10 level were hypothesized for subsequent testing by the 
means of path analysis.
Current structural equation modeling software is not programmed to provide path 
coefficients and their standard errors in terms o f the HFACS accident cause assignments. 
Current SEM software, SPSS/AMOS included, provide bootstrap estimates o f 
unstandardized regression weights and standard errors. A contribution of this work in 
applying SEM analysis to DOD HFACS accident report classifications was the 
recognition that, because the covariance matrix provides independent estimates o f SEM 
direct effect coefficients between HFACS categorical levels, each HFACS path is 
composed of independent random variables o f SEM direct effect coefficients and their 
standard errors. Correspondingly, each path effect on Accident outcome is the ppath = po 
x Ps x Pp x Pa —> Accident product, and from mathematical statistics the principle o f the 
variance of the product o f independent random variables was applied to provide the two 
estimates o f path standard errors by which the Ppath /SEpath statistical significance could be 
tested.
Fifteen models for the two aircraft type, UAV and MAV at both significance 
levels, were hypothesized and six models were selected for structural equation modeling 
and path analysis. All the first models (A) o f the respective aircraft type and significance 
level had low levels of fit statistics within the context o f y2 / df, RMSEA, GFI, CFI 
values. All second SEM models (B) showed significantly improved fit indices. Third 
models were constructed according to respective regression weights o f the second models 
(B), but all third models did not show substantial improvements in fit indices. Thus, 
second models (B) were retained for path analyses. According to Byrne (2010), fit
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indices yield information bearing only on the model’s lack of fit and are unable to reflect 
the extent to which the model is plausible. The judgment o f plausibility rests squarely on 
the researcher.
In the MAV model, three paths, including no dummy variable, emanated from 
category OC were found to be statistically significant a tp  < -  0.1855 andp  < = 0.3439 
levels:
O OSP>PC>AE 1 
OOSP>PC>AE2 
OOSP>PC>AE3
Seven additional paths, five emanating from category OC, were found to be statistically 
significant at p  < = 0.3439 level.
OC>SDMY>PC>AE 1 (for p=0 and P*0)
OC>SDMY>PC>AE2 (for p=0 and p*0)
ORG>SP>PC>AE 1 (for p=0 and p<*0)
ORG>SP>PC>AE2 (for p*0)
OC>SDMY>PC>AE3 (for p*0)
OC>SV>PDM Y>AE 1 (forB=0)
OC>SI>PDM Y> AE1 (for B=0)
Thus for p * 0, it can be observed that at the “Organizational Influences” HFACS 
categorical the OC, organizational climate, was the main contributor to MAV accidents.
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At the “Unsafe Supervision” level, SP, planned inappropriate operations, was the main 
contributor. At the “Preconditions for Unsafe Acts” level, PC, condition of the 
individual, was the main contributor. At the “Unsafe Acts” level, AE1 skill based errors, 
AE2 judgment and decision making errors, and AE3 misperception errors all contributed 
to accidents with AE1 having the largest effect with coefficient -1.108, AE2 the next 
largest effect with coefficient -0.545, and AE3 the least effect with coefficient -0.132.
In the UAV model, one path was found to be statistically significant at the/? < = 
0.3439 level.
ODMY>SDMY>PC>AE 1
Thus, it can be observed that the organizational causal mechanisms that lead to 
UAV accidents are different from those that lead to MAV accidents. MAV accident 
causal paths involve all organizational levels, whereas UAV accident causes are located 
in the “Preconditions for Unsafe Acts” and the “Unsafe Acts” organizational levels. The 
commonality is that PC, condition of the individual, AE1, skill based errors are the main 
causal contributors to both MAV and UAV accidents.
Three different comparisons were conducted for the purpose o f the third research 
question whether there is a common statistically significant path between UAV and MAV 
accidents in terms of HFACS categorical levels. The first comparison was made between 
the results o f factor analyses, the second comparison was made via contrasting the results 
of the path analysis for each aircraft type, and the third comparison was conducted via 
applying MAV data to UAV model at two significance levels to contrast common paths 
within the context o f DOD HFACS.
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The first comparison was made according to factor analysis and yielded thirteen 
common correlations at the/? < = 0.05 level and nineteen common correlations at thep  
< =0.10  level between MAV and UAV. The second comparison was based on 
contrasting the results o f path analysis of two aircrafts. As reported above, no common 
statistically significant paths were identified.
The third comparison was conducted applying MAV data to the UAV models at 
two significance levels to contrast common statistically significant paths within the 
context o f DOD HFACS. As reported in Chapter 4, applying MAV data to UAV models 
and comparing the results with UAV model showed no statistically signficant common 
paths under the constraint of Reason’s Swiss Cheese model requiring full paths through 
all organizational levels. As noted above partial common paths exist at the "Preconditions 
for Unsafe Acts” and the “Unsafe Acts” organizational levels.
In conventional organizations, each level is generally responsible for its 
respective and lower levels. While it is difficult or not possible to amend or correct the 
higher level decisions or errors, end-users are not always able to detect these errors 
originated from the top level. The problem to be addressed within the context of 
organizational management is finding out the structure o f the accident paths from the top 
levels to end users. Organizations concerned with accidents and human factors can utilize 
this methodology and find the respective failure model.
Another point is that each sector or domain may have different type of failure 
models. While Reason’s failure model can be appropriate for traditional organizations, 
the model might not be suitable for organizations having low hierarchy or technology 
driven-complex structures. As Bar-Yam (2004) states, the complex mission is one that
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has a large number o f possible unsuccessful! actions. Flight, the core activity o f aviation, 
can be considered as a complex mission and an air force as a complex organziation. 
Considering the Reason’s model as a base structure, HFACS and the structural 
assessments presented in this study can be utilized to identify the failure model of an 
organization. Accurate identification o f the failure model o f an organization can provide 
enhanced interventions and improvements in system safety in terms o f human factors.
Originally developed for the nuclear power industry, Reason’s model is adapted 
to aviation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) and has been studied in different types of 
domains such as maintenance (Krulak, 2004), shipping (Celik & Cebi, 2009), motor 
vehicle accidents (Iden, 2012), and mining (Lenne, Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 2012). These 
studies utilized HFACS taxonomy as a framework to adapt the Reason model to their 
respective organization or domain. Considering differences o f these areas and the type of 
technology operated, the failure models can be different from the Reason’s approach, 
suggesting more dynamic and complex structures or activities.
The levels set forth by Reason can be customized to a variety o f organizations 
according to their decision making process, hierarchical structure, and technology being 
used. In that context, HFACS can be used as the mean o f determining the failure structure 
by classifying and analyzing the accidents, mishaps, or near misses. Improving and 
adapting Reason’s model (1990) by the means o f adapted HFACS taxonomy can 
contribute to organizations ability to comprehend the failure structure and elaborate a 
variety of intervention strategies.
Given the identification o f significant causation paths of an organization by the 
methodology set forth in this study, new failure models can be tested and improved in
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terms of human factors. As this type o f failure model study allows identification of the 
significant paths and consequently the accident model it can be named as a “dynamic 
failure model”. Obviously, there should be an optimum definition of a failure so that it 
can be assessed in analysis to identify the significant causation paths and failure model o f 
an organization or a structure. In this study, Class A accidents that occurred in USAF 
between the Flight Years of 2000 and 2013 were used as “failures”.
Knowledge of statistically significant paths and structural relations o f causes is 
necessary for successful interventions to prevent human related accidents and improve 
the safety o f the organization’s activities. Besides this fact, since UAV and MAV have 
different concepts in terms o f personnel training mission types, interventions at 
organizational level should be in accordance with these differences. Decision makers of 
the respective organization can utilize the differences of accident paths between MAV 
and UAV while deciding on wide-scale interventions.
5.4 Limitations o f the Study
The majority o f the reports in the USAF Accident Investigation Boards database 
include the executive summaries o f the accidents. Given that 347 reports o f which 272 of 
the accident reports were summaries and required classification by the researcher, the 
issue of classification reliability had to be address through rater reliability assessment.
The samples size o f UAV accidents (N = 60) was another limitation of the study. 
However; as the proposed UAV model had only single-direction paths between the 
categories, the model hypothesized was considered not to have a complexity in terms of 
paths or correlations.
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The narrative and detailed data available was for the years between 2000 and 
2013. Since UAV usage and its accident analysis are not as common as manned aircrafts, 
there is a limited interval of time for the analysis. However, this time is considered to be 
sufficient to analyze UAV and MAV accidents.
5.S Recommendations for Future Studies
The inter-rater reliability study methodology developed in this work can be 
conducted to establish and improve assessment reliability for any aviation organization 
applying the HFACS directly or any organization in another sector adapting the HFACS 
system to its sector. Other sectors will have to develop their own respective accident 
categorical level classification schemes and adapt the methodology for assessment and 
possibly certification of raters.
Future research will be required to implement SEM code to estimate path 
coefficients and standard errors using accepted bootstrap estimate methods. This work 
estimated path coefficients and standard errors as the product of independent random 
variables based on the observation that the covariance matrix provides independent 
estimates of SEM direct effect coefficients between HFACS categorical levels
Future research is needed to develop optimal path pruning methods similar to 
backward and forward stepwise regression and best subsets regression in empirical 
modeling. Such pruning methods will have to consider the tradeoff between improved 
model fit and magnitude of total path effect in terms of the size o f its coefficient. As can 
be observed in Tables 19, 26, 28, and 34 of this study, there were paths that were not
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statistically significant and eligible for pruning but had path coefficients that were larger 
in magnitude than the coefficients o f statistically significant paths.
USAF investigators did not always assign accident codes to each HFACS level. 
This was the reason that dummy variables were implemented for structural equation 
modeling in this study. This strongly suggests that either USAF investigators are not 
following the intent o f Reason’s Swiss Cheese model in applying the HFACS or that 
Reason’s Swiss Cheese model does not strictly hold for MAV and UAV accident causes. 
In either case, the structural equation modeling methodology developed in this study will 
have to be modified to admit partial paths in order to relax the assumptions underlying 
Reason’s model. It is uncertain at this time as to whether or not such partial paths or 
under what missing partial path conditions will yield positive definite covariance 
matrices. Future research will be required to develop partial path structural equation 
modeling.
In the future, different services o f Armed Forces, having aviation departments or 
sectors other than aviation using HFACS, can be analyzed with the structural equation 
modeling methodology developed in this work. Furthermore, a more complex study may 
include the human errors not just in one service but also throughout armed forces and 
other sectors.
The methodology that set forth the path(s) among HFACS levels and sublevels 
can be applied to other domains and organizations that use HFACS taxonomy by the 
mean of analyzing the secondhand accident investigation reports. The integration of such 
secondhand data will require additional research to assure rater accuracy and understand
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the implications o f the structural equation modeling process, assessment, and 
interpretation.
Since differing organizations and sectors have different structures and processes 
the relationship among HFACS levels and sublevels found in this study are unlikely to 
have the same path(s). The knowledge developed is not only the HFACS path(s) in 
USAF UAV and MAV accidents but also the analytical methodology, which can be 
applied to other aviation or industrial organizations as well. Additional research will be 
required to develop the name of the holes together with relationships among the Swiss 
Cheese pieces, which are HFACS levels and sublevels.
The HFACS taxonomy can be reviewed and tested regularly with the data to 
capture the effects of technology and structural changes of the organization. Since no 
latent variable such as mission type or accident phase was used in the study, further 
studies may include this kind of latent variables as well to observe the effect.
5.6 Conclusion
Decreasing accident rates is crucial to military and commercial aviation and to 
industrial organizations, especially those concerned with human factors, working under 
budget constraints. In order to mitigate the potential for aviation accidents, it is important 
to ensure that accidents are investigated and evaluated in an appropriate methodology and 
taxonomy so as to understand the causes for individual and all cases as well. This study 
conducted a set of analysis to identify statistically significant paths o f UAV and MAV 
accidents and common paths between UAV and MAV accidents within the context o f 
DOD HFACS taxonomy based on Reason’s (1990) Accident Causation Model.
131
The correlations found among the variables, categories were applied to HFACS 
taxonomy based on the Reason Model via path analysis. In other words, the results of 
correlation matrix were applied to four layered- structure based on the Reason model via 
multiple regressions. The study concluded the presence o f statistically significant paths 
at both UAV and MAV accidents and common partial paths of those aircraft types within 
the framework of DOD HFACS taxonomy. The study also suggests that accident data can 
be utilize to test and improve the failure model o f an organization to apprehend any 
significant effect such as technology and structural changes in the organization.
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX A. COVER, EXECUTIVE SUM M ARY AND OUTLINE OF AN AIBs 
REPORT
This appendix includes the cover, executive summary and outline o f an AIBs report.
U N I T E D  S T A T E S  A m  F O R C E  
A I R C R A F T  A C C I D E N T  I N V E S T I G A T I O N  
B O A R D  R E P O R T
MQ-1B, T/N 06-3175
196 th Reconnaissance Squadron 
163d Reconnaissance Wing 
M u c h  Air Reserve Base, California
LOCATION: Kandahar AB, Afghanistan 
DATE OF ACCIDENT: 3 October 2009 
BOARD PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Colonel Todd G. Chase 




MQ-lB.TlN 06-3175, MARCH JOINT AIR RESERVE BASE 
3 October 2009
At 0353 Zulu(Z)/0723 Local, Afghanistan on 3 October 2009 (2053 Pacific Daylight Saving 
Time on 2 October 2009), after normal maintenance and pre-flight checks, the Mishap Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft (MRPA) taxied and departed from Kandahar Air Field for a reconnaissance 
mission. There were two mishap crews involved in this mishap, as the mishap occurred shortly 
after crew swap. Mishap Crew 1 (MCI) consisted of Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1) and Mishap Sensor 
Operator 1 (MSOl). Mishap Crew 2 (MC2) consisted of Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2) and Mishap 
Sensor Operator 2
EXtring the flight, MC1 received a direct tasking from the Combined Forces Air C omponent 
Commander to provide dose air support to United States and Af^ian ground forces under attack 
by Anti-Afgian F orces (AAF). At the time of the tasking, AAF earned out a large, coordinated 
attack against U .S. and Afghan ground forces at two remote outposts. Several U S troops were 
killed during the attacks. Given the circumstances of the AAF attack and the immediate and 
urgent need for CAS, both Mishap Crews (MCs) were consumed with a high-degree of irgency
While en route to the tasking, MC2 as aimed control of the MRPA at approximately 0905Z. At 
approximately 0918Z, despite efforts by MC2 to avoid the terrain at the last minute, MC2 failed 
to prevent a Controlled Flight Into Terrain of the MRPA. The impact completely destroyed the 
MRPA.
The Accident Investigation B oard President determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
the mishap was the result of pilot error caused primarily by MP2’s channelized attention away 
from flying the MRPA and an inattention to thehiga terrain in the MRPA ’ s immediate vicinity 
Furthermore, inattention by both MP1 and MP2 resulted from a perceived absence of threat from 
the environment. Specifically, they both felled to appreciate the need for a significant increase in 
altitude requited to safely overfly the mountainous terrain located between the MRPA and the 
target
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APPENDIX B. HFACS SAM PLE PROBABLITIES OF M ISCLASSIFICATION  
FOR VARIOUS SAMPLE SIZE EXPECTED M ISCLASSIFICATION RATES
E[p] P(M isclass)
0.5 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0 13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0 13
0.4 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0 15 0.15 0 15 0 14 0,14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0 13 0.13 0.13 0 13 0 13
0.3 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0 14
0.2 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0 16
0 1 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21
0.05 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28
LCL(0.5-0.4,0.92) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
LCL(0.5-0.3,0.93) 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 001 001 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0 0 3 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0 0 4
LCK0 5-0.2,0.99) 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 02 0 0 2 0.03 0 0 3 0.04 0.04 0 04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 0 6 0 0 6 0 0 6
LCK 0.5-0.1,0.999 0.00 0.01 0.02 0 0 2 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 O i l O i l 0.12
143
p  = 0.5




3 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00
6 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.16 0.14 0 1 2 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0 04 0.03 0.02 0 0 2 0 01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00
12 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0 14 0.13 0.11 0 10 0.08 0 0 7 0.05 0.04 0 0 3 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 01 0.01 001
13 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0 14 0 13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0 0 5 0 04 0.03 0.03 0 0 2 0.01 0.01
14 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
15 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04
16 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.1 1 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06
17 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0 0 8 0.10 0.11 0.12 0 13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0 12 O i l 0.10
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 O i l 0.12 0.13 0.13 0  13 0.13 0.12
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 1 0.12 0 12 0.13 0.13
21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0 0 5 0.07 0.08 0.09 0  10 0.11 0.12
22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10
23 0.00 0.00 0 00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08
24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 001 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 4
26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
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d(Misclass) 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.18 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
0.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0 .1 1 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06
0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0 .1 1 0.10 0.09 0.08
10 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11
11 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0 .1 1 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13
12 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0 .1 1 0.12 0.12 0.13
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0 .0 1 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
18 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.2
d(Misclass) 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.21 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
0.22 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05
0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0 .1 1 0.10 0.09 0.09
0.11 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12
0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0 .10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .0 1 0.01 0.01 0.01
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
^06105
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p  = 0.1
d(Misclass) 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
0 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
1 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
2 0 2 9 0.2g 028 028 027 0.27 0 2 6 025 024 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14
3 0.19 0.20 021 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0 2 4 0.24 0 2 4 0 2 4 0.23 023 023 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 021 021 0.20
4 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 021 0.21
5 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16
6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0 .0 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 O.OI 0.01 0.01
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
p = 0.05
d(Misclass) 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
0 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13
1 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27
2 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
3 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0 .11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19
4 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
g 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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APPENDIX D. UAV ACCIDENT REPORTS PEARSON CORRELATION  
M ATRIX
CORRELATIONS
ORG OC OP ODMY SI SP SV SDMY PE PC PP PDMY AE1 AE2 AE3 AV
ORG 1 -0.088 -0.228 -0.49 0.019 -0.011 -0.088 -0.044 0.018 -0.255 -0.028 0.254 -0.26 -0.161 -0.014 -0.062
OC 1 0.188 -0.192 -0.083 -0.047 -0.034 0.102 -0.144 0.082 -0.086 0.081 -0.053 0.022 -0.062 -0.024
OP 1 -0.652 0.233 -0.021 0.188 -0.171 -0 146 -0 094 -0.018 0.126 -0.197 -0.142 -0 0 2 7 0.132
ODMY 1 -0.283 -0.008 -0.192 0.255 0.094 0.234 0.003 -0.24 0.336 0.246 -0.011 -0.135
SI 1 -0.113 0.415 -0.811 0.053 -0.145 0.29 0 -0.026 -0.011 0.298 0.291
SP 1 -0.047 -0.458 0.03 -0.035 -0.023 -0.074 0.024 -0.092 -0.084 -0.033
s v 1 -0.337 -0.144 0.017 -0.086 0.081 -0.053 0.022 0.557 0.701
SDMY 1 -0.066 0.167 -0.226 0.017 0.023 0.048 -0.21 -0.236
PE 1 -0.073 0.072 -0.508 0 .017 0.05 -0.06 -0.101
PC 1 0.261 -0.393 0.479 0.524 0.146 0 102
PP 1 -0.303 0.112 0.15 0.278 -0.06
PDMY 1 -0.188 -0.184 -0.097 -0.085
AE1 1 0.396 0.032 -0.112
AE2 1 0 2 8 2 0 11
AE3 1 0.391
AV 1
Si S. { 1-tailed)
ORG 0.252 0.04 0 0.442 0.467 0.252 0.369 0.446 0.025 0.416 0.025 0.022 0.109 0.457 0.32
OC 0.071 0.264 0.361 0.397 0.218 0.136 0.268 0.257 0.269 0.342 0.432 0.319 0.427
OP 0 0.037 0.437 0.075 0.096 0.134 0.238 0.446 0.169 0.065 0.139 0.418 0.157
ODMY 0.014 0.475 0.071 0.025 0.239 0.036 0.491 0.032 0.004 0.029 0.466 0.153
SI 0.195 0 0 0.343 0.135 0.012 0.5 0.423 0.467 0.01 0.012
SP 0.361 0 0.41 0.395 0.43 0.288 0.427 0.243 0.261 0.401
s v 0.004 0.136 0.448 0.257 0.269 0.342 0.432 0 0
SDMY 0.309 0.1 0.041 0.448 0.432 0.359 0.054 0.035
PE 0.29 0.293 0 0.448 0.351 0.325 0.221
PC 0.022 0.001 0 0 0.132 0.218
PP 0.009 0.197 0.127 0.016 0.324
PDMY 0.075 0.079 0.231 0.259





APPENDIX E. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAY M ODEL A  (p< 0.05)
Analysis Sum m ary 
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 203
Param eter Sum m ary (G roup num ber 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 15 0 0 0 0 15
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 36 0 18 0 0 54
Total 51 0 18 0 0 69
Models
Com putation of degrees of freedom (Default model) 
Number o f distinct sample moments:
Number o f distinct parameters to be estimated: 
Degrees o f freedom (171 - 54):
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 1010.570 
Degrees o f freedom = 117 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates




Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <— OP -.237 .064 -3.711 ***par_l
SI <— ORG .264 .056 4.709 ***par_2
SI <— OC .970 .282 3.434 ***par_3
SP <— OC .925 .283 3.263 .001par_4
SDMY <--- OC -.811 .298 -2.721 .007par 5
SI <— OP .201 .060 3.335 ***par_6
150
SI < -- ODMY .229 .059 3.866 ***par_7
SDMY <--- ORG -.108 .059 -1.829 .067par_14
SV < -- OC .503 .083 6.089 ***par_l 7
SV < -- OP .015 .018 .852 .394par 18
SDMY <--- ODMY -.214 .063 -3.417 ***par_19
SF <--- ORG .069 .017 4.011 ***par_22
PDMY <— SP -.046 .019 -2.464 .014par_8
na 0 A 1 1 1 SP .254 .049 5.160 ***par_13
PDMY <— SDMY -.005 .017 -.293 .769par_15
PDMY <— SV -.018 .061 -.304 .761par_20
PP <--- SI .007 .020 .354 .723par_23
PP <— SP .047 .022 2.136 .033par_24
iI1Vcu0* SDMY -.041 .020 -2.051 .040par_25
111VuCU, SDMY .119 .044 2.691 .007par_26
PE <— SP .039 .022 1.786 .074par_28
PDMY <--- SF .099 .060 1.655 .098par_35
AE1 <--- PC .738 .220 3.355 ***par_9
AE2 <— PC .635 .142 4.467 ***par_10
AE3 <— PC .374 .076 4.913 ***par_l 1
AE2 <--- PDMY .097 .396 .245 ,806par_12
AE1 <— PDMY .380 .612 .620 .535par_16
I1iV>< PDMY -.164 .162 -1.016 .310par_21
ADMY <— PDMY .452 .343 1.319 .187par_27
ADMY <— PC -.362 .123 -2.940 ,003par_29
ADMY <— accident 1.000
I1IV>< accident -.055 .033 -1.669 ,095par_30
AE3 <--- accident -.081 .043 -1.890 .059par_31
151
AE2 <— accident -.281 .078 -3.590 ***par_32
AE1 <— accident -1.123 .097 -11.575 ***par_33
ADMY <— PP .152 .218 .695 .487par_34
ADMY <— PE .538 .224 2.403 .016par_36
Probability level = .000
Total Effects (G roup num ber
ODMY OC ORG
1 - Default model)
OP SF SV SP SDMY SI accident PE PP PC PDMY
SF .000 .000 .069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .503 .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .925 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDMY -.214 -.811 -.108 -.237 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .229 .970 .264 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 .000 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .011 .084 .006 .011 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.025 .138 -.013 -.028 .000 .000 .254 .119 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDMY .001 -.048 .007 .001 .099 -.018 -.046 -.005 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADMY .011 -.039 .009 .012 .045 -.008 -.085 -.052 .001 1.000 .538 .152 -.362 .452
AV .000 .008 -.001 .000 -.016- .003 .008 .001 .000 -.055 .000 .000 .000 -.164
AE2 -.016 .083 -.007 -.018 .010 -.002 .157 .075 .000 -.281 .000 .000 .635 .097
AE3 -.010 .052 -.005 -.011 .000 .000 .095 .045 .000 -.081 .000 .000 .374 .000
AE1 -.018 .084 -.007 -.020 .038 -.007 .170 .086 .000 -1.123 .000 .000 .738 .380
Standardized Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OC ORG OP SF SV SP SDMY SI accident PE PP PC PDM
SF .000 .000 .272 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .393 .000 .055 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDMY -.221 -.176 -.118 -.240 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .239 .212 .291 .206 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .125 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
152
PP .038 .063 .024 .040 .000 .000 .147 -.143 .025 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.039 .044 -.021 -.042 .000 .000 .337 .176 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDMY .004 -.043 .033 .004 .114 -.021 -.170 -.020 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADMY .009 -.007 .008 .010 .010 -.002 -.062 -.042 .001 .968 .124 .036 -.199 .089
AV .000 .003 -.002 .000 -.008 .002 .012 .001 .000 -.116 .000 .000 .000 -.071
AE2 -.012 .013 -.006 -.013 .002 .000 .098 .052 .000 -.234 .000 .000 .300 .016
AE3 -.013 .015 -.007 -.014 .000 .000 .110 .057 .000 -.125 .000 .000 .327 .000
AE1 -.009 .008 -.003 -.010 .005 -.001 .070 .039 .000 -.614 .000 .000 .229 .042
Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY o c ORG OP SF SV SP SDMY SI accident PE PP PC PDMY
SF .000 .000 .069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .503 .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .925 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.214 -.811 -.108 -.237 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .229 .970 .264 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .254 .119 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .099 -.018 -.046 -.005 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .538 .152 -.362 .452
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.055 .000 .000 .000 -.164
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.281 .000 .000 .635 .097
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.081 .000 .000 .374 .000
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.123 .000 .000 .738 .380
Standardized Direct Effects (C roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OC ORG OP SF SV SP y DM SI accident PE PP PC PDMY 
SF .000 .000 .272 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
153
SV .000 .393 .000 .055 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDMY -.221 -.176 -.118 -.240 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .239 .212 .291 .206 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .125 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .147 -.143 .025 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .337 .176 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDMY .000 .000 .000 .000 .114 -.021 -.170 -.020 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADMY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .968 .124 .036-.199 .089
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.116 .000 .000 .000 -.071
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.234 .000 .000 .300 .016
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.125 .000 .000 .327 .000
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.614 .000 .000 .229 .042
Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP
SDM
Y SI accident PE PP PC PDMY
SF .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDMY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .011 .084 .006 .01 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.025 .138 -.013 -.028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDMY .001 -.048 .007 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADMY .011 -.039 .009 .012 .045 -.008 -.085 -.052 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .008 -.001 .000 -.016 .003 .008 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.016 .083 -.007 -.018 .010 -.002 .157 .075 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.010 .052 -.005 -.011 .000 .000 .095 .045 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
154
AEl - .0 1 8 .0 8 4  -.007 -.020 .038 - .0 0 7 .1 7 0  .086 .000 .000 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0
Standardized Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y
OC ORG OP SF SV SP SDMYS1 accident PE PP PC PDMY
SF .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .038 .063 .024 .040 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.039 .044 -.021 -.042 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y
.004 -.043 .033 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .009 -.007 .008 .010 .010 -.002 -.062 -.042 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .003 -.002 .000 -.008 .002 .012 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.012 .013 -.006 -.013 .002 .000 .098 .052 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.013 .015 -.007 -.014 .000 .000 .110 .057 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AEl -.009 .008 -.003 -.010 .005 -.001 .070 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
155
Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
OC <—> ODMY 4.080 .000
ORG <—> ODMY 89.027 .000
OP <—> ODMY 82.267 .000
OP <—> OC 5.926 .000
e2 <—> e3 21.006 .000
e2 <—> e4 4.428 .000
e5 <—> e3 10.595 .000
e5 <—> e4 6.222 .000
e5 <—> e2 75.379 .000
el <—> e3 9.486 .000
el <—> e5 84.190 .000
resl <—> ODMY 39.245 .000
resl <—> ORG 29.671 .000
resl <—> OP 12.185 .000
e6 <—> OC 25.719 .000
e6 <—> ORG 6.045 .000
e6 <—> el4 5.888 .000
e8 <—> ODMY 9.792 .000
e8 <—> ORG 8.223 .000
e8 <—> el4 21.757 .000
e8 <—> e7 23.608 .000
e8 <—> e6 51.059 .000
elO <—> OC 4.088 .000
elO <—> OP 4.389 .000
156
e l l <—> elO 4.462 .000
e9 <—> el 4.590 .000
e9 <—> elO 13.014 .000
e9 <—> e l l 6.811 .000
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change 
Regression Weights: (G roup number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SF <— SP 19.967 .094
SF <— SDMY 10.828 -.062
SF <— SI 9.138 .057
SV <— SP 4.206 -.041
s v <— SDMY 4.938 -.040
SP <— SF 16.371 .894
SP <— SDMY 65.726 -.499
SDMY <— SF 9.814 -.728
SDMY <— SV 5.241 -.534
SDMY <— SP 71.605 -.610
SDMY <— SI 64.903 -.525
SI <— SF 8.787 .653
SI <— SDMY 71.398 -.519
accident <— ODMY 39.245 -.507
accident <— ORG 29.671 .417
accident <— OP 12.185 .288
PE <— PC 5.661 .069
PE <— PDMY 21.049 -.373
















































NPAR CMIN DF P
54 1010.570 117 .000
171 .000 0
18 1331.327 153 .000




Default model .000 .707 .571 .484
Saturated model .000 1.000
Independence model .000 .614 .569 .549
Baseline Com parisons
NFI RFI IFI TLI
Model Delta 1 rhol Delta2 rho2 CFI
Default model .241 .007 .264 .008 .242
Saturated model 1.000 1.000 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted M easures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .765 .184 .185
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 893.570 795.750 998.839
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1178.327 1065.473 1298.619
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 5.003 4.424 3.939 4.945
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 6.591 5.833 5.275 6.429
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE




























ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
5.537 5.053 6.059 5.593
1.693 1.693 1.693 1.869


































APPENDIX F. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAV M ODEL B (p < 0.05)
Analysis Sum m ary 
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 203
Param eter Sum m ary (G roup num ber I)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 15 0 0 0 0 15
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 36 5 18 0 0 59
Total 51 5 18 0 0 74
Models
Com putation o f degrees of freedom (Default model)
Number of distinct sample moments: 171 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 59
Degrees o f freedom (171- 59): 112
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 416.844 
Degrees o f freedom =112 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression Weights: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <— OP -.199 .075 -2.633 .008par 1
SI <— ORG .264 .086 3.058 .002par_2
SI <— OC .970 .282 3.434 ***par_3
SP <— OC .925 .283 3.263 .001par_4
SDMY <--- OC -.834 .288 -2.898 .004par_5
SI <— OP .201 .090 2.230 .026par_6
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SI <— ODMY .229 .118 1.943 ,052par_7
SDMY <— ORG -.143 .072 -1.982 .047par_14
SV <--- OC .503 .083 6.089 ***par_17
SV <— OP .015 .018 .852 .394par_18
SDMY < -- ODMY -.191 .099 -1.940 .052par_19
SF <— ORG .069 .017 4.011 ***par_22
PDMY <— SP -.035 .023 -1.536 . 124par_8
PC <--- SP .254 .061 4.189 ***par_13
PDMY <— SDMY .001 .023 .048 .962par_15
PDMY <--- SV .046 .052 .882 ,378par_20
PP <— SI .007 .032 .224 .823par_23
PP <--- SP .047 .032 1.499 . 134par_24
PP <— SDMY -.041 .040 -1.043 ,297par_25
PC <— SDMY .119 .059 2.007 .045par_26
PE < - SP .039 .022 1.786 ,074par_28
PDMY <— SF .031 .051 .611 .541par_35
AEl <--- PC .738 .267 2.767 ,006par 9
AE2 <— PC .635 .173 3.681 ***par_10
AE3 <--- PC .374 .079 4.753 ***par_l 1
AE2 <— PDMY .097 .468 .208 ,836par_12
AEl <— PDMY .380 .723 .525 .599par_16
AV <— PDMY -.164 .163 -1.010 .312par_21
ADMY <— PDMY .452 .404 1.119 .263par_27
ADMY <— PC -.362 .149 -2.428 .015par_29
ADMY <--- accident 1.000
AV <--- accident -.055 .033 -1.669 .095par_30
AE3 <— accident -.081 .043 -1.890 .059par_31
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AE2 < — accident -.281 .078 -3.590 * * * par_32
AEl < — accident - 1.123 .097 -11.575 * * * par_33
ADMY <— PP .152 .216 .702 .483par_34
ADMY <— PE .538 .224 2.404 .016par_36
Total Effects (C roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SPSDMY SI accident PE PP PCPDMY
SF .000 .000 .069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .503 .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .925 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.191 -.834 --.143 -.199 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .229 .970 .264 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 .000 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .010 .085 .008 .010 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.023 .136 --.017 -.024 .000 .000 .254 .119 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y
.000 -.011 .002 .000 .031 .046 -.035 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .010 -.021 .008 .010 .014 .021 -.080 -.049 .001 1.000 .538 .152 -.362 .452
AV .000 .002 .000 .000 ■-.005 -.008 .006 .000 .000 -.055 .000 .000 .000 --.164
AE2 -.014 .085 - .011 ■-.015 .003 .004 .158 .076 .000 -.281 .000 .000 .635 .097
AE3 -.009 .051 - .006 ■-.009 .000 .000 .095 .045 .000 -.081 .000 .000 .374 .000
AEl -.017 .096 - .012 ■-.017 .012 .017 .174 .088 .000 -1.123 .000 .000 .738 .380
Standardized Total Effects (G roup num ber I - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP
SF SV SPSDMY SI accident PE PP PCPDMY
SF .000 .000 .272 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .393 .000 .055 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.206 -.197 - .170 ■-.220 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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SI .246 .229 .314 .222 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .125 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .032 .063 .029 .034 .000 .000 .146 -.130 .023 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.034 .045 -.028 -.037 .000 .000 .348 .167 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.001 -.010 .009 .002 .036 .053 -.132 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .008 -.004 .007 .008 .003 .005 -.058 -.036 .001 .961 .123 .036 -.192 .088
AV .000 .001 -.001 .000 -.003 -.004 .009 .000 .000 -.116 .000 .000 .000 -.071
AE2 -.010 .013 -.008 -.011 .001 .001 .100 .049 .000 -.235 .000 .000 .292 .016
AE3 -.011 .014 -.009 -.012 .000 .000 .110 .053 .000 -.125 .000 .000 .317 .000
AE1 -.008 .010 -.006 -.008 .002 .002 .072 .037 .000 -.618 .000 .000 .223 .042
Direct Effects (G roup num ber I - Default model)
ODM
Y o c ORG OP SF
SV SPSDMY SI accident PE PP PC PDM Y
SF .000 .000 .069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
s v .000 .503 .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .925 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.191
-.834 -.143 -.199 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .229 .970 .264 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .254 .119 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000
.000 .031 .046 -.035 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 1.000 .538 .152 -.362 .452
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.055 .000 .000 .000 -.164
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.281 .000 .000 .635 .097
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.081 .000 .000 .374 .000
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.123 .000 .000 .738 .380
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Standardized Direct Effects (G roup  num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SPSDM Y SI accident PE PP PC PDM Y
SF .000 .000 .272 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .393 .000 .055 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.206 -.197 -.170 -.220 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .246 .229 .314 .222 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .125 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .146 -.130 .023 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .348 .167 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .036 .053 -.132 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .961 .123 .036 -.192 .088
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.116 .000 .000 .000 -.071
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.235 .000 .000 .292 .016
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.125 .000 .000 .317 .000
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.618 .000 .000 .223 .042
Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y
o c ORG OP SF SV SPSDM Y SI accident PE PP PC
PDM
Y
SF .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .010 .085 .008 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.023 .136 -.017 -.024 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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PDM
Y .000 -.011 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .010 -.021 .008 .010 .014 .021 -.080 -.049 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .002 .000 .000 -.005 -.008 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.014 .085 -.011 -.015 .003 .004 .158 .076 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.009 .051 -.006 -.009 .000 .000 .095 .045 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 -.017 .096 -.012 -.017 .012 .017 .174 .088 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect EiTects (G roup num ber I - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SPSDM Y SI
acciden
t PE PP PC
PDM
Y
SF .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .032 .063 .029 .034 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.034 .045 -.028 -.037 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM




.008 -.004 .007 .008 .003 .005 -.058 -.036 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .001 -.001 .000 -.003 -.004 .009 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.010 .013 -.008 -.011 .001 .001 .100 .049 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.011 .014 -.009 -.012 .000 .000 .110 .053 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 -.008 .010 -.006 -.008 .002 .002 .072 .037 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model)
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
OC <--> ODMY 4.350 .000
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ORG <—> OC 4.060 .000
e3 <—> ODMY 7.136 .000
e3 <—> ORG 4.127 .000
e2 <—> e3 21.139 .000
e2 <—> e4 44.613 .000
e5 <—> e4 52.542 .000
el <—> e3 12.457 .000
el <—> e4 30.906 .000
resl <—> ODMY 4.857 .000
e6 <—> OC 28.552 .000
e6 <—> e7 7.142 .000
e8 <—> el4 15.483 .000
e8 <—> e7 31.038 .000
elO <—> OC 4.088 .000
e l l <—> elO 4.462 .000
e9 <—> elO 13.014 .000
e9 <—> e l l 6.811 .000
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SF <— SP 19.967 .094
SF <— SDMY 12.834 -.074
SF <— SI 10.648 .067
SV <— SP 4.206 -.041
SV <— SDMY 5.853 -.047
SP <— SF 17.403 .640
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SP < — SV 37.352 -.940
SDMY < — SV 44.261
OO<N°oi
SI < — SF 11.538 .504
SI < — SV 26.034 -.760
accident < — ODMY 43.062 -.556
accident < — ORG 29.671 .417
accident < — OP 12.185 .288
PE < — PC 6.046 .074
PE < — PDMY 21.303 -.377
PP < — PDMY 24.819 -.410
PC < — OC 28.552 .926
PC < — PP 6.469 -.328
PDMY < — ODMY 10.603 -.047
PDMY < — ORG 5.454 .031
PDMY < — OP 5.517 .033
PDMY < — PE 15.243 -.198
PDMY < — PP 28.739 -.263
ADMY < — ODMY 31.598 -.359
ADMY < — ORG 17.214 .240
ADMY < — OP 7.791 .173
AE2 < — OC 4.088 .866
AE2 < — OP 4.389 .192
AE2 < — SV 4.744 .730
AE2 < — AE1 7.498 -.118
AE1 < — SI 4.617 .270
AE1 < — AE2 11.249 -.272
AE1 < — AE3 6.019 -.367
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Model Fit Summary 
CMIN
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/D
Default model 59 416.844 112 .000 3.72
Saturated model 171 .000 0
Independence model 18 1331.327 153 .000 8.70
RMR, GFI
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI
Default model .000 .831 .741 .544
Saturated model .000 1.000











Default model .687 .572 .750 .647 .741
Saturated model 1.000 1.000 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .732 .503 .543
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 304.844 246.101 371.167
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1178.327 1065.473 1298.619
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FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 2.064 1.509 1.218 1.837
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 6.591 5.833 5.275 6.429
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .116 .104 .128 .000
Independence model .195 .186 .205 .000
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC
Default model 534.844 547.095 730.323 789.323
Saturated model 342.000 377.508 908.558 1079.558
Independence model 1367.327 1371. 064 1426.964 1444.964
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 2.648 2.357 2.976 2.708
Saturated model 1.693 1.693 1.693 1.869


























APPENDIX G. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAV M ODEL C (p < 0.05)
Analysis Summary
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 203
Parameter Summary (G roup number 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 15 0 0 0 0 15
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 34 5 18 0 0 57
Total 49 5 18 0 0 72
Models
Computation o f  degrees o f freedom (Default model)
Number o f distinct sample moments: 171 
Number o f distinct parameters to be estimated: 57
Degrees o f freedom (171-57): 114
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 421.205 
Degrees o f freedom = 114 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression W eights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <— OP -.120 .063 -1.899 .058par 1
SI <— ORG .135 .057 2.391 .017par_2
SI <— OC .886 .285 3.110 .002par_3
SP <— OC .925 .283 3.263 .001 par_4
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SDMY < -- OC -.783 .289 -2.710 .007par_5
SI <— OP .074 .061 1.217 .224par_6
SDMY <— ORG -.064 .060 -1.061 .289par_13
SV <— OC .515 .083 6.224 ***par 16
SDMY <— ODMY -.050 .066 -.749 .454par_17
SF <— ORG .069 .017 4.011 ***par_20
PDMY <— SP -.035 .023 -1.536 .125par_7
PC <— SP .254 .061 4.189 ***par_12
PDMY <— SDMY .001 .023 .048 .962par_14
PDMY <— SV .046 .052 .886 .376par_18
PP <— SI .007 .032 .224 .823par_21
PP <— SP .047 .032 1.499 . 134par_22
PP <— SDMY -.041 .040 -1.043 .297par_23
PC <— SDMY .119 .060 1.998 ,046par_24
PE <— SP .039 .022 1.786 .074par_26
PDMY <— SF .031 .051 .611 .541par_33
AE1 <— PC .738 .267 2.767 .006par_8
AE2 <— PC .635 .172 3.681 ***par 9
AE3 <— PC .374 .079 4.753 ***par_10
AE2 <— PDMY .097 .468 .208 .836par_l 1
AE1 <— PDMY .380 .723 .526 .599par_15
AV <— PDMY -.164 .163 -1.010 .312par_19
ADMY <— PDMY .452 .404 1.119 .263par_25
ADMY <— PC -.362 .149 -2.429 .015par_27
ADMY <— accident 1.000
AV <— accident -.055 .033 -1.669 .095par_28
AE3 < ~ accident -.081 .043 -1.890 .059par_29
AE2 <--- accident -.281 .078 -3.590 ***par 30
AE1 <— accident -1.123 .097 -11.575 ***par_31
ADMY <— PP .152 .216 .702 .483par_32
ADMY <— PE .538 .224 2.404 .016par_34
Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP
SDM
Y SI accident PE PP PC
PDM
Y
SF .000 .000 .069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .515 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .925 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.050 ■-.783 -.064 -.120 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .886 .135 .074 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 .000 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .002 .083 .004 .006 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.006 .142 -.008 -.014 .000 .000 .254 .119 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 ■-.010 .002 .000 .031 .046
-.035 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .002 •-.024 .004 .006 .014 .021 -.080 -.049 .001
1.000 .538 .152 -.362 .452
AV .000 .002 .000 .000 -.005 -.008 .006 .000 .000 -.055 .000 .000 .000 -.164
AE2 -.004 .089 -.005 -.009 .003 .004 .158 .076 .000 -.281 .000 .000 .635 .097
AE3 -.002 .053 -.003 -.005 .000 .000 .095 .045 .000 -.081 .000 .000 .374 .000
AE1 -.004 .101 -.005 -.011 .012 .017 .174 .088 .000 -1.123 .000 .000 .738 .380
Standardized Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP
SF SV SP SDMY SI
accident PE PP PC
PDM
Y
SF .000 .000 .272 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .401 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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SP .000 .224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y
-.054 -.186 -.076 -.134 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .210 .162 .082 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .125 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .007 .061 .014 .019 .000 .000 .146 -.130 .023 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.009 .047 -.013 -.022 .000 .000 .348 .166 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDMY .000 -.009 .010 -.001 .036 .053 -.132 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
r/w  .002 -.004 .004 .005 .003 .005 -.058 -.036 .001 .961 .123 .036 -.192 .088MY
AV .000 .001 -.001 .000 -.003 -.004 .009 .000 .000 -.116 .000 .000 .000 -.071
AE2 -.003 .014 -.004 -.006 .001 .001 .100 .049 .000 -.235 .000 .000 .292 .016
AE3 -.003 .015 -.004 -.007 .000 .000 .110 .053 .000 -.125 .000 .000 .317 .000
AE1 -.002 .010 -.002 -.005 .002 .002 .072 .037 .000 -.618 .000 .000 .223 .042
Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF s v SP
SDM
Y SI accident PE PP PC
PDM
Y
SF .000 .000 .069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .515 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .925 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.050 -.783 -.064 -.120 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .886 .135 .074 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .254 .119 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .031 .046 -.035 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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AD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .538 .152 -.362 .452
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.055 .000 .000 .000 -.164
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.281 .000 .000 .635 .097
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.081 .000 .000 .374 .000
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.123 .000 .000 .738 .380
Standardized Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y o c ORG OP SF s v SP
SDM
Y SI accident PE PP PC
PDM
Y
SF .000 .000 .272 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .401 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.054 -.186 -.076 -.134 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .210 .162 .082 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .125 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .146 -.130 .023 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .348 .166 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .036 .053 -.132
.004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .961 .123 .036
-.192 .088
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.116 .000 .000 .000 -.071
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.235 .000 .000 .292 .016
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.125 .000 .000 .317 .000
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.618 .000 .000 .223 .042
Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
OD Y OC ORG OP SF SV SPSDMY SI accident PE PP PCPD^
SF ,000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .002 .083 .004 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.006 .142 -.008 -.014 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y
.000 -.010 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .002 -.024
.004 .006 .014 .021 -.080 -.049 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .002 .000 .000 -.005 -.008 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.004 .089 -.005 -.009 .003 .004 .158 .076 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.002 .053 -.003 -.005 .000 .000 .095 .045 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 -.004 .101 -.005 -.011 .012 .017 .174 .088 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF s v SPSDMY SI accident PE PP PC
PDM
Y
SF .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
s v .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .007 .061 .014 .019 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.009 .047 -.013 -.022 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 -.009
.010 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .002
-.004 .004 .005 .003 .005 -.058 -.036 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .001 -.001 .000 -.003 -.004 .009 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.003 .014 -.004 -.006 .001 .001 .100 .049 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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AE3 -.003 .015 -.004 -.007 .000 .000 .110 .053 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 -.002 .010 -.002 -.005 .002 .002 .072 .037 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
M odification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
OC <—> ODMY 4.350 .000
ORG <—> OC 4.060 .000
e3 <—> ODMY 7.136 .000
e3 <—> ORG 4.127 .000
e2 <—> e3 21.139 .000
e2 <—> e4 44.187 .000
e5 <—> e4 52.360 .000
el <—> e3 14.058 .000
el <—> e4 31.780 .000
resl <—> ODMY 4.857 .000
e6 <—> OC 28.552 .000
e6 <—> e7 7.142 .000
e8 <—> el4 15.483 .000
e8 <—> e7 31.038 .000
elO <—> OC 4.088 .000
e l l <—> elO 4.462 .000
e9 <—> elO 13.014 .000
e9 <—> e ll 6.811 .000
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
Regression Weights: (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
1 8 1
SF <— SP 19.967 .094
SF <— SDMY 12.950 -.074
SF <— SI 10.744 .068
SV <— SP 4.075 -.040
SV <— SDMY 6.413 -.050
SP <— SF 17.403 .640
SP <— SV 37.077 -.933
SDMY <— SV 43.935 -.821
SI <— SF 13.021 .538
SI <— SV 26.667 -.769
accident <— ODMY 43.062 -.556
accident <— ORG 29.671 .417
accident <— OP 12.185 .288
PE <— PC 6.046 .074
PE <— PDMY 21.303 -.377
PP <— PDMY 24.819 -.410
PC <— OC 28.552 .926
PC <— PP 6.471 -.328
PDMY <— ODMY 10.603 -.047
PDMY <— ORG 5.454 .031
PDMY <— OP 5.517 .033
PDMY <— PE 15.243 -.198
PDMY <— PP 28.749 -.263
ADMY <— ODMY 31.598 -.359
ADMY <— ORG 17.214 .240
ADMY <— OP 7.791 .173




































NPAR CMIN DF P
57 421.205 114 .000
171 .000 0
18 1331.327 153 .000
RMR GFI AGFI PGFI
.000 .829 .743 .552
.000 1.000
.000 .614 .569 .549
NFI RFI IFI TLI
Deltal rhol Delta2 rho2
.684 .575 .748 .650
1.000 1.000 












Independence model 1.000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 307.205 248.171 373.818
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1178.327 1065.473 1298.619
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 2.085 1.521 1.229 1.851
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 6.591 5.833 5.275 6.429
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .116 .104 .127 .000
Independence model .195 .186 .205 .000
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC
Default model 535.205 547.041 724.057 781.057
Saturated model 342.000 377.508 908.558 1079.558
Independence model 1367.327 1371.064 1426.964 1444.964
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 2.650 2.357 2.979 2.708
Saturated model 1.693 1.693 1.693 1.869
Independence model 6.769 6.210 7.364 6.787
HOELTER




























APPENDIX H. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAV M ODEL A (p < 0.1)
Analysis Summary 
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 203
Parameter Summary (Group number 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 15 0 0 0 0 15
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 41 0 18 0 0 59
Total 56 0 18 0 0 74
Models
Computation o f degrees o f freedom (Default model)
Number o f distinct sample moments: 171
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 59
Degrees of freedom (171 - 59): 112
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 1004.826 
Degrees of freedom = 112 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <— OP -.237 .064 -3.711 ***par_l
SI <— ORG .264 .056 4.709 ***par2
SI <— OC .970 .282 3.434 ***par_3
SP <— OC .907 .282 3.215 ,001par_4
SDMY <--- OC -.811 .298 -2.721 .007par_5
188
SI <— OP .201 .060 3.335 ***par_6
SI <— ODMY .229 .059 3.866 ***par_7
SDMY <— ORG I o 00 .059 -1.829 .067par_14
SV <— OC .503 .083 6.089 ***par_17
SV <— OP .015 .018 .852 .394par 19
SDMY <--- ODMY -.214 .063 -3.417 ***par_20
SF < — ORG .069 .017 4.011 ***par_23
SP <— ORG -.076 .056 -1.352 .176par_35
PDMY <— SP -.049 .019 -2.631 .009par_8
PC <— SP .254 .049 5.158 ***par_13
PDMY <— SDMY -.010 .017 -.611 .541par_l 5
PDMY <— SV -.022 .061 -.363 .717par_21
PP <— SI .007 .020 .355 .723par_24
PP <— SP .047 .022 2.136 .033par_25
PP <— SDMY -.041 .020 -2.052 .040par_26
PC <— SDMY .119 .044 2.692 .007par_27
PE <— SP .039 .022 1.784 ,074par_29
PDMY <— SI -.006 .017 -.329 .742par_36
PDMY <— SF .103 .060 1.706 .088par_41
AE1 <— PC .770 .221 3.490 ***par_9
AE2 <— PC .643 .142 4.521 ***par_10
AE3 <— PC .433 .076 5.686 ***par_l 1
AE2 <— PDMY .121 .395 .307 .759par_12
AE1 <— PDMY .476 .612 .777 .437par_16
AE3 <— PDMY .294 .211 1.394 .163par_18
AV <— PDMY .037 .160 .232 .816par_22
ADMY <— PDMY .351 .344 1.019 .308par_28
189
ADMY <— PC -.393 .124 -3.167 .002par_30
ADMY <— accident 1.000
AV <— accident -.053 .033 -1.613 . 107par_31
AE3 <— accident -.081 .043 -1.884 .060par_32
AE2 <— accident -.281 .078 -3.596 ***par_33
AE1 <— accident -1.122 .097 -11.563 ***par_34
ADMY <— PE .538 .224 2.404 .016par_37
AV <— PC .081 .058 1.395 .163par_38
AV <— PP .189 .135 1.404 .160par_39
ADMY <— PP .125 .219 .568 .570par_40
Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP
SDM
Y SI accident PE PP PC PD MY
SF .000 .000 .069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .503 .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .907 -.076 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
MY -.214 -.811 -.108 -.237 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .229 .970 .264 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 -.003 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .011 .084 .003 .011 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.025 .134 -.032 -.028 .000 .000 .254 .119 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
MY .001 -.053 .010 .001 .103 -.022 -.049 -.010 -.006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .012 -.042 .015 .013 .036 -.008 -.090 -.056 -.001 1.000 .538.125 -.393 .351
AV .000 .025 -.002 .000 .004 -.001 .028 .001 .001 -.053 .000 .189 .081 .037
AE2 -.016 .080 -.019 -.018.012 -.003 .157 .075 -.001 -.281 .000 .000 .643 .121
AE3 -.011 .042 -.011 -.012 .030 -.006 .095 .048 -.002 -.081 .000.000 .433 .294
190
AE1 -.019 .078 -.020 -.021 .049 -.010 .172 .087 -.003 -1.122.000.000 .770.476
Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
0D1^  OC ORG OP SF SV S P SD1^  SI accident PE PP PC ™  Y Y MY
SF .000 .000 .272 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .393 .000 .055 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .220 -.092 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
MY -.221 -.176 -.118 -.240 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .239 .212 .291 .206 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .027 -.012 .000 .000 .000 .125 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .038 .063 .011 .040 .000 .000 .147 -.143 .025 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.039 .043 -.052 -.042 .000 .000 .336 .176 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
MY .004 -.047 .047 .004.117 -.025 -.181 -.043 -.023 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .010 -.007 .013 .011 .008 -.002 -.066 -.045 -.001 .966.123 .029 -.216.069
AV .000 .010 -.003 .000 .002 .000 .044 .002 .002 -.112 .000.098 .097 .016
AE2 -.012 .012 -.015 -.013 .002 -.001 .099 .052 .000 -.234 .000 .000 .304 .021
AE3 -.014 .012 -.015 -.015 .011 -.002 .109 .061 -.002 -.122 .000.000 .372 .091
AE1 -.009 .008 -.010 -.010.006 i b o .071 .040 -.001 -.612 .000.000 .239 .053
Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
OD Y OC ORG OP SF SV S P SD ^  SI accident PE PP PC ^
SF .000 .000 .069 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000
SV .000 .503 .000 .015.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000
SP .000 .907 -.076 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000
sn
r x ,  -.214 -.811 -.108 -.237.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000MY
SI .229 .970 .264 .201.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000
191
PE .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000.000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .254 .119 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000
PD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000.103 -.022 -.049 -.010 -.006 .000.000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000.538.125 -.393 .351
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.053 .000.189 .081 .037
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.281 .000 .000 .643 .121
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.081.000.000 .433.294
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.122.000.000 .770.476
Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
0D1^  OCORG OP SF SV S P S™  SI accident PE PP PCY Y MY
SF .000 .000 .272 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000
SV .000 .393 .000 .055.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000
SP .000 .220-.092 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000
-.221 -.176-.118-.240.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000
SI .239 .212 .291 .206.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000
PE .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .125 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .147-.143 .025 .000.000.000 .000.000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .336 .176 .000 .000.000.000 .000.000
^  .000 .000 .000 .000.117-.025 -.181 -.043 -.023 .000.000.000.000.000
A D
.000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .966.123 .029-.216.069MY
AV .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.112.000.098 .097.016
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.234.000.000 .304.021
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AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.122.000.000 .372.091
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.612.000.000 .239.053
Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP S° Y SI iaccident PE PP PC ^
SF .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 -.003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .011 .084 .003 .011 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.025 .134 -.032 -.028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
MY .001 -.053 .010 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .012 -.042 .015 .013 .036 --.008 --.090 --.056 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .025 -.002 .000.004 --.001 .028 .001 .001 .000.000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.016 .080 -.019 -.018.012 -■.003 .157 .075 -.001 .000 .000 .000.000 .000
AE3 - .0 1 1 .042 - .0 1 1 -.012.030 --.006 .095 .048 -.002 .000 .000 .000.000 .000
AE1 -.019 .078 -.020 -.021 .049 -.010 .172 .087 -.003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number I - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP
SDM
Y SI accident PE PP PC ^
SF .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
193
SI .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .027 -.012 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .038 .063 .011 .040.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.039 .043 -.052 -.042 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
^  .004 -.047 .047 .004.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
A D
MY .010 -.007 .013 .011 .008 -.002 -.066 -.045 -.001
AV .000 .010 -.003 .000.002 .000 .044 .002 .002
AE2 -.012 .012 -.015 -.013 .002 -.001 .099 .052 .000
AE3 -.014 .012 -.015 -.015.011 -.002 .109 .061 -.002
AE1 -.009 .008 -.010 -.010.006 -.001 .071 .040 -.001
Modification Indices (Group number i - Default model) 
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
OC <—> ODMY 4.080 .000
ORG <—> ODMY 89.027 .000
OP <—> ODMY 82.267 .000
OP <—> OC 5.926 .000
e2 <—> e3 21.197 .000
e2 <—> e4 4.762 .000
e5 <—> e3 10.595 .000
e5 <—> e4 6.222 .000
e5 <--> e2 76.060 .000
el <—> e3 9.486 .000
el <—> e5 84.190 .000
resl <—> ODMY 39.767 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
,000 .000 .000 .000 .000
000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
000 .000 .000 .000 .000
000 .000 .000 .000 .000
000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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resl < —> ORG 29.889 .000
resl < —> OP 12.455 .000
e6 < —> OC 25.719 .000
e6 <—> ORG 6.045 .000
e6 <—> el4 5.888 .000
e8 < —> ODMY 9.951 .000
e8 < —> ORG 8.317 .000
e8 < —> el4 21.795 .000
e8 <—> e7 23.588 .000
e8 < —> e6 50.403 .000
elO < —> OC 4.097 .000
elO < —> OP 4.397 .000
e l l <—> elO 4.484 .000
e9 < —> el 4.630 .000
e9 < —> elO 13.033 .000
e9 < —> e l l 6.869 .000
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
Regression Weights: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SF <--- SP 20.004 .094
SF <— SDMY 10.828 -.062
SF <— SI 9.138 .057
SV <— SP 4.214 -.041
SV <— SDMY 4.938 -.040
SP <— SF 19.633 .974
SP <— SDMY 66.410 -.500
195
SDMY <— SF 9.814 -.728
SDMY <— SV 5.241 -.534
SDMY <— SP 71.740 -.612
SDMY <— SI 64.903 -.525
SI <— SF 8.787 .653
SI <— SDMY 71.398 -.519
accident <— ODMY 39.767 -.510
accident <— ORG 29.889 .419
accident <— OP 12.455 .291
PE <— PC 5.654 .069
PE <— PDMY 20.892 -.370
PP <— PDMY 24.340 -.402
PC <— OC 25.719 1.030
PC <— ORG 6.045 -.099
PC <— SF 4.179 -.324
PC <— PE 5.797 .376
PC <— PDMY 52.341 -1.310
PDMY <— ODMY 9.951 -.051
PDMY <— ORG 8.317 .044
PDMY <— PE 21.456 -.274
PDMY <— PP 22.520 -.274
PDMY <— PC 43.306 -.162
ADMY <— ODMY 28.846 -.328
ADMY <— ORG 17.231 .240
ADMY <— OP 7.814 .174
AE2 <— OC 4.097 .867































MPAR CMIN DF P
59 1004.826 112 .000
171 .000 0
18 1331.327 153 .000
RMR GFI AGFI PGFI
.000 .708 .554 .463
.000 1.000
.000 .614 .569 .549
NFI RFI IFI TLI
Deltal rhol Delta2 rho2
.245 -.031 .268 -.035
1.000 1.000











NCP LO 90 HI 90
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Default model 892.826 795.179 997.921
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1178.327 1065.473 1298.619
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 4.974 4.420 3.937 4.940
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 6.591 5.833 5.275 6.429
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .199 .187 .210 .000
Independence model .195 .186 .205 .000
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC
Default model 1122.826 1135.077 1318.305 1377.305
Saturated model 342.000 377.508 908.558 1079.558
Independence model 1367.327 1371.064 1426.964 1444.964
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 5.559 5.075 6.079 5.619
Saturated model 1.693 1.693 1.693 1.869

































APPENDIX I. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAV M ODEL B (p < 0.1)
Analysis Summary
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 203
Parameter Summary (G roup number 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 15 0 0 0 0 15
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 41 5 18 0 0 64
Total 56 5 18 0 0 79
Models
Computation o f degrees o f  freedom (Default model)
Number o f distinct sample moments: 171 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 64
Degrees o f freedom (171 - 64): 107
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 407.286 
Degrees o f freedom = 107 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 -  Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <— OP -.199 .075 -2.633 .008par_l
SI <— ORG .264 .086 3.058 .002par_2
SI <— OC .970 .282 3.434 ***par3
SP <— OC .907 .282 3.215 .001par_4
SDMY <--- OC -.824 .287 -2.867 .004par_5
201
SI <— OP .201 .090 2.230 .026par_6
SI <— ODMY .229 .118 1.943 .052par_7
SDMY <--- ORG -.099 .079 -1.249 .212par_14
SV <— OC .503 .083 6.089 ***par_17
SV <— OP .015 .018 .852 .394par_19
SDMY <— ODMY -.191 .099 -1.940 .052par_20
SF <— ORG .069 .017 4.011 ***par_23
SP <— ORG -.076 .056 -1.352 .176par_35
PDMY <--- SP -.006 .026 -.244 .807par_8
PC <— SP .254 .060 4.197 ***par_13
PDMY <--- SDMY .051 .031 1.642 .101par_15
PDMY <— SV .082 .052 1.590 .1 12par_21
PP <— SI .007 .032 .224 .823par_24
PP <— SP .047 .032 1.492 .136par_25
PP <— SDMY * o .040 -1.044 ,297par_26
PC <— SDMY .119 .059 2.007 .045par_27
PE <— SP .039 .022 1.784 .074par_29
PDMY <--- SI .051 .023 2.210 .027par_36
PDMY <— SF
ooi .051 -.052 .959par_46
AE1 <— PC .770 .271 2.844 .004par_9
AE2 <— PC .643 .175 3.684 ***par_10
AE3 <— PC .433 .093 4.634 ***par_l 1
AE2 <— PDMY .121 .464 .261 .794par_12
AE1 <— PDMY .476 .719 .661 .508par_16
AE3 <— PDMY .294 .248 1.187 .235par_18
AV <— PDMY .037 .188 .198 .843par_22
ADMY <— PDMY .351 .404 .868 .385par_28
ADMY <— PC -.393 .152 -2.581 .010par_30
ADMY <— accident 1.000
AV <— accident -.053 .033 -1.613 ,107par 31
AE3 <— accident -.081 .043 -1.884 .060par_32
AE2 <— accident -.281 .078 -3.596 ***par_33
AE1 <— accident -1.122 .097 -11.563 ***par_34
ADMY <— PE .538 .224 2.405 .016par_37
AV <— PC .081 .071 1.136 .256par_38
AV <— PP .189 .133 1.418 .156par_39
ADMY <— PP .125 .217 .574 .566par_45
Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP
SDM
Y accident PE PP PC PD MY
SF .000 .000 .069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .503 .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .907 -.076 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
MY -.191 -.824 -.099 -.199 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .229 .970 .264 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 -.003 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .010 .084 .002 .010 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.023 .132 -.031 -.024 .000 .000 .254 .119 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
MY .002 .043 .009 .001 -.003 .082 -.006 .051 .051 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .011 -.007 .014 .011 -.001 .029 -.075 -.034 .019 1.000 .538 .125 -.393 .351
AV .000 .028 -.002 .000 .000 .003 .029 .004 .003 -.053 .000.189 .081 .037
AE2 -.014 .090 -.019 -.015 .000 .010 .162 .083 .006 -.281 .000 .000 .643 .121
AE3 -.009 .070 -.011 -.010 -.001 .024 .108 .066 .015 -.081 .000 .000 .433 .294
203
AE1 -.017 .122 -.020 -.018 --.001 .039 .192 .116 .024 -1.122 .000 .000 .770 .476
Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP
SDM QT
Y accident PE PP PC ^  MY
SF .000 .000 .272 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .393 .000 .055 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .220 -.092 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
MY -.206 -.196 -.118 -.220 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .246 .229 .314 .222 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .027 -.012 .000 .000 .000 .125 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .032 .063 .009 .034 .000 .000 .145 -.130.023 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.034 .044 -.052 -.037 .000 .000 .348 .166 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
MY .008 .038 .039 .006 -.003 .093 -.023 .189 .191 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .009 -.001 .012 .009 .000 .006 -.054 -.025 .014 .961 .123 .029 -.208 .070
AV .000 .011 -.003 .000 .000 .002 .047 .006 .005 -.112 .000 .099 .094 .016
AE2 -.010 .014 -.015 - .0 1 1 .000 .002 .102 .053 .004 -.235 .000 .000 .296 .021
AE3 -.012 .020 -.015 -.013 .000 .009 .125 .079 .018 -.124 .000 .000 .367 .094
AE1 -.008 .012 -.010 -.008 .000 .005 .080 .049 .010 -.617 .000 .000 .233 .054
Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP
SDM
Y accident PE PP PC MY
SF .000 .000 .069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .503 .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .907 -.076 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
MY -.191 -.824 -.099 -.199 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
204
SI .229 .970 .264 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .254 .119.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 -.003 .082 -.006 .051 .051 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .538 .125 -.393 .351
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.053 .000 .189 .081 .037
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.281 .000 .000 .643 .121
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.081 .000.000 .433 .29^
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.122 .000 .000 .770 A lt
Standardized Direct: Effects (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP SD Y s i accident PE PP
PC ^  r  MY
SF .000 .000 .272 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .393 .000 .055 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .220 -.092 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
MY -.206 ■-.196 -.118 -.220 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .246 .229 .314 .222 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .125 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .145 -.130.023 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .348 .166 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 -.003 .093 -.023
.189 .191 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .961 .123 .029 -.208 .070
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000.000 -.112.000.099 .094.016
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AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.235.000.000 .296.021
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.124.000.000 .367.094
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.617.000.000 .233.054
Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP
SDM
Y
PDaccident PE PP PC MY
SF .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 -.003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .010 .084 .002 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.023 .132 -.031 -.024 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
MY .002 .043 .009 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .011 -.007 .014 .011 -.001 .029 -.075 -.034 .019 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .028 -.002 .000 .000 .003 .029 .004 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.014 .090 -.019 -.015 .000.010 .162 .083 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.009 .070 -.0 1 1 -.010 -.001 .024 .108 .066 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 -.017 .122 -.020 -.018 -.001 .039 .192 .116.024 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP SD^  SI accident PE PP PC ™
SF .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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"T”  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000  .000 .000.000M Y
SI .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000 .000.000
PE .000 .027 -.012 .000.000.000 .000 .000.000
PP .032 .063 .009 .034.000.000 .000 .000.000
PC -.034 .044 -.052 -.037 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
^  .008 .038 .039 .006.000.000 .000 .000.000
A D
009 -.001 .012 .009 .000 .006 -.054 -.025 .014MY
AV .000 .011 -.003 .000 .000 .002 .047 .006 .005
AE2 -.010 .014 -.015 -.011 .000.002 .102 .053.004
AE3 -.012 .020 -.015 -.013 .000.009 .125 .079.018
AE1 -.008 .012 -.010 -.008.000.005 .080 .049.010
Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
OC <—> ODMY 4.350 .000
ORG <—> OC 4.060 .000
e3 <—> ODMY 7.136 .000
e3 <—> ORG 4.127 .000
e2 <—> e3 21.311 .000
e2 <—> e4 45.233 .000
e5 <—> e4 52.542 .000
el <—> e3 12.457 .000
el <—> e4 30.906 .000
resl <—> ODMY 4.930 .000
e6 <—> OC 24.926 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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e6 <—> e7 8.179 .000
e8 <—> el4 14.785 .000
e8 <—> e7 31.875 .000
elO <—> OC 4.097 .000
e l l <—> elO 4.484 .000
e9 <—> elO 13.033 .000
e9 <—> e l l 6.869 .000
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
M.I. Par Change
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SF <— SP 20.004 .094
SF <— SDMY 12.905 -.074
SF <— SI 10.648 .067
SV <— SP 4.214 -.041
SV <— SDMY 5.885 -.048
SP <— SF 19.739 .680
SP <— SV 37.780 -.944
SDMY <— SV 44.261 -.828
SI <— SF 11.538 .504
SI <— SV 26.034 -.760
accident <— ODMY 43.634 -.560
accident <— ORG 29.889 .419
accident <— OP 12.455 .291
PE <— PC 6.045 .074
PE <— PDMY 20.466 -.362
PP <— PDMY 23.845 -.394
208
PC <— OC 24.926 .849
PC <— PP 7.505 -.347
PDMY <— ODMY 8.855 -.043
PDMY <— ORG 4.526 .028
PDMY <— OP 5.058 .031
PDMY <— PE 14.555 -.192
PDMY <— PP 29.821 -.266
ADMY <— ODMY 31.651 -.360
ADMY <— ORG 17.231 .240
ADMY <— OP 7.814 .174
AV <— SDMY 4.753 .092
AE2 <— OC 4.097 .867
AE2 <— OP 4.397 .192
AE2 <— SV 4.738 .730
AE2 <— AE1 7.501 -.118
AE1 <— SI 4.661 .271
AE1 <— AE2 11.255 -.272
AE1 <— AE3 6.035 -.367
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN
Model NPAR CMIN DF P
Default model 64 407.286 107 .000
Saturated model 171 .000 0
Independence model 18 1331.327 153 .000
RMR, GFI
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI





Saturated model .000 1.000











Default model .694 .563 .755 .636 .745
Saturated model 1.000 1.000 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted M easures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .699 .485 .521
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 300.286 242.152 365.993
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1 178.327 1065.473 1298.619
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 2.016 1.487 1.199 1.812
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 6.591 5.833 5.275 6.429
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .118 .106 .130 .000
Independence model .195 .186 .205 .000
210
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC
Default model 535.286 548.576 747.331
Saturated model 342.000 377.508 908.558
Independence model 1367.327 1371.064 1426.964
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 2.650 2.362 2.975 2.716
Saturated model 1.693 1.693 1.693 1.869




Default model 66 72























APPENDIX J. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF MAV M ODEL C (p < 0.1)
Analysis Summary  
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 203
Parameter Summary (Group number 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 15 0 0 0 0 15
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 39 5 18 0 0 62
Total 54 5 18 0 0 77
Models
Computation o f degrees of freedom (Default model)
Number o f distinct sample moments: 171 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 62
Degrees of freedom (171- 62): 109
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 409.806 
Degrees o f freedom = 109 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression W eights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY < -- OP -.199 .075 -2.633 .008par_l
SI <— ORG .264 .086 3.058 .002par_2
SI <— OC .970 .282 3.434 ***par_3
SP <— OC .925 .283 3.263 ,001par_4
SDMY <— OC -.834 .288 -2.898 .004par_5
214
SI <— OP .201 .090 2.230 .026par_6
SI <— ODMY .229 .118 1.943 .052par_7
SDMY <— ORG -.143 .072 -1.982 .047par_14
111V> OC .515 .083 6.224 ***par_17
SDMY <— ODMY -.191 .099 -1.940 .052par_19
SF <--- ORG .069 .017 4.011 ***par_22
PDMY <— SP -.006 .026 -.245 .807par_8
111VuOh SP .254 .061 4.189 ***par_13
PDMY <--- SDMY .051 .031 1.642 .101par_15
PDMY < -- SV .082 .051 1.596 .111 par_20
PP <— SI .007 .032 .224 .823par_23
PP <--- SP .047 .032 1.499 . 134par_24
PP < - SDMY -.041 .040 -1.043 .297par_25
PC <--- SDMY .119 .059 2.007 .045par_26
PE <--- SP .039 .022 1.786 .074par_28
PDMY <— SI .051 .023 2.208 .027par_34
PDMY <— SF -.003 .051 -.052 .959par_44
AE1 <--- PC .770 .271 2.844 .004par_9
AE2 < -- PC .643 .174 3.685 ***par 10
AE3 <— PC .433 .093 4.635 ***par_l 1
AE2 < - PDMY .121 .464 .261 ,794par_12
AE1 <--- PDMY .476 .719 .662 .508par_16
AE3 <— PDMY .294 .248 1.187 .235par_18
> < A 1 1 1 PDMY .037 .188 .198 .843par_21
ADMY <— PDMY .351 .404 .868 ,385par_27
ADMY <— PC -.393 .152 -2.581 .010par_29
ADMY <— accident 1.000
215
AV < -- accident -.053 .033 -1.613 .107par_30
AE3 <--- accident -.081 .043 -1.884 .060par_31
AE2 <— accident -.281 .078 -3.596 ***par_32
AE1 <--- accident -1.122 .097 -11.563 ***par_33
ADMY <— PE .538 .224 2.405 .016par_35
AV < - PC .081 .071 1.137 .256par_36
AV <— PP .189 .133 1.418 .156par_37
ADMY <— PP .125 .217 .574 .566par_43
Total Effects (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM OC ORG OP SF SV SP SDM SI accident PE PP PC PDM
SF .000 .000 .069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .515 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .925 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
M -.191 -.834 -.143 -.199 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .229 .970 .264 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 .000 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .010 .085 .008 .010 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.023 .136 -.017 -.024 .000 .000 .254 .119 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
M .002 .043 .006 .000 -.003 .082 -.006 .051 .051 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000
AD .011 -.008 .010 .011 -.001 .029 -.075 -.034 .019 1.000 .538 .125 -.393 .351
AV .000 .029 .000 .000 .000 .003 .029 .004 .003 -.053 .000 .189 .081 .037
AE2 -.014 .092 -.010 -.015 .000 .010 .162 .083 .006 -.281 .000 .000 .643 .121
AE3 -.009 .071 -.006 -.010 -.001 .024 .108 .066 .015 -.081 .000 .000 .433 .294
AE1 -.017 .125 -.010 -.018 -.001 .039 .192 .116 .024 -1.122 .000 .000 .770 .476
Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM OC ORG OP SF SV SP SDM SI accident PE PP
SF .000 .000 .272 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .401 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
M -.206 -.197 -.170 -.220 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .246 .229 .314 .222 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .125 .000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .032 .063 .029 .034 .000 .000 .146 -.130.023 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.034 .045 -.028 -.037 .000 .000 .348 .167.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
M .008 .038 .027 .001 -.003 .093 -.023 .190.191 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD .009 -.001 .009 .009 .000 .006 -.054 -.025 .014 .961 .123 .029 -.208 .070
AV .000 .011 .001 .000 .000 .002 .047 .006 .005 -.112 .000 .099 .094 .016
AE2 -.010 .014 -.008 -.011 .000 .002 .102 .053 .004 -.235 .000 .000 .296 .021
AE3 -.012 .020 -.008 -.013 .000 .009 .126 .079.018 -.124 .000 .000 .367 .094
AE1 -.008 .013 -.005 -.009 .000 .005 .080 .049.010 -.617 .000 .000 .233 .054
Direct Effects (Group number 1 -
0 0  Y OC ORG OP
Default model)



















.000 .000 .000 





SD -191 MY -.834 -.143 -.199 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000








.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .039 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .047 -.041 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .254 .119 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 -.003 .082 -.006 .051 .051 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .538 .125 -.393 .351
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.053 .000 .189 .081 .037
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.281 .000 .000 .643 .121
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.081 .000 .000 .433 .294
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.122 .000 .000 .770 .476















OC ORG OP SF SV SP SDM „Y ^ accident PE PP PC PD MY
.000 .272 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.401 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
-.197 -.170 -.220 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.229 .314 .222 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .125 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .146 -.130 .023 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .348 .167 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 -.003 .093 -.023 .190 .191 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .961 .123 .029 -.208 .070
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.112 .000 .099 .094 .016
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.235 .000 .000 .296 .021
218
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000.000 -.124.000.000 .367.094
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000.000 .000 .000.000 -.617.000.000 .233.054
Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP
SDM
Y
PDaccident PE PP PC
SF .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .036 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .010 .085 .008 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.023 .136 -.017 -.024 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
MY .002 .043 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .011 -.008 .010 .011 -.001 .029 -.075 -.034 .019 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .029 .000 .000 .000 .003 .029 .004 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.014 .092 -.010 -.015 .000 .010 .162 .083 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.009 .071 -.006 -.010 -.001 .024 .108 .066 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 -.017 .125 -.010 -.018 -.001 .039 .192 .116 .024 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OC ORG OP SF SV SP SD y  SI accident PE PP PC ^
SF .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SV .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SP .000 .000 .000 .000.000.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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SD
MY .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PE .000 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .032 .063 .029 .034 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.034 .045 -.028 -.037 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PD
MY .008 .038 .027 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AD
MY .009 -.001 .009 .009 .000 .006 -.054 -.025 .014 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .011 .001 .000 .000 .002 .047 .006 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.010 .014 -.008 -.011 .000 .002 .102 .053 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.012 .020 -.008 -.013 .000 .009 .126 .079 .018 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 -.008 .013 -.005 -.009 .000 .005 .080 .049 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
OC <—> ODMY 4.350 .000
ORG <—> OC 4.060 .000
e3 <~> ODMY 7.136 .000
e3 <—> ORG 4.127 .000
e2 <—> e3 21.139 .000
e2 <—> e4 44.187 .000
e5 <—> e4 52.360 .000
el <—> e3 12.457 .000
el <—> e4 30.798 .000
resl <—> ODMY 4.930 .000
e6 <—> OC 24.926 .000
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e6 <—> e7 8.179 .000
e8 <—> el4 14.785 .000
e8 <—> e7 31.875 .000
elO <—> OC 4.097 .000
e l l <—> elO 4.484 .000
e9 <—> elO 13.033 .000
e9 <—> e ll 6.869 .000
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
M.I. Par Change
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SF <— SP 19.967 .094
SF <— SDMY 12.834 -.074
SF <— SI 10.648 .067
SV <— SP 4.075 -.040
SV <— SDMY 6.355 -.049
SP <— SF 17.403 .640
SP <— SV 37.077 -.933
SDMY <— SV 43.935 -.821
SI <— SF 11.538 .504
SI <— SV 25.843 -.754
accident <— ODMY 43.634 -.560
accident <— ORG 29.889 .419
accident <— OP 12.455 .291
PE <— PC 6.046 .074
PE <— PDMY 20.476 -.363
PP <— PDMY 23.856 -.394
221
PC <— OC 24.926 .849
PC <— PP 7.501 -.346
PDMY <— ODMY 8.855 -.043
PDMY <— ORG 4.526 .028
PDMY <— OP 5.058 .031
PDMY <— PE 14.555 -.192
PDMY <— PP 29.806 -.265
ADMY <— ODMY 31.651 -.360
ADMY <— ORG 17.231 .240
ADMY <— OP 7.814 .174
AV <— SDMY 4.726 .092
AE2 <— OC 4.097 .867
AE2 <— OP 4.397 .192
AE2 <— SV 4.703 .724
AE2 <— AE1 7.501 -.118
AE1 <— SI 4.661 .271
AE1 <— AE2 11.255 -.272
AE1 <— AE3 6.034 -.367
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN
Model NPAR CMIN DF P
Default model 62 409.806 109 .000
Saturated model 171 .000 0
Independence model 18 1331.327 153 .000
RMR, GFI
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI





Saturated model .000 1.000
Independence model .000 .614 .569 .549
Baseline Comparisons
NFI RFI IFI TLI
Model Delta 1 rhol Delta2 rho2 CFI
Default model .692 .568 .754 .642 .745
Saturated model 1.000 1.000 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted M easures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .712 .493 .531
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 300.806 242.542 366.647
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1178.327 1065.473 1298.619
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 2.029 1.489 1.201 1.815
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 6.591 5.833 5.275 6.429
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .117 .105 .129 .000
Independence model .195 .186 .205 .000
223
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC
Default model 533.806 546.680 739.225
Saturated model 342.000 377.508 908.558
Independence model 1367.327 1371.064 1426.964
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 2.643 2.354 2.969 2.706
Saturated model 1.693 1.693 1.693 1.869































APPENDIX K. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV M ODEL A (p < 0.05)
Analysis Summary
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 60
Parameter Summary (Group number 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 12 0 0 0 0 12
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 24 0 14 0 0 38
Total 36 0 14 0 0 50
Models
Computation o f degrees o f  freedom (Default model)
Number o f distinct sample moments: 105 
Number o f distinct parameters to be estimated: 38 
Degrees of freedom (105 - 38): 67
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 325.983 
Degrees o f freedom = 67 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <— ORG .122 .144 .848 .396par_l
SI <— OP .054 .080 .673 .501par_5
SI <— ODMY -.179 .098 -1.836 .066par_6
SDMY <--- ODMY .273 .111 2.450 .014par_7
SV <— ODMY -.072 .048 -1.503 .133par_22
PDMY < -- SDMY .012 .030 .392 ,695par_2
227
PC <— SDMY .123 .093 1.326 .185par_3
PP <— SI .161 .066 2.456 .014par_9
PDMY <--- SI .000 .035 .000 l.OOOparlO
PDMY <— SV .054 .071 .754 ,451par_13
PP <— SDMY .012 .056 .208 .835par_14
AE1 <— PDMY -.061 1.257 -.048 .962par 4
AE2 <— PDMY .197 .969 .203 .839par_8
AE3 <— PDMY -.084 .475 -.176 .860par_l 1
AV <— PDMY -.138 .210 -.658 .51 lpar_12
AE1 <— PC 1.628 .396 4.111 ***par_15
AE2 <— PC 1.463 .307 4.768 ***par_16
AE3 <— PP .479 .236 2.029 .043par_17
AE1 <— Accident -1.108 .174 -6.377 ***par_l 8
AE2 <— Accident -.545 .159 -3.428 ***par_19
AE3 <— Accident -.132 .084 -1.584 .113par_20
AV <— Accident -.022 .038 -.571 ,568par_21
ADMY <— PC -.326 .225 -1.450 .147par_23
ADMY <— PDMY .641 .725 .885 .376par_24
ADMY <— Accident 1.000
Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.072 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .273 .000 .122 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.179 .054 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.026 .009 .001 .000 .012 .161 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .034 .000 .015 .000 .123 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
228
PDM
Y -.001 .000 .001 .054 .012 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.011 .000 -.004 .034 -.033 .000 1.000 .000 -.326 .641
AE3 -.012 .004 .001 -.005 .005 .077 -.132 .479 .000 -.084
AV .000 .000 .000 -.007 -.002 .000 -.022 .000 .000 -.138
AE2 .049 .000 .022 .011 .182 .000 -.545 .000 1.463 .197
AE1 .055 .000 .024 -.003 .199 .000 -1.108 .000 1.628 -.061
Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.192 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .302 .000 .105 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.232 .085 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.063 .026 .003 .000 .026 .305 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .051 .000 .018 .000 .170 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.003 .000 .005 .098 .051 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.010 .000 -.003 .011 -.025 .000 .977 .000 -.180 .113
AE3 -.016 .006 .001 -.002 .005 .076 -.195 .250 .000 -.022
AV .000 .000 .000 -.008 -.004 .000 -.074 .000 .000 -.085
AE2 .027 .000 .009 .002 .091 .000 -.347 .000 .526 .022
AE1 .024 .000 .008 -.001 .079 .000 -.564 .000 .468 -.006
Direct Effects (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.072 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM




































Y .000 .000 .000 .054 .012 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 -.326 .641
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.132 .479 .000 -.084
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.022 .000 .000 -.138
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.545 .000 1.463 .197
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.108 .000 1.628 -.061
Standardized Direct Effects (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.192 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM



































Y .000 .000 .000 .098 .051 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM













































Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.026 .009 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .034 .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.001 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.011 .000 -.004 .034 -.033 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.012 .004 .001 -.005 .005 .077 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .000 .000 -.007 -.002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .049 .000 .022 .011 .182 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .055 .000 .024 -.003 .199 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.063 .026 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .051 .000 .018 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.003 .000 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.010 .000 -.003 .011 -.025 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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AE3 -.016 .006 .001 -.002 .005 .076 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .000 .000 -.008 -.004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .027 .000 .009 .002 .091 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .024 .000 .008 -.001 .079 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
OP <—> ODMY 25.066 .000
ORG <—> ODMY 14.158 .000
e5 <--> e4 4.760 .000
el <—> e4 8.456 .000
el <—> e5 37.083 .000
resl <—> e5 5.860 .000
resl <—> el 6.015 .000
e6 <—> e7 6.031 .000
e8 <—> ORG 4.168 .000
e8 <—> e7 5.219 .000
e8 <—> e6 9.960 .000
e ll <—> e4 20.439 .000
el2 <—> e4 27.485 .000
el2 <—> e l l 10.225 .000
e9 <—> e l 2 5.339 .000
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change



















































NPAR CMIN DF P





Independence model 14 433.300 91 .000
RMR, GFI
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI
Default model .000 .625 .412 .399
Saturated model .000 1.000
Independence model .000 .521 .447 .451
Baseline Comparisons
NFI RFI IFI TLI
Model Delta 1 rhol Delta2 rho2
Default model .248 -.022 .293 -.028
Saturated model 1.000 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted M easures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .736 .182 .179
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 258.983 206.441 319.058
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 342.300 281.240 410.893
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 5.525 4.390 3.499 5.408
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000








Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .256 .229 .284 .000
Independence model .252 .229 .277 .000
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC
Default model 401.983 427.892 481.568 519.568
Saturated model 210.000 281.591 429.906 534.906
Independence model 461.300 470.846 490.621 504.621
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 6.813 5.923 7.831 7.252
Saturated model 3.559 3.559 3.559 4.773




Default model 16 18
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A ccidentUnstandardized estimates 
Chi-square=325.983 (67 df)
p  = .0 0 0
r e s l
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APPENDIX L. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV M ODEL B (p < 0.05)
Analysis Sum m ary  
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 60
Parameter Summary (G roup number 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 12 0 0 0 0 12
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 24 4 14 0 0 42
Total 36 4 14 0 0 54
Models
Computation o f  degrees of freedom (Default model)
Number o f distinct sample moments: 105 
Number o f distinct parameters to be estimated: 42
Degrees of freedom (105 - 42): 63
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 141.906 
Degrees o f freedom = 63 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <— ORG .051 .140 .361 .718par_l
SI <— OP .071 .090 .794 .427par_5
SI <— ODMY -.165 .112 -1.473 .141 par_6
SDMY <— ODMY .246 .116 2.123 .034par_7
SV <— ODMY -.072 .043 -1.678 .093par_22
PDMY <— SDMY .010 .049 .198 ,843par_2
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PC <— SDMY .123 .094 1.312 . 190par_3
PP <— SI .161 .110 1.465 .143par_9
PDMY <— SI -.007 .053 -.134 .893par_10
PDMY <— SV .075 .065 1.162 .245par_13
PP <— SDMY .012 .098 .120 ,905par_14
AE1 <— PDMY -.061 1.358 -.045 .964par_4
AE2 <— PDMY .197 1.047 .188 .851par_8
AE3 <— PDMY -.084 .473 -.177 .859par_l 1
AV <— PDMY -.138 .209 -.662 .508par_12
AE1 <— PC 1.628 .431 3.777 ***par_15
AE2 <— PC 1.463 .334 4.381 ***par_16
AE3 <— PP .479 .237 2.021 ,043par_17
AE1 <— Accident -1.108 .174 -6.377 ***par_18
AE2 <— Accident -.545 .159 -3.428 ***par_19
AE3 <— Accident -.132 .084 -1.584 .113par_20
AV <— Accident -.022 .038 -.571 .568par_21
ADMY <— PC -.326 .245 -1.332 . 183par_23
ADMY <— PDMY .641 .781 .821 .412par_24
ADMY <— Accident 1.000
Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.072 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .246 .000 .051 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.165 .071 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.024 .011 .001 .000 .012 .161 .000 .000 .000
PC .030 .000 .006 .000 .123 .000 .000 .000 .000
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PDM
Y -.002 -.001 .000 .075 .010 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.011 .000 -.002 .048 -.034 -.005 1.000 .000 -.326 .641
AE3 -.011 .006 .000 -.006 .005 .078 -.132 .479 .000 -.084
AV .000 .000 .000 -.010 -.001 .001 -.022 .000 .000 -.138
AE2 .044 .000 .009 .015 .182 -.001 -.545 .000 1.463 .197
AE1 .049 .000 .010 -.005 .199 .000 -1.108 .000 1.628 -.061
Standardized Total Effects (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.213 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .307 .000 .044 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.233 .110 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.065 .034 .001 .000 .026 .314 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .052 .000 .007 .000 .168 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.010 --.003 .002 .137 .041 -.027 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.010 .000 -.001 .015 -.025 -.003 .969 .000 -.179 .112
AE3 -.016 .009 .000 -.003 .005 .079 -.196 .249 .000 -.022
AV .001 .000 .000 -.012 -.004 .002 -.074 .000 .000 -.086
AE2 .027 .000 .004 .003 .090 -.001 -.348 .000 .528 .023
AE1 .024 .000 .003 -.001 .079 .000 -.564 .000 .468 -.006
Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SD ^  SI Accident PP PC PDMY 
SV -.072 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
f M .246 .000 .051 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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SI -.165 .071 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
pp .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .161 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .123 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .075 .010 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 -.326 .641
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.132 .479 .000 -.084
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.022 .000 .000 -.138
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.545 .000 1.463 .197
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.108 .000 1.628 -.061
Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.213 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .307 .000 .044 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.233 .110 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .026 .314 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .168 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .137 .041 -.027 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .969 .000 -.179 .112
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.196 .249 .000 -.022
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.074 .000 .000 -.086
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.348 .000 .528 .023
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.564 .000 .468 -.006
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Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident pp PC PDMY
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.024 .011 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .030 .000 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.002 -.003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.011 .000 -.002 .048 -.034 -.005 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.011 .006 .000 -.006 .005 .078 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .000 .000 -.010 -.001 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .044 .000 .009 .015 .182 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .049 .000 .010 -.005 .199 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group num ber I - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident pp PC
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.065 .034 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .052 .000 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.010 -.003 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.010 .000 -.001 .015 -.025 -
.003 .000 .000 .000 .000
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AE3
©1 .009 .000 -.003 .005 .079 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .001 .000 .000 -.012 -.004 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .027 .000 .004 .003 .090 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .024 .000 .003 -.001 .079 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Modification indices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
e l l  <--> e4 20.439 .000
el2  <--> e4 27.485 .000
el2  <--> e l l  10.225 .000
e9 < ->  el 2 5.339 .000
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SV <— SDMY 5.017 -.121
SV <— SI 7.806 .170
Accident <— SDMY 5.051 .378
Accident <— SI 4.619 -.408
PP <— PC 5.860 .188
PP <— PDMY 5.852 -.588
ADMY <— SDMY 5.498 .283
ADMY <— SI 4.482 -.289
AE3 <— SV 20.012 1.140
AE3 <— AV 10.094 .912
AV <— SV 28.748 .616
AV <— SI 4.271 .114
243
> < A ( 1 t AE3 8.113 .158
AE1 <— AV 5.270 -1.370
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF
Default model 42 141.906 63 .000 2.252
Saturated model 105 .000 0
Independence model 14 433.300 91 .000 4.762
RMR, GFI
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI
Default model .000 .748 .580 .449
Saturated model .000 1.000











Default model .672 .527 .787 .667 .769
Saturated model 1.000 1.000 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted M easures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .692 .466 .533
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 78.906 48.138 117.403
244
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 342.300 281.240 410.893
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 2.405 1.337 .816 1.990
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 7.344 5.802 4.767 6.964
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .146 .114 .178 .000
Independence model .252 .229 .277 .000
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC
Default model 225.906 254.543 313.869 355.869
Saturated model 210.000 281.591 429.906 534.906
Independence model 461.300 470.846 490.621 504.621
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 3.829 3.307 4.481 4.314
Saturated model 3.559 3.559 3.559 4.773
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APPENDIX M. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV M ODEL A (p < 0.1)
Analysis Summary 
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 60
Parameter Summary (G roup number 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 12 0 0 0 0 12
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 27 0 14 0 0 41
Total 39 0 14 0 0 53
Models
Computation o f degrees of freedom (Default model)
Number of distinct sample moments: 105 
Number o f distinct parameters to be estimated: 41
Degrees of freedom (105 - 41): 64
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 322.441 
Degrees o f freedom = 64 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression W eights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <--- ORG .367 .143 2.572 .010par_l
SI <— OP .054 .080 .673 .501par_5
SI <— ODMY -.179 .098 -1.836 .066par_6
SDMY <--- ODMY .537 .110 4.866 ***par_7
SV <— ODMY -.045 .048 -.946 .344par_22
SV <— OP .034 .039 .863 .388par 26
248
SDMY < -- OP .216 .091 2.384 .017par_27
PDMY <— SDMY .012 .025 .466 .641par_2
PC <— SDMY .123 .078 1.580 .114par_3
PP <— SI .161 .066 2.451 .014par_9
PDMY <--- SI .000 .035 .000 1 .OOOparlO
PDMY <— SV .054 .072 .748 ,454par_13
PP <— SDMY .012 .047 .247 ,805par_14
AE1 <— PDMY -.062 1.257 -.049 ,961par_4
AE2 <— PDMY .196 .968 .203 .839par_8
AE3 <— PDMY -.052 .475 -.110 .913par_l 1
AV <— PDMY -.138 .210 -.658 .510par_12
AE1 <— PC 1.627 .393 4.136 ***par_l 5
AE2 <— PC 1.463 .305 4.797 ***par_16
AE3 <— PP .532 .239 2.229 ,026par_17
AE1 <— Accident -1.130 .174 -6.502 ***par_18
AE2 <— Accident -.550 .160 -3.430 ***par_19
AE3 <— Accident -.134 .084 -1.585 .113par_20
AV < — Accident -.026 .038 -.687 ,492par_21
ADMY <— PC -.283 .222 -1.278 .201par_23
ADMY <— PDMY .450 .719 .626 .532par_24
ADMY <— Accident 1.000
ADMY <— PP -.411 .263 -1.562 .118par_25
Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PD
SV -.045 .034 .000 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .000 .000 .0 0 0  .0 0 0
SDM
Y .537 .216 .367 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .000 .000 .0 0 0  .000
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SI -.179 .054 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
pp -.023 .011 .004 .000 .012 .161 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .066 .027 .045 .000 .123 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .004 .004 .004 .054 .012 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000
ADM
Y -.008 -.010 -.013 .024 -.034 -.066 1.000 -.411 -.283 .450
AE3 -.012 .006 .002 -.003 .006 .086 -.134 .532 .000 -.052
AV -.001 -.001 -.001 -.007 -.002 .000 -.026 .000 .000 -.138
AE2 .097 .040 .067 .011 .182 .000 -.550 .000 1.463 .196
AE1 .107 .043 .073 -.003 .199 .000 -1.130 .000 1.627 -.062
Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.121 .111 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .499 .245 .264 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.232 .085 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.055 .033 .008 .000 .031 .305 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .101 .049 .053 .000 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .018 .026 .016 .097 .061 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000
ADM
Y -.007 -.011 -.008 .008 -.031 -.044
.974 -.143 -.158 .079
AE3 -.016 .009 .002 -.001 .008 .084 -.194 .276 .000 -.014
AV -.002 -.002 -.001 -.008 -.005 .000 -.089 .000 .000 -.085
AE2 .054 .027 .028 .002 .108 .000 -.346 .000 .528 .022
AE1 .047 .023 .025 -.001 .094 .000 -.570 .000 .470 -.006
Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDM SI Accident PP PC PDMY
250
Y
SV -.045 .034 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .537 .216 .367 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000
SI -.179 .054 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .161 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .123 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .054 .012 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000
-.411 -.283 .450
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.134 .532 .000 -.052
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.026 .000 .000 I 00
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.550 .000 1.463 .196
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.130 .000 1.627 -.062
Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.121 .111 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .499 .245 .264 .000 .000 .000



































Y .000 .000 .000 .097 .061 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .974 -.143 -.158 .079
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.194 .276 .000 -.014
251
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.089 .000 .000 -.085
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.346 .000 .528 .022
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.570 .000 .470 -.006
Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.023 .011 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .066 .027 .045 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .004 .004 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000
ADM
Y -.008 -.010 -.013 .024 ■-.034 -.066 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.012 .006 .002 -.003 .006 .086 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV -.001 -.001 -.001 -.007 ■-.002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .097 .040 .067 .011 .182 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .107 .043 .073 -.003 .199 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident pp PC
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.055 .033 .008 .000 000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .101 .049 .053 .000 000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
252
PDM
Y .018 .026 .016 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.007 -.011 -.008 .008 -.031 -.044 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.016 .009 .002 -.001 .008 .084 .000 .000 .000
AV -.002 -.002 -.001 -.008 -.005 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .054 .027 .028 .002 .108 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .047 .023 .025 -.001 .094 .000 .000 .000 .000
M odification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (Group number I - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
OP <—> ODMY 25.066 .000
ORG <—> ODMY 14.158 .000
e5 <—> e4 4.175 .000
el <—> e4 8.518 .000
el <—> e5 36.124 .000
resl <—> e5 4.356 .000
resl <—> el 4.545 .000
e6 <—> e7 6.031 .000
e8 <—> ORG 4.168 .000
e8 <—> e7 5.219 .000
e8 <—> e6 9.960 .000
e l l <—> e4 20.916 .000
el2 <—> e4 27.113 .000
el2 <—> e l l 10.230 .000
e9 <—> el2 5.927 .000









Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SV <— SI 7.999 .176
SDMY <— SV 4.062 -.595
SDMY <— SI 33.924 -.832
SI <— SV 8.287 .751
SI <— SDMY 23.943 -.444
PP <— PC 5.787 .186
PP < — PDMY 5.914 -.594
PC <— PP 5.375 .475
PC <— PDMY 9.485 -1.242
PDMY <— ORG 4.168 .071
PDMY <— PP 4.737 -.143
PDMY <— PC 9.555 -.126
AE3 <— SV 20.523 1.169
AE3 <— AV 10.075 .911
AV <— SV 29.314 .629
AV <— SI 4.475 .119
AV <— AE3 7.999 .156
AE1 <— AV 5.838 -1.430
Model Fit Summary  
CMIN
Model NPAR CMIN DF P
Default model 41 322.441 64 .000
Saturated model 105 .000 0
Independence model 14 433.300 91 .000
RMR, GFI





Default model .000 .631 .394 384
Saturated model .000 1.000
Independence model .000 .521 .447 451
Baseline Comparisons
NFI RFI IFI TLI
Model Delta 1 rhol Delta2 rho2
Default model .256 -.058 .300 -.074
Saturated model 1.000 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .703 .180 .172
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 258.441 206.093 318.317
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 342.300 281.240 410.893
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90














RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE






Independence model .252 .229 .277 .000
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC
Default model 404.441 432.396 490.309 531.309
Saturated model 210.000 281.591 429.906 534.906
Independence model 461.300 470.846 490.621 504.621
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 6.855 5.968 7.870 7.329
Saturated model 3.559 3.559 3.559 4.773



























































APPENDIX N. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV M ODEL B ( p <  0.1)
Analysis Sum m ary  
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 60
Parameter Summary (Group number 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 12 0 0 0 0 12
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 27 4 14 0 0 45
Total 39 4 14 0 0 57
Models
Computation o f  degrees o f freedom (Default model)
Number o f distinct sample moments: 105 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 45
Degrees of freedom (105 - 45): 60
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 139.308 
Degrees o f freedom = 60 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression W eights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <--- ORG .084 .177 .476 .634par_l
SI <— OP .054 .116 .466 .641par_5
SI <— ODMY -.179 .126 -1.421 ,155par_6
SDMY <--- ODMY .294 .211 1.398 . 162par_7
SV <— ODMY -.045 .062 -.732 .464par_22
SV <— OP .034 .057 .598 .550par_30
259
SDMY <— OP .045 .167 .271 .786par 31
PDMY <— SDMY .010 .049 .198 ,843par_2
PC <— SDMY .123 .094 1.308 .191par_3
PP <— SI .161 .110 1.470 . 142par_9
PDMY <--- SI -.007 .053 -.135 .893par_10
PDMY <— SV .075 .065 1.161 .246par_l 3
PP <— SDMY .012 .097 .120 .904par_14
AE1 <— PDMY -.062 1.358 -.045 ,964par_4
AE2 <— PDMY .196 1.047 .187 .851par_8
AE3 <— PDMY -.052 .472 -.110 .912par_l 1
AV <— PDMY l U> 00 .209 -.662 ,508par_12
AE1 <— PC 1.627 .431 3.777 ***par_15
AE2 <— PC 1.463 .334 4.381 ***par_16
AE3 <— PP .532 .240 2.221 .026par_17
AE1 <— Accident -1.130 .174 -6.502 ***par_18
AE2 <— Accident -.550 .160 -3.430 ***par_19
AE3 <— Accident -.134 .084 -1.585 . 113par_20
AV <— Accident -.026 .038 -.687 ,492par_21
ADMY <— PC -.283 .243 -1.167 ,243par_23
ADMY <— PDMY .450 .775 .580 .562par 24
ADMY <— Accident 1.000
ADMY <— PP -.411 .264 -1.555 . 120par_29
Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.045 .034 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
?rDM .294 .045 .084 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
260
SI -.179 .054 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
pp -.025 .009 .001 .000 .012 .161 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .036 .006 .010 .000 .123 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .001 .003 .001 .075 .010 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .001 -.004 -.003 .034 -.035 -.070 1.000 -.411 -.283 .450
AE3 -.014 .005 .000 -.004 .006 .086 -.134 .532 .000 -.052
AV .000 .000 .000 -.010 -.001 .001 -.026 .000 .000 < 00
AE2 .053 .009 .015 .015 .182 -.001 -.550 .000 1.463 .196
AE1 .059 .009 .017 -.005 .199 .000 -1.130 .000 1.627 -.062
Standardized Total Effects (Group number I - Default model)
ODM
Y OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.134 .109 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .369 .062 .073 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.253 .083 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.070 .028 .002 .000 .026 .313 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .062 .010 .012 .000 .168 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .004 .015 .003 .136 .041 -.027 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .001 -.004 -.002 .011 -.027 -.047 .970 -.142 -.156 .079
AE3 -.019 .007 .000 -.002 .006 .087 -.194 .275 .000 -.014
AV .000 -.001 .000 -.012 -.004 .002 -.089 .000 .000 -.086
AE2 .033 .006 .007 .003 .090 -.001 -.348 .000 .528 .023
AE1 .029 .005 .006 -.001 .078 .000 -.570 .000 .468 -.006
261
Direct Effects (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.045 .034 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .294 .045 .084 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.179 .054 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .161 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .123 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .075 .010 -.007 .000 .000
.000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 -.411 -.283
.450
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.134 .532 .000 -.052
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.026 .000 .000 -.138
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.550 .000 1.463 .196
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.130 .000 1.627 -.062
Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident pp PC PDMY
SV -.134 .109 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .369 .062 .073 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.253 .083 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .026 .313 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .168 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .136 .041 -.027 .000
.000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .970
-.142 -.156 .079
262
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)

























.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
-.025 .009 .001 .000 .000 .000







Y .001 .003 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .001 -.004
i © o U) .034 -.035 -.070 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.014 .005 .000 -.004 .006 .086 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .000 .000 -.010 -.001 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .053 .009 .015 .015 .182 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .059 .009 .017 -.005 .199 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)






.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.070 .028 .002 .000 .000 .000
Y
000 .000.000 .000






PC .062 .010 .012 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .004 .015 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .001 -.004 -.002 .011 -.027 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.019 .007 .000 -.002 .006 .087 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 -.001 .000 -.012 -.004 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .033 .006 .007 .003 .090 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .029 .005 .006 -.001 .078 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
a A i 1 V e4 20.916 .000
el 2 <--> e4 27.113 .000
el2  <--> e l l 10.230 .000
e9 <--> el2 5.927 .000
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SV <— SDMY 5.061 -.121
< A 1 I 1 SI 7.655 .168
(11VCLCL PC 5.861 .188
PP <— PDMY 5.853 -.588
AE3 <— SV 20.017 1.140
AE3 <— AV 10.074 .911
i1IV>< SV 28.590 .614
> < A 1 1 1 SI 4.283 .114
264
AV <— AE3 8.002 .156
AE1 <— AV 5.837 -1.430
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF
Default model 45 139.308 60 .000 2.322
Saturated model 105 .000 0
Independence model 14 433.300 91 .000 4.762
RMR, GFI
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI
Default model .000 .750 .563 .429
Saturated model .000 1.000











Default model .678 .512 .788 .649 .768
Saturated model 1.000 1.000 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted M easures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .659 .447 .507
Saturated model .000 .000 .000











Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 342.300 281.240 410.893
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 2.361 1.344 .826 1.994
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 7.344 5.802 4.767 6.964
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .150 .117 .182 .000
Independence model .252 .229 .277 .000
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC
Default model 229.308 259.990 323.554 368.554
Saturated model 210.000 281.591 429.906 534.906
Independence model 461.300 470.846 490.621 504.621
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 3.887 3.368 4.536 4.407
Saturated model 3.559 3.559 3.559 4.773

































APPENDIX O. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV M ODEL C (p < 0.1)
Analysis Summary 
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 60
Parameter Summary (Group number 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 12 0 0 0 0 12
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 26 4 14 0 0 44
Total 38 4 14 0 0 56
Models
Computation o f  degrees o f freedom (Default model)
Number o f distinct sample moments: 105 
Number o f distinct parameters to be estimated: 44
Degrees o f freedom (105 - 44): 61
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 139.735 
Degrees o f freedom = 61 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <--- ORG .084 .177 .476 ,634par 1
SI <— OP .054 .116 .466 .641par_5
SI <— ODMY -.179 .126 -1.421 .155par_6
SDMY <--- ODMY .294 .211 1.398 .162 par 7
SV <— ODMY -.072 .043 -1.678 .093par_22
SDMY <--- OP .045 .167 .271 .786par_30
269
PDMY < - SDMY .010 .049 .198 .843par_2
PC <— SDMY .123 .094 1.308 .191 p a r 3
PP <— SI .161 .110 1.470 . 142par_9
PDMY <--- SI -.007 .053 -.135 .893par_10
PDMY <— SV .075 .065 1.162 .245par_13
PP <— SDMY .012 .097 .120 ,904par_14
AE1 <— PDMY -.062 1.358 -.045 .964par_4
AE2 <— PDMY .196 1.047 .187 .851par_8
AE3 <— PDMY -.052 .472 -.110 .912par_l 1
AV <— PDMY -.138 .209 -.662 .508par_12
AE1 <— PC 1.627 .431 3.777 ***par_15
AE2 <— PC 1.463 .334 4.381 ***par_16
AE3 <— PP .532 .240 2.220 ,026par_17
AE1 <— Accident -1.130 .174 -6.502 ***par_18
AE2 <— Accident -.550 .160 -3.430 ***par_19
AE3 <— Accident -.134 .084 -1.585 . 113par_20
AV <— Accident -.026 .038 -.687 .492par_21
ADMY <— PC -.283 .243 -1.167 .243par_23
ADMY <— PDMY .450 .775 .580 .562par_24
ADMY <— Accident 1.000
ADMY <— PP -.411 .264 -1.555 . 120par_29
Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OP ORG SVSDMY SI Accident
PP PCPDMY
SV -.072 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .294 .045 .084
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.179 .054 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
270
PP -.025 .009 .001 .000 .012 .161 .000 .000 .000 .000





-.001 .000 .001 .075 .010 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 -.005 -.003 .034 -.035 -.070 1.000 -.411 -.283 .450
AE3 -.013 .005 .000 -.004 .006 .086 -.134 .532 .000 -.052
AV .000 .000 .000 -.010 -.001 .001 -.026 .000 .000 -.138
AE2 .053 .008 .015 .015 .182 -.001 -.550 .000 1.463 .196
AE1 .059 .009 .017 -.005 .199 .000 -1.130 .000 1.627 -.062
Standardized Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.213 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .369 .062 .073 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.253 .083 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.070 .028 .002 .000 .026 .313 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .062 .010 .012 .000 .168 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.007 .000 .003 .137 .041 -.027 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 -.006 -.002 .011 -.027 -.047 .970 -.142 -.156
.079
AE3 -.019 .008 .000 -.002 .006 .087 -.194 .275 .000 -.014
AV .001 .000 .000 -.012 -.004 .002 -.089 .000 .000 -.086
AE2 .033 .005 .007 .003 .090 -.001 -.348 .000 .528 .023
AE1 .029 .005 .006 -.001 .078 .000 -.570 .000 .468 -.006
Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)





-.072 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.294 .045 .084 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.179 .054 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .012 .161 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .123 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .075 .010 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 -.411 -.283 .450
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.134 .532 .000 -.052
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.026 .000 .000 -.138
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.550 .000 1.463 .196
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.130 .000 1.627 -.062
Standardized Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.213 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .369 .062 .073 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000
SI -.253 .083 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 .026 .313 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 .168 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .137 .041 -.027 .000 .000 .000
.000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .970 -.142 -.156
.079
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.194 .275 .000 -.014
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.089 .000 .000 -.086
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.348 .000 .528 .023
272
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI
-.570 .000 .468 -.006
Accident PP PC PDM
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.025 .009 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .036 .006 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.001 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 -.005 -.003 .034 -.035 -.070 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.013 .005 .000 -.004 .006 .086 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .000 .000 -.010 -.001 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .053 .008 .015 .015 .182 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .059 .009 .017 -.005 .199 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.070 .028 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .062 .010 .012 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM




Y .000 ■-.006 -.002 .011 -.027 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.019 .008 .000 -.002 .006 .087 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .001 .000 .000 -.012 -.004 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .033 .005 .007 .003 .090 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .029 .005 .006 -.001 .078 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Modification Indices (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
Covariances: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
e ll <—> e4 20.401 .000
el2 <—> e4 27.239 .000
el2 <—> e ll 10.230 .000
e9 <—> el2 5.927 .000
Variances: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
Regression Weights: (Group num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SV < — SDMY 5.042 -.121
SV < — SI 7.828 .171
PP < — PC 5.861 .188
PP < — PDMY 5.852 -.588
AE3 < — SV 19.987 1.139
AE3 < — AV 10.074 .911
AV < — SV 28.548 .613
AV < — SI 4.283 .114
AV < — AE3 8.002 .156
AE1 < — AV 5.837 -1.430
274
Model Fit Sum m ary 
CMIN
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF
Default model 44 139.735 61 .000 2.291
Saturated model 105 .000 0
Independence model 14 433.300 91 .000 4.762
RM R, GFI
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI
Default model .000 749 .569 .435
Saturated model .000 1.000
Independence model .000 521 .447 .451
Baseline Comparisons
NFI RFI IFI TLI
Model Deltal rhol Delta2 rho2 CFI
Default model .678 .519 .789 .657 .770
Saturated model 1.000 1.000 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsim ony-Adjusted M easures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .670 .454 .516
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 78.735 48.147 117.045
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 342.300 281.240 410.893
275
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 2.368 1.334 .816 1.984
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 7.344 5.802 4.767 6.964
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .148 .116 .180 .000
Independence model .252 .229 .277 .000
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC
Default model 227.735 257.735 319.886 363.886
Saturated model 210.000 281.591 429.906 534.906
Independence model 461.300 470.846 490.621 504.621
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 3.860 3.341 4.509 4.368
Saturated model 3.559 3.559 3.559 4.773





Default model 34 38























APPENDIX P. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL W ITH MAV
DATA A (p  < 0.05)
Analysis Summ ary 
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 203
Param eter Sum m ary (G roup num ber 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 12 0 0 0 0 12
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 24 0 14 0 0 38
Total 36 0 14 0 0 50
Models
Com putation of degrees of freedom (Default model)
Number of distinct sample moments: 105 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 38
Degrees of freedom (105 -38): 67
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 701.235 
Degrees of freedom = 67 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression Weights: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <— ORG .046 .061 .749 .454par_l
SI <— OP .091 .063 1.445 .148par_5
SI <— ODMY -.054 .062 -.878 ,380par 6
SDMY <--- ODMY .067 .065 1.032 .302par_7
279
SV <— ODMY -.024 .019 -1.251 .21 lpar_22
PDMY <— SDMY .034 .018 1.905 ,057par_2
PC <— SDMY -.031 .048 -.647 .518par_3
PP <— SI -.015 .022 -.690 .490par_9
PDMY <— SI .025 .018 1.373 ,170par_10
PDMY < - SV .012 .061 .194 .846par 13
PP <— SDMY -.084 .021 -3.991 ***par 14
AE1 <— PDMY .295 .613 .481 .630par_4
AE2 <— PDMY .073 .395 .186 .853par_8
AE3 <— PDMY -.455 .221 -2.056 .040par_l 1
AV <— PDMY -.162 .161 -1.002 .316par_12
AE1 <— PC .643 .227 2.838 ,005par_15
AE2 <— PC .609 .147 4.148 ***par_16
AE3 < — PP -.296 .180 -1.643 .lOOparl 7
AE1 <— Accident -1.100 .096 -11.432 ***par_l 8
AE2 < — Accident -.290 .077 -3.769 ***par_19
AE3 < — Accident -.098 .044 -2.225 .026par_20
AV <— Accident -.057 .032 -1.778 .075par_21
ADMY <— PC -.281 .127 -2.201 ,028par_23
ADMY <— PDMY .243 .349 .695 .487par_24
ADMY <— Accident 1.000
Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PD1
SV -.024 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 J
SDM
Y .067 .000 .046 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 J
SI -.054 .091 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 J
2 8 0
PP -.005 -.001 -.004 .000 -.084 -.015 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.002 .000 -.001 .000 -.031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .001 .002 .002 .012 .034 .025 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .001 .001 .001 .003 .017 .006 1.000 .000 -.281 .243
AE3 .001 -.001 .000 -.005 .009 -.007 -.098 -.296 .000 -.455
AV .000 .000 .000 -.002 -.005 -.004 -.057 .000 .000 -.162
AE2 -.001 .000 -.001 .001 -.016 .002 -.290 .000 .609 .073
AE1 -.001 .001 .000 .003 -.010 .007 -1.100 .000 .643 .295
Standardized Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.088 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .072 .000 .053 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.061 .101 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.017 -.005 -.014 .000 -.270 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.003 .000 -.002 .000 -.045 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .003 .010 .007 .013 .132 .095 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .001 .000 .001 .001 .013 .005 .987 .000 -.150 .048
AE3 .002 -.001 .001 -.002 .012 -.008 -.152 -.113 .000 -.142
AV .000 -.001 .000 -.001 -.009 -.007 -.124 .000 .000 -.070
AE2 -.001 .000 -.001 .000 -.011 .001 -.246 .000 .280 .013
AE1 -.001 .000 .000 .000 -.004 .003 -.614 .000 .194 .033
Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY 







Y .067 .000 .046 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.054 .091 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 -.084 -.015 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 -.031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .012 .034 .025 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 -.281 .243
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.098 -.296 .000 -.455
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.057 .000 .000 -.162
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.290 .000 .609 .073
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.100 .000 .643 .295
Standardized Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.088 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .072 .000 .053 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.061 .101 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 -.270 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 -.045 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .013 .132 .095 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .987 .000 -.150 .048
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.152 -.113 .000 -.142
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.124 .000 .000 -.070
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.246 .000 .280 .013
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.614 .000 .194 .033
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Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.005 -.001 -.004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.002 .000 -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .001 .002 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .001 .001 .001 .003 .017 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 .001 -.001 .000 -.005 .009 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .000 .000 -.002 -.005 -.004 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.001 .000 -.001 .001 -.016 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 -.001 .001 .000 .003 -.010 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.017 -.005 -.014 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.003 .000 -.002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .003 .010 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .001 .000 .001 .001 .013 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000
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AE3 .002 -.001 .001 -.002 .012 -.008 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 -.001 .000 -.001 -.009 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.001 .000 -.001 .000 -.011 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 -.001 .000 .000 .000 -.004 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000
Modification Indices (G roup num ber 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
OP <—> ODMY 82.267 .000
ORG <—> ODMY 89.027 .000
e5 <—> e4 10.195 .000
el <—> e5 86.701 .000
resl <—> ODMY 38.837 .000
resl <—> OP 11.350 .000
resl <—> ORG 30.634 .000
e6 <—> ORG 8.185 .000
e8 <—> ODMY 9.896 .000
e8 <—> ORG 11.093 .000
e8 <—> e l 25.913 .000
e8 <—> e6 56.426 .000
e ll <—> e6 12.712 .000
elO <—> OP 4.518 .000
elO <—> e4 4.165 .000
e9 <—> el 4.678 .000
e9 <—> e ll 6.211 .000
e9 <—> elO 13.739 .000
Variances: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model) 
M.I. Par Change
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Regression Weights: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SV <— SDMY 10.670 -.067
SDMY <— SV 10.116 -.763
SDMY <— SI 88.532 -.687
SI <— SDMY 84.499 -.616
Accident <— ODMY 38.837 -.511
Accident <— OP 11.350 .281
Accident <— ORG 30.634 .430
PP <— PDMY 25.456 -.415
PC <— ORG 8.185 -.120
PC <— PDMY 54.747 -1.396
PDMY <— ODMY 9.896 -.051
PDMY <— ORG 11.093 .051
PDMY <— PP 23.969 -.280
PDMY <— PC 56.309 -.194
ADMY <— ODMY 28.652 -.331
ADMY <— OP 7.487 .172
ADMY <— ORG 17.557 .245
AE3 <— PC 12.368 .286
AE3 <— AE2 7.379 .102
AE2 <— OP 4.518 .194
AE2 <— SV 4.558 .711
AE2 <— AE1 8.018 -.122
AE1 <— SI 4.600 .272
AE1 <— AE3 6.457 -.380
AE1 <— AE2 11.830 -.281
285
Model Fit Sum m ary 
CMIN
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF
Default model 38 701.235 67 .000 10.466
Saturated model 105 .000 0
Independence model 14 885.280 91 .000 9.728
RMR, GFI
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI
Default model .000 .713 .550 .455
Saturated model .000 1.000









Default model .208 -.076 .225 -.085 .201
Saturated model 1.000 1 .0 0 0 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted M easures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .736 .153 .148
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 634.235 552.911 723.006
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 794.280 702.634 893.374
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FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 3.471 3.140 2.737 3.579
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 4.383 3.932 3.478 4.423
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .216 .202 .231 .000
Independence model .208 .196 .220 .000
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC
Default model 777.235 783.331 903.137 941.137
Saturated model 210.000 226.845 557.887 662.887
Independence model 913.280 915.526 959.665 973.665
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 3.848 3.445 4.287 3.878
Saturated model 1.040 1.040 1.040 1.123
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APPENDIX Q. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV M ODEL W ITH MAV
DATA B (p < 0.05)
Analysis Summ ary 
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 203
Param eter Sum m ary (G roup num ber 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 12 0 0 0 0 12
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 24 4 14 0 0 42
Total 36 4 14 0 0 54
Models
Default model (Default model)
Notes for Model (Default model)
Com putation of degrees of freedom (Default model)
Number of distinct sample moments: 105
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 42
Degrees of freedom (105 - 42): 63
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 238.399 
Degrees of freedom = 63 
Probability level = .000
Group num ber 1 (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
Estimates (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
Scalar Estimates (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression Weights: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E.





SI < — O D M Y
SD M Y  <— O DM Y
SV <— O DM Y
PD M Y  <--- SD M Y
PC <— SD M Y
PP <— SI
PD M Y  <— SI
PD M Y  <--- SV
PP <— SD M Y
AE1 <— PDM Y
AE2 < — PD M Y
AE3 <— PD M Y
AV <— PD M Y
AE1 <— PC
AE2 < — PC
AE3 <— PP
AE1 <— A ccident
AE2 <— A ccident
AE3 <— Accident
A V < — Accident
A D M Y  < — PC
A D M Y  <— PD M Y
A D M Y  <— Accident
Total Effects (G roup num ber I - Default model) 
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY 
SV -.024 .000 .000 .000 .000
.005 .062 .074 .941 par 5
i o 00 .075 -1.445 .148par_6
.126 .080 1.576 . 115par_7
-.024 .020 -1.194 .232par_22
.037 .022 1.667 .095par_2
-.031 .048 -.651 .515par 3
-.015 .029 -.516 .606par_9
.027 .021 1.285 .199par_10
.042 .051 .823 .41 lpar_13
-.084 .028 -2.998 .003par_14
.295 .725 .407 .684par_4
.073 .468 .157 .875par_8
-.455 .223 -2.045 .041par_l 1
-.162 .162 -.996 .319par_12
.643 .267 2.408 .016par_l 5
.609 .173 3.519 ***par_16
-.296 .181 -1.631 .103par_17
1.100 .096 -11.432 ***par_18
-.290 .077 -3.769 ***par_19
-.098 .044 -2.225 .026par_20
t o .032 -1.778 .075par_21
-.281 .150 -1.867 .062par_23
.243 .412 .589 .556par_24
1 . 0 0 0
SI Accident PP PC PDMY
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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Y .126 .000 .131 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.108 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.009 .000 -.011 .000 -.084 -.015 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.004 .000 -.004 .000 -.031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDMY .001 .000 .005 .042 .037 .027 .000 .000 .000 .000
Y ° M .001 .000 .002 .010 .018 .007 1.000 .000 -.281 .243
AE3 .002 .000 .001 -.019 .008 -.008 -.098 -.296 .000 -.455
AV .000 .000 -.001 -.007 -.006 -.004 -.057 .000 .000 -.162
AE2 -.002 .000 -.002 .003 -.016 .002 -.290 .000 .609 .073
AE1 -.002 .000 -.001 .012 -.009 .008 -1.100 .000 .643 .295
Standardized Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY 
SV -.084 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Y°M .130 .000 .149 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.117 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.030 .000 -.041 .000 -.274 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.006 .000 -.007 .000 -.046 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -003 -001 -022 -049 -146 .102 .000 .000 .000 .000
Y ° M .001 .000 .002 .002 .014 .005 .984 .000 -.149 .048
AE3 .003 .000 .001 -.007 .010 -.009 -.152 -.112 .000 -.142
AV .000 .000 -.002 -.003 -.010 -.007 -.124 .000 .000 -.070
AE2 -.002 .000 -.002 .001 -.011 .001 -.247 .000 .280 .013
AE1 -.001 .000 -.001 .002 -.004 .003 -.617 .000 .195 .033
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Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI
-.024 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000SV
SDM
Y .126 .000 .131 .000 .000 .000
Accident PP PC PDMY
.000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.108 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 -.084 -.015 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 -.031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .042 .037 .027 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1 .000 .000 -.281 .243
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.098 -.296 .000 -.455
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.057 .000 .000 -.162
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.290 .000 .609 .073
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.100 .000 .643 .295
Standardized Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.084 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .130 .000 .149 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.117 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 -.274 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 -.046 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .049 .146 .102 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .984 .000 -.149 .048
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.152 -.112 .000 -.142
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AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.124 .000 .000 -.070
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.247 .000 .280 .013
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.617 .000 .195 .033
Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model) 
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDM
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.009 .000 -.011 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.004 .000 -.004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .001 .000 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .001 .000 .002 .010 .018 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 .002 .000 .001 -.019 .008 -.008 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .000 -.001 -.007 -.006 -.004 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.002 .000 -.002 .003 -.016 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 -.002 .000 -.001 .012 -.009 .008 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDM
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP -.030 .000 -.041 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC -.006 .000 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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PDM
Y .003 .001 .022 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .001 .000 .002 .002 .014 .005 .000 .000 .000
AE3 .003 .000 .001 -.007 .010 -.009 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .000 -.002 -.003 -.010 -.007 .000 .000 .000
AE2 -.002 .000 -.002 .001 -.011 .001 .000 .000 .000
AE1 -.001 .000 -.001 .002 -.004 .003 .000 .000 .000
Modification Indices (G roup num ber 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
e5 <—> e4 11.841 .000
resl <—> ODMY 4.716 .000
e6 <—> e7 5.315 .000
e8 <--> e7 30.072 .000
e ll <—> e6 16.624 .000
elO <—> e4 4.165 .000
e9 <—> e ll 6.211 .000
e9 <—> elO 13.739 .000
Variances: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
Regression Weights: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SV <— SDMY 10.536 -.066
SDMY <— SV 11.758 -.612
Accident <— ODMY 42.614 -.561
Accident <— OP 11.350 .281




















































NPAR CMIN DF P
42 238.399 63 .000
105 .000 0
14 885.280 91 .000
RMR GFI AGFI PGFI
.000 .867 .778 .520





Independence model .000 639 .583 .554
Baseline Com parisons
NFI RFI IFI TLI
Model Delta 1 rhol Delta2 rho2
Default model .731 .611 .787 .681
Saturated model 1 .0 0 0 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted M easures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .692 .506 .539
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1 .000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 175.399 131.815 226.560
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 794.280 702.634 893.374
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 1.180 .868 .653 1.122
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 4.383 3.932 3.478 4.423
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .117 .102 .133 .000
Independence model .208 .196 .220 .000
CFI
.779




Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC
Default model 322.399 329.137 461 .553 503.553
Saturated model 210.000 226.845 557.887 662.887
Independence model 913.280 915.526 959.665 973.665
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 1.596 1.380 1.849 1.629
Saturated model 1.040 1.040 1.040 1.123













































































APPENDIX R. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL W ITH MAV
DATA A ( p <  0.1)
Analysis Sum m ary 
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 203
Param eter Sum m ary (G roup num ber 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 12 0 0 0 0 12
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 27 0 14 0 0 41
Total 39 0 14 0 0 53
Models
Default model (Default model)
Notes for Model (Default model)
Com putation o f degrees of freedom (Default model)
Number of distinct sample moments: 105
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 41




Degrees of freedom = 64
Probability level = .000
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression Weights: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY < - ORG -.069 .060 -1.149 .251par_l
SI OP .091 .063 1.445 .148par_5
SI <— ODMY -.054 .062 -.878 .380par_6
SDMY < - ODMY -.164 .064 -2.578 .010par_7
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SV <— ODMY -.004 .019 -.239 .81 lpar_22
SV <— OP .031 .019 1.594 .11 lpar_26
SDMY <— OP -.240 .065 -3.695 ***par_27
PDMY <— SDMY .034 .017 1.966 .049par_2
PC <— SDMY -.031 .047 -.668 .504par_3
PP <— SI -.015 .022 -.689 .491par_9
PDMY <— SI .025 .018 1.373 .170par_10
PDMY <— SV .012 .061 .193 ,847par_13
PP <— SDMY -.084 .020 -4.121 ***par_14
AE1 <— PDMY .293 .612 .479 .632par_4
AE2 <— PDMY .073 .395 .186 .853par_8
AE3 <— PDMY -.460 .221 -2.076 .038par_l 1
AV <— PDMY -.162 .161 -1.003 .316par_12
AE1 <— PC .642 .226 2.834 .005par_l 5
AE2 <— PC .609 .147 4.148 ***par_16
AE3 <— PP -.306 .181 -1.691 .091par_17
AE1 <— Accident -1.102 .096 -11.471 ***par_l8
AE2 <— Accident -.288 .077 -3.743 ***par_19
AE3 <— Accident -.099 .044 -2.245 .025par_20
AV <— Accident -.058 .032 -1.808 .071par_21
ADMY <— PC -.271 .128 -2.125 .034par_23
ADMY <— PDMY .302 .349 .865 .387par_24
ADMY <— Accident 1.000
ADMY <— PP .103 .218 .474 ,635par_25
Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
OD1^  OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.004 .031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.164 -.240 -.069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.054 .091 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .015 .019 .006 .000 -.084 -.015 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .005 .007 .002 .000 -.031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.007 -.005 -.002 .012 .034 .025 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.002 -.002 -.001 .004 .010 .006 1.000 .103 -.271 .302
AE3 -.001 -.003 -.001 -.005 .010 -.007 -.099 -.306 .000 -.460
AV .001 .001 .000 -.002 -.005 -.004 -.058 .000 .000 -.162
AE2 .003 .004 .001 .001 -.016 .002 -.288 .000 .609 .073
AE1 .001 .003 .001 .003 -.010 .007 -1.102 .000 .642 .293
Standardized Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.017 .111 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.172 -.247 -.077 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.061 .101 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .051 .064 .021 .000 -.278 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .008 .012 .004 .000 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.030 -.023 -.010 .013 .136 .095 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.002 -.001 -.001 .001 .008 .005 .987 .025 -.145 .060
AE3 -.002 -.004 -.001 -.002 .013 -.008 -.153 -.116 .000 -.144
AV .002 .002 .001 -.001 -.010 -.007 -.126 .000 .000 -.070
AE2 .002 .003 .001 .000 -.011 .001 -.245 .000 .280 .013
303
AE1 .001 .002 .000 .000 -.005 .003 -.616 .000 .194 .033
Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.004 .031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.164 -.240 -.069 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.054 .091 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 -.084 -.015 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 -.031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .012 .034 .025 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .103 -.271 .302
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.099 -.306 .000 -.460
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.058 .000 .000 -.162
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.288 .000 .609 .073
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.102 .000 .642 .293
Standardized Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODM
Y OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.017 .111 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.172 -.247 -.077 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.061 .101 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 -.278 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .013 .136 .095 .000 .000 .000 .000
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ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .987 .025 -.145 .060
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.153 -.116 .000 -.144
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.126 .000 .000 -.070
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.245 .000 .280 .013
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.616 .000 .194 .033
Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .015 .019 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .005 .007 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.007 -.005 -.002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.002 -.002 -.001 .004 .010 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.001 -.003 -.001 -.005 .010 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .001 .001 .000 -.002 -.005 -.004 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .003 .004 .001 .001 -.016 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .001 .003 .001 .003 -.010 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
PDMOP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC ^
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000





PP .051 .064 .021 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .008 .012 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.030 -.023 -.010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.002 -.001
■ o o .001 .008 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 -.002 -.004 -.001 -.002 .013 -.008 .000 .000 .000 .000
AY .002 .002 .001 -.001 -.010 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .002 .003 .001 .000 -.011 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .001 .002 .000 .000 -.005 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000
Modification Indices (G roup num ber 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
OP <—> ODMY 82.267 .000
ORG <—> ODMY 89.027 .000
e5 <—> e4 10.424 .000
el <—> e5 85.393 .000
resl <—> ODMY 38.787 .000
resl <—> OP 11.335 .000
resl <—> ORG 30.541 .000
e6 <—> ORG 8.185 .000
e8 <—> ODMY 9.896 .000
e8 <—> ORG 11.093 .000
e8 <—> e7 25.913 .000
e8 <—> e6 56.426 .000
e ll <—> e6 12.654 .000
elO <—> OP 4.487 .000
e9 <—> el 4.512 .000
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e9 < ->  e l l  6.295 .000
e9 < ->  elO 13.665 .000
Variances: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change













































AE2 <— AE1 7.955 -.121
AE1 < -- SI 4.440 .267
AE1 <— AE3 6.409 -.378
AE1 <— AE2 11.776 -.280
Model Fit Sum m ary 
CMIN
Model NPAR CMIN DF P
Default model 41 693.587 64 .000
Saturated model 105 .000 0
Independence model 14 885.280 91 .000
RM R, GFI
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI
Default model .000 .715 .533 .436
Saturated model .000 1.000









Default model .217 -.114 .233
Saturated model 1.000 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted M easures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .703 .152 .146
Saturated model .000 .000 .000











Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 629.587 548.656 717.965
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 794.280 702.634 893.374
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 3.434 3.117 2.716 3.554
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 4.383 3.932 3.478 4.423
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .221 .206 .236 .000
Independence model .208 .196 .220 .000
AIC
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC
Default model 775.587 782.165 911.428 952.428
Saturated model 210.000 226.845 557.887 662.887
Independence model 913.280 915.526 959.665 973.665
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 3.840 3.439 4.277 3.872
Saturated model 1.040 1.040 1.040 1.123






Default model 25 28
Independence model 27 29
UAV model with MAV data



















































.29 -16 3061.00 .00
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p  = .0 0 0
resl
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APPENDIX S. PATH ANALYSIS OUTPUT OF UAV MODEL W ITH MAV
DATA B (p< 0.1)
Analysis Sum m ary 
The model is recursive.
Sample size = 203
Param eter Sum m ary (G roup num ber 1)
Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total
Fixed 12 0 0 0 0 12
Labeled 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlabeled 27 4 14 0 0 45
Total 39 4 14 0 0 57
Models
Com putation of degrees of freedom (Default model)
Number of distinct sample moments: 105 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 45
Degrees of freedom (105 - 45): 60
Result (Default model)
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 233.737 
Degrees of freedom = 60 
Probability level = .000 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Regression Weights: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
Estimate S.E. C.R. PLabel
SDMY <— ORG .081 .070 1.158 .247par_l
SI <— OP .091 .078 1.172 .241par_5
SI <— ODMY -.054 .080 -.680 ,497par6
SDMY <— ODMY -.010 .110 -.088 ,930par_7
SV <— ODMY -.004 .024
o->00r .854par_22
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SV <— OP .031 .024 1.292 .196par_30
SDMY <— OP -.161 .090 -1.780 .075par_31
PDMY <— SDMY .037 .022 1.668 .095par_2
PC <— SDMY -.031 .048 -.651 .515par_3
PP <— SI -.015 .029 -.517 .605par_9
PDMY <— SI .027 .021 1.287 .198par_10
PDMY <— SV .042 .051 .823 .41 lpar_13
PP <— SDMY -.084 .028 -3.001 .003par_14
AE1 <— PDMY .293 .725 .404 .686par_4
AE2 <— PDMY .073 .468 .157 .875par_8
AE3 <— PDMY -.460 .223 -2.065 .039par_l 1
AV <— PDMY -.162 .162 -.996 .319par_12
AE1 <— PC .642 .267 2.403 ,016par_15
AE2 <— PC .609 .173 3.519 ***par_16
AE3 <— PP -.306 .183 -1.674 ,094par_17
AE1 <— Accident -1.102 .096 -11.471 ***par_18
AE2 <— Accident -.288 .077 -3.743 ***par_19
AE3 <— Accident -.099 .044 -2.245 .025par_20
AV <— Accident -.058 .032 -1.808 .071 par_21
ADMY <— PC -.271 .150 -1.802 .072par_23
ADMY <— PDMY .302 .412 .734 .463par_24
ADMY <— Accident 1.000
ADMY <— PP .103 .220 .470 .639par_29
Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
0 D Y o p  ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.004 .031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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SDM
Y -.010 -.161 .081 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.054 .091 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .002 .012 -.007 .000 -.084 -.015 .000 .000 .000 .000





-.002 -.002 .003 .042 .037 .027 .000 .000 .000 .000
-.001 -.001 .001 .013 .011 .007 1.000 .103 -.271 .302
AE3 .000 -.003 .001 -.019 .009 -.008 -.099 -.306 .000 -.460
AV .000 .000 .000 -.007 -.006 -.004 -.058 .000 .000 -.162
AE2 .000 .003 -.001 .003 -.016 .002 -.288 .000 .609 .073
AE1 .000 .003 -.001 .012 -.009 .008 -1.102 .000 .642 .293
Standardized Total Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.016 .111 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.010 -.170 .092 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.058 .101 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .005 .042 -.025 .000 -.274 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .008 -.004 .000 -.046 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.008 -.009 .013 .049 .146 .102 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 -.001 .001 .003 .009 .005 .983 .025 -.144 .059
AE3 .001 -.004 .001 -.007 .011 -.009 -.153 -.115 .000 -.143
AV .001 .001 -.001 -.003 -.010 -.007 -.126 .000 .000 -.070
AE2 .000 .002 -.001 .001 -.011 .001 -.245 .000 .280 .012
AE1 .000 .001 .000 .002 -.004 .003 -.618 .000 .195 .033
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Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.004 .031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.010 -.161 .081 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.054 .091 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 -.084 -.015 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 -.031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .042 .037 .027 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .103 -.271 .302
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.099 -.306 .000 -.460
AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.058 .000 .000 -.162
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.288 .000 .609 .073
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -1.102 .000 .642 .293
Standardized Direct Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
SV -.016 .111 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y -.010 -.170 .092 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI -.058 .101 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .000 .000 .000 .000 -.274 -.047 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .000 .000 .000 -.046 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .049 .146 .102 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .983 .025 -.144 .059
AE3 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.153 -.115 .000 -.143
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AV .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.126 .000 .000
AE2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.245 .000 .280
AE1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.618 .000 .195
Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
s v .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .002 .012 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .005 -.003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PDM
Y -.002 -.002 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y -.001 -.001 .001 .013 .011 .007 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 .000 -.003 .001 -.019 .009 -.008 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .000 .000 .000 -.007 -.006 -.004 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .000 .003 -.001 .003 -.016 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .000 .003 -.001 .012 -.009 .008 .000 .000 .000 .000
Standardized Indirect Effects (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
ODMY OP ORG SV SDMY SI Accident PP PC PDMY
s v .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SDM
Y .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
SI .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PP .005 .042 -.025 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
PC .000 .008 -.004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
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PDM
Y -.008 -.009 .013 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADM
Y .000 -.001 .001 .003 .009 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE3 .001 -.004 .001 -.007 .011 -.009 .000 .000 .000 .000
AV .001 .001 -.001 -.003 -.010 -.007 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE2 .000 .002 1 o o .001 -.011 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
AE1 .000 .001 .000 .002 -.004 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000
Modification Indices (G roup num ber 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
e5 <—> e4 12.043 .000
resl <—> ODMY 4.734 .000
e6 <—> e7 5.315 .000
e8 <—> e7 30.072 .000
e ll <—> e6 16.544 .000
e9 <—> e ll 6.295 .000
e9 <—> elO 13.665 .000
Variances: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
Regression Weights: (G roup num ber 1 - Default model)
M.I. Par Change
SV <— SDMY 9.332 -.062
SDMY <— SV 11.866 -.612
Accident <— ODMY 42.559 -.561
Accident <— OP 11.335 .281
Accident <— ORG 30.541 .429
PP <— PDMY 25.751 -.420
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PC <— PP 4.995 -.297
PDMY <— ODMY 9.671 -.045
PDMY <— OP 5.118 .032
PDMY <— ORG 4.638 .028
PDMY <— PP 28.265 -.260
ADMY <— ODMY 31.369 -.363
ADMY <— OP 7.447 .172
ADMY <— ORG 17.477 .245
AE3 <— PC 12.309 .286
AE3 <— AE2 7.371 .102
AE2 <— OP 4.487 .194
AE2 <— SV 4.583 .713
AE2 <— AE1 8.008 -.122
AE1 <— SI 4.411 .265
AE1 <— AE3 6.408 -.377
AE1 <— AE2 11.820 -.281
Model Fit Sum m ary 
CMIN
Model NPAR CMIN DF P
Default model 45 233.737 60 .000
Saturated model 105 .000 0
Independence model 14 885.280 91 .000
RMR, GFI
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI
Default model .000 .870 .772 .497
Saturated model .000 1.000















Default model .736 .600 .789 .668
Saturated model 1.000 1.000
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000
Parsimony-Adjusted M easures
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI
Default model .659 .485 .515
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000
NCP
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90
Default model 173.737 130.512 224.533
Saturated model .000 .000 .000
Independence model 794.280 702.634 893.374
FMIN
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90
Default model 1.157 .860 .646 1.112
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000
Independence model 4.383 3.932 3.478 4.423
RMSEA
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE
Default model .120 .104 .136 .000
Independence model .208 .196 .220 .000
AIC







Default model 323.737 330.956 472.831
Saturated model 210.000 226.845 557.887
Independence model 913.280 915.526 959.665
ECVI
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI
Default model 1.603 1.389 1.854 1.638
Saturated model 1.040 1.040 1.040 1.123





Default model 69 77
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